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“Am I in contradiction with myself?”1
ABSTRACT
Every time the Supreme Court strikes down a law enacted by Congress or a state
legislature the age-old debate over the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”
resurfaces.  Theories of judicial review, new and old, are offered to answer this
tension between constitutionalism and democracy.  But what explains the persis-
tence and contestability of this difficulty?  Why has the existing wealth of schol-
arship failed to resolve this difficulty?  In this Article, I address such questions
while contextualizing “counter-majoritarianism” within larger liberal theoreti-
cal frameworks.  I offer a typology and map the prominent progressive liberal
answers deployed to justify judicial review in constitutional democracies.  This
typology and map fill a gap in the existing literature, which has been largely
preoccupied with advancing positions within the debate rather than assessing it
holistically.  This reconstructive exercise both organizes the field of constitu-
tional theory and identifies the discursive moves and patterns of reasoning used
within the field.  The Article evaluates the similarities and differences between
the different positions.  By mapping these differences and relations, I show that
the supposed distinction between democracy and constitutionalism has been un-
dermined without resolving the underlying tension between these competing val-
ues.  The collapse of the distinction exposes the circular movement of the debate
around the tension.  Ultimately, I conclude, the existing body of literature offers
no satisfying method for assessing whether the ruling in any controversial case
is “counter-majoritarian.”  I suggest that rather than attempting to solve the
difficulty, scholars should recognize its irreconcilability, because only then
would a better understanding of the role of law in society emerge.
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1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250 (J. P. Mayer ed., George Law-
rence trans., Perennial Classics 2000) (1848) (“I regard it as an impious and detestable maxim
that in matters of government the majority of a people has the right to do everything, and
nevertheless I place the origin of all powers in the will of the majority.  Am I in contradiction
with myself?”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. “Counter-Majoritarianism”?
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated parts of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002.2  Put crudely, a small group of unelected, life-tenured judges acted in a
seemingly “counter-majoritarian” fashion by preventing an elected legisla-
ture from imposing limits on campaign spending.  As it had in previous
cases, the Court deployed constitutional rights to restrain the will of contem-
porary popular majorities.3  Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, accused the Court of engaging in judicial activism by “bypassing
or ignoring rules of judicial restraint used to cabin the Court’s lawmaking
power.”4  He further argued that “[i]n a democratic society, the longstand-
ing consensus on the need to limit corporate campaign spending should out-
weigh the wooden application of judge-made rules. . . .  At bottom, the
Court’s opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the American
people . . . .”5  Chief Justice Roberts spurned this charge: He distinguished
“judicial restraint” from “judicial abdication,”6 arguing that the Court had
to redress a governmental violation of fundamental political speech rights.7
Not only progressive judges, however, deploy the charge of “counter-
majoritarianism.”8  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invalidated a Texas anti-
sodomy law.9  But, unlike in Citizens United, in Lawrence, the conservative
2 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
3 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  Specifically, in these cases, the Court has
deployed First Amendment speech rights to justify striking down campaign finance
restrictions.
4 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 Id.
6 See id. at 919 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining why broad constitutional holdings
are sometimes appropriate).
7 Id. at 924–25.
8 In contemporary popular and academic discourse in the United States, “liberal” overlaps
or is synonymous with “progressive,” and is used in opposition to “conservative.”  I use
“progressive” to denote positions that are characteristically associated with left-of-center posi-
tions, such as those supporting social democracy, the welfare-state, or affirmative action for
minority groups.  On the other hand, “conservative” here denotes positions that are associated
with right-of-center positions such as, but not limited to, neo-liberalism.  The content of these
categories is neither stable nor monolithic, because they change over time and include a plural-
ity of positions on a spectrum of issues.  Rather, the distinction between these two camps is
relative and thus has persisted over time.  For the distinction between right and left, see gener-
ally, for example, NORBERTO BOBBIO, LEFT AND RIGHT: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A POLITICAL
DISTINCTION (Allan Cameron trans., 1996).  For a discussion of “progressive” and “conserva-
tive” as constitutional categories see, for example, RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCI-
PLE 181–204 (1985) (opposing liberalism to conservatism); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION [FIN DE SIE`CLE]  46–48 (1997) (using liberal/conservative); Robin West, Pro-
gressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990).  For examples of
progressive scholarship see infra note 20; for examples of conservative scholarship see infra R
note 21. R
9 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
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Justices accused the progressive Justices of activism and counter-majoritari-
anism.  Justice Scalia wrote:
[P]ersuading one’s fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing
one’s views in absence of democratic majority will is something
else. . . .  What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of
traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed
through the invention of a brand-new “constitutional right” by a
Court that is impatient of democratic change.10
Are both Citizens United and Lawrence “counter-majoritarian” rulings?  By
evaluating constitutional scholarship, this Article asks whether the long-run-
ning debate about the so-called “counter-majoritarian difficulty” provides
the intellectual framework to answer this question.11  I suggest that it does
not, because the categories of constitutionalism and democracy are them-
selves too unstable to support the scholarship that builds upon them.
In the United States, the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” is only one
example of a quintessential question standing at the center of political and
constitutional theory and dominating its debates: the tension between consti-
tutionalism and democracy.12  To date, most legal scholarship in this realm
has been preoccupied largely with defending or criticizing controversial
landmark Court rulings such as Citizens United and Lawrence.13  This preoc-
cupation underestimates the tension’s centrality, which derives not only from
the magnitude of the cases in which it comes to light, but also from its
implications for larger discussions concerning the justification of political
regimes. Citizens United and Lawrence embody the broader “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” not because their holdings are controversial, but be-
cause they crystallize the basic problem with the deployment of rights by a
constitutional court to domesticate popular will.
10 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11 The phrase “counter-majoritarian difficulty” was famously dubbed and popularized by
the canonical work of Alexander Bickel. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (2d ed. 1986) (1962).
12 See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS & CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 136 (1995) (“The existence of an irreconcilable ‘tension’ between constitutional-
ism and democracy, in fact, is one of the core premises of modern political thought.”).
13 The literature on judicial review is vast.  For some of the early and important contribu-
tions to this debate, see generally, for example, BICKEL, supra note 11; HENRY STEELE COM- R
MAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1943); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1958); LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913–1938 (Archi-
bald MacLeish & E. F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958
Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959); Eugene V.
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952); Albert
M. Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term—Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96 (1954); James B.
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (1893); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).  For the more recent scholarship that was largely invigorated by
Bickel’s contributions, see discussion infra Part II.
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This problem looms well beyond Citizens United and Lawrence; it
arises in any case in which the Court reviews the validity of laws enacted by
popularly elected assemblies.14  It lies at the base of theories of judicial re-
view, which seek to justify the role of the Court in reaction to the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty.”  Nor is this problem new: Lochner v. New York,15
Brown v. Board of Education,16 Citizens United, and Lawrence all bring
forth this dilemma.
B. Overview of the Argument
This Article goes beyond critiquing the Court’s rulings in specific cases
or articulating a theory of adjudication that reconciles judicial review and
democratic theory.17  Rather, this Article is a discursive analysis of the criti-
ques and theories themselves.18  The Article investigates the tradition of legal
scholarship hitherto produced to justify positions in this long-running de-
14 This problem surfaces in cases involving abortion, contraception, pornography, hate
speech, religion, apportionment, and Congressional authority. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997) (partially invalidating the Communications Decency Act); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act because it violates
the Commerce Clause); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a law
barring cross burning); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating a state law author-
izing school prayers); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating a statute requiring
schools to post the Ten Commandments on classroom walls); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (invalidating criminal abortion laws); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (inval-
idating a law prohibiting teaching evolution theory); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (invalidating statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to married couples); Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (invalidating apportionments of seats in the Alabama legis-
lature and affirming the “one person, one vote” principle).
15 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating limitations on work hours under the notion of freedom
of contract).  I mention Lochner specifically, instead of the “Lochner-era,” because scholars
have recently begun to critically examine whether the whole period was actually a defense of
laissez-faire capitalism.  For a summary and a discussion of this literature see, for example,
Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85
B.U. L. REV. 677 (2005).
16 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in schools under the separate but
equal policy).
17 Among the typical criticisms of the Court rulings, critics charge the Court with making
an anti-democratic choice by inappropriately exercising judicial power against a reasonable
choice by the People and its representatives. See, e.g., supra notes 4–10 and accompanying R
text (discussing quotations from Citizens United and Lawrence).  These critics charge the
Court with exercising flawed reasoning, see, for example, Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating”
Decision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010 (claiming that the Court wrongly applied the First
Amendment to corporations in Citizens United), or they charge the Court with infidelity to the
Framers’ original understanding, see, for example, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s interpretation of “public
use” in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause).
18 By “discursive analysis” I mean an analysis of the discursive formations, such as con-
cepts and argumentative techniques, deployed by scholars to address the tensions at the base of
the constitutional democratic regime.  These discursive elements form a practice of producing
cultural meaning by a community of professional scholars.  I do not seek a coherent idealiza-
tion of these scholarly positions. See discussion of “situated discursive practice” infra note
54.  I limit this analysis to the level of discourse, that is, the phenomenological level. See R
discussion of phenomenological infra note 23. R
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bate.19  Primarily, it examines the persistence of the “counter-majoritarian
difficulty,” especially in light of the remarkable intellectual resources in-
vested in addressing it by highly sophisticated and well-respected scholars.
This Article maps the field of contemporary progressive liberal consti-
tutional theory (“the field”) and offers a typology of its fragmentation.20
Although the dilemma discussed here arises within both the conservative
and progressive camps, I focus solely on the latter and leave assessment of
conservative scholarship for another occasion.21  The general focus on the
progressive/conservative divide obscures the internal disputes within these
opposing camps.  As the discussion of progressive scholarship below seeks
to show, while the scholars at issue belong to the same side of the divide,
they occupy different positions within the field.  This Article’s relatively lim-
ited focus facilitates an accurate understanding of the workings of the field
and prevents myopic analysis.
This mapping reveals a virtual structure of both the debates and the
field that is lost when the field is examined episodically.22  Rather than sup-
19 I focus in the remainder of the Article on legal scholarship published in law reviews and
books rather than on the rhetoric of judges.  Most judicial opinions interact with the facts and
opinions of particular cases or lines of cases, typically avoiding articulation of an overarching
conceptual vision of adjudication beyond “activism” or “restraint.”  The scholarly literature I
critique here attempts to go behind the “activism”/“restraint” debate and instead provide theo-
retical defenses for either side of the debate.  In so doing, this literature brings to a higher
consciousness, and systematically accounts for, views expressed or implied in judicial rulings.
Occasionally, such theories themselves influence judicial decision-making.  At times the jus-
tices themselves write such theoretical accounts outside the Court. See generally STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
20 For an illuminating discussion of the notion of “progressive constitutionalism,” see, for
example, J. M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE
L.J. 1935 (1995); Frank I. Michelman, What (If Anything) Is Progressive-Liberal Democratic
Constitutionalism?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 181 (1999); Louis Michael Seidman, Can Consti-
tutionalism Be Leftist?, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 557 (2008) (discussing MARK TUSHNET, TAK-
ING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000)); Mark Tushnet, What Is
Constitutional About Progressive Constitutionalism?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 19 (1999);
Robin West, Is Progressive Constitutionalism Possible?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (1999);
West, supra note 8, at 678–713. R
21 For an early conservative example of awareness to the tension between rights and de-
mocracy, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 19 (1972) (claiming that the tension can be resolved through an original under-
standing of the constitutional text).  The debate between “originalists” concerning whether
“originalism” mandates or rejects judicial activism offers a recent instantiation of the debate.
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004) (supporting judicial activism on behalf of libertarian causes); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) (rejecting
judicial activism); SCALIA, supra note 19 (rejecting judicial activism); Steven G. Calabresi, R
The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy
Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, supra).  Note, however, that
“originalism” is not necessarily a conservative method: Progressive scholars have also appro-
priated it.  For a recent example, see generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)
(arguing that progressive causes are compatible with the original meaning of the Constitution).
22 The term “structure” in “structuralist” and “post-structuralist” scholarship signifies
recursive patterns of relationships between parts and a larger whole that are reproduced over
time through the interaction between these parts. See, e.g., PETER DEWS, LOGICS OF DISINTE-
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porting a specific position or synthesizing different positions, this Article
searches for such a structure on the phenomenological, discursive level.23  It
identifies and evaluates the primary discursive formations that dominate, de-
fine, and limit the field, including the particular ways in which a specific
group of scholars uses them.  This exercise of identification and evaluation
shows that the apparent richness and complexity of the debate conceals the
debate’s deeper deficiencies and futility.
The body of this Article divides into three parts.  Part II maps the land-
scape of scholarship, presenting a typology of four dominant responses of-
fered by contemporary progressive liberal constitutional theorists to the
tension between constitutionalism and democracy.  Scholars are either (i)
“deniers”—because they deny the tension (e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Bruce
Ackerman, and Frederick Schauer); (ii) “reconcilers”—because they recon-
cile the tension (e.g., John Hart Ely, Cass Sunstein, and Larry Kramer); (iii)
“endorsers”—because they recognize the irreconcilability of the tension yet
endorse it (e.g., Frank Michelman, Louis Seidman, and Laurence Tribe); or
(iv) “dissolvers”—because they dissolve the tension by forgoing judicial
review of the validity of legislation (e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Richard Parker,
and Mark Tushnet).  I refer to the first two groups—both of whom advance
conceptual justifications of constitutional democracies—as the “discourse of
unity.”  In contrast, I refer to the last two groups as the “discourse of dis-
unity” because they reject attempts to unite the conflicting concepts and thus
do not advance similar conceptual justifications.
Parts III and IV offer ways of understanding the polarized debate illus-
trated in Part II by arguing that the tension is either irreconcilable (Part III)
or that its resolution is based on collapsing the distinction between the con-
cepts, leading to what I call a “circular movement” of the debate (Part IV).
Part III explains the polarization of the debate by using the notions of “es-
sential contestability” and “paradox.”  Contemporary progressives—whose
work this Article discusses—recognize that even the most basic concepts
deployed in political thought are essentially contestable, rather than merely
contested, and thus are not easily resolvable.  Yet deniers, reconcilers, and
dissolvers stop short of recognizing that “constitutional democracy” is no
GRATION: POST-STRUCTURALIST THOUGHT AND THE CLAIMS OF CRITICAL THEORY (1987);
ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE AND CON-
TRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1979).
23 By “phenomenological” I mean a consciousness-bound phenomenon, as opposed to an
ontological pursuit of a physical or material being.  The focus is on appearances and exper-
iences (i.e., the way things appear to, and are experienced by, human consciousness) rather
than on their ontological or metaphysical standing (i.e., whether they really exist or not).  Ed-
mund Husserl, a major contributor in the discipline of phenomenology, advocated a method-
ological constraint that brackets ontological questions and instead focuses on the experience of
the subject. See generally EDMUND HUSSERL, 1 LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS (Dermot Moran ed.,
J. N. Findlay trans., 2001).  Concretely, this Article focuses on the discourse produced and
practiced by a group of scholars in the field of progressive liberal constitutional theory.  The
Article unearths a structure (a map) of this discourse.  Put differently, it is a study of a discur-
sive consciousness.
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less an example of contestability than “constitutionalism” and “democ-
racy.”  Recognizing this contestability gives rise to a paradox between ra-
tionally compelling yet contradictory conceptions of the concepts.  Part III
situates the attempts to resolve the tension between constitutionalism and
democracy within familiar patterns that Western thinkers deploy when faced
by such perceived paradoxes.
I conclude that the utility of Part III’s analysis for understanding the
field is limited.  Such analysis accepts the dichotomous polarization of the
field as a division between constitutionalists who support judicial review and
majoritarian democrats who oppose it.  This linear view of the field appears
inadequate when confronted with the essential contestability of these con-
cepts.  To that end, Part IV shows that the typology of Part II is less stable
than it appears.24  Indeed, deniers, reconcilers, and dissolvers collapse the
distinction between the two competing concepts of constitutionalism and de-
mocracy in their attempt to overcome contestability by resolving the para-
dox.  Specifically, scholars make the argument for one concept by redefining
the competing concept and hence deriving their preferred concept from the
competing concept.  Such collapsing of the distinction throws the debate into
a circular movement comprised of redefinitions that offer combinations of
constitutionalism and democracy that vary only in degree.  Ultimately, rather
than solving the paradox, the debate revolves around it.
This Article does not seek to resolve this paradox.  Quite the contrary, I
suggest that no rational definitive resolution has hitherto been proposed for
the conceptual controversy.  It does not necessarily follow that no such de-
finitive resolution is logically available.  Indeed, it might be satisfying to
search for a solution, but that is not the objective of this exercise.
C. Liberal Dilemmas: From “Constitutionalism and Democracy” to the
“Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty”
Before discussing the question of constitutionalism and democracy, it is
important to appreciate its centrality to liberal thinking by ascertaining how
it arises in the general theoretical framework of liberalism.  Indeed, this
question derives from the larger issue of justifying political regimes.  Politi-
cal justification is a foundational concern for liberal theorists in particular
because it examines the acceptability of political authority to reasonable per-
sons.25  Specifically, it is a public justification that offers reasons to persons
24 In this sense, Part II is a structuralist analysis whereas Part IV is a post-structuralist
analysis.  Part II reveals a structure within which several differentiated categories are ordered;
Part IV shows that this is not the only possible representation of the field nor are the categories
representing scholarly positions as differentiated as may be initially assumed.  Part II repre-
sents the debate in a linear way; Part IV displaces this view for a circular representation of the
debate.
25 Some liberals prefer “rational” instead of “reasonable.” See, e.g., DAVID GAUTHIER,
MORALS BY AGREEMENT 2–3 (1986) (claiming that a moral theory outlining moral duties can
be grounded within “rational choice theory”).  One can broadly distinguish between two tradi-
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\47-2\HLC204.txt unknown Seq: 9  3-JUL-12 13:18
2012] The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory 379
deliberating in the public sphere.26  And for liberals, such a public justifica-
tion is not acceptable if others could reasonably reject it.27  The importance
of such political justification reflects modern liberalism’s emphasis on rea-
son over might or God.28  Political authority should be justifiable to reasona-
ble society members who are treated equally, while their wide-ranging
disagreements and differences are recognized and respected.29
The questions of justifying authority and justifying its imposition of
certain obligations on citizens intermingle in these debates.30  On the one
hand, liberals are not anarchists as they do not reject authority as such.  In-
stead, they are quasi-Hobbesian in their acceptance and defense of the inevi-
tability and desirability of legal ordering.31  On the other hand, they do not
tions with respect to “reason”: One that contrasts reason with the passions or self-interest, and
another that contrasts reason with irrationality.  The former associates reason with the common
good, while the latter considers rationality to be the property of persons who offer “sufficient
reasons” for their actions.  The latter view stands at the base of rational choice theory. See JON
ELSTER, REASON AND RATIONALITY 1–3 (Steven Rendall trans., 2009).  In his earlier work,
John Rawls, too, relied on rational choice theory: “[A] rational person is thought to have a
coherent set of preferences between the options open to him.  He ranks these options according
to how they further his purposes; he follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires
rather than less, and which has the greater chance of being successfully executed.” JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 124 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE] .  Only in his
later work does Rawls clearly distinguish between the rational and the reasonable. See JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 48–54 (expanded ed. Columbia Univ. Press 2005) (1993)
[hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM] .  In Political Liberalism, Rawls distinguishes be-
tween two moral powers of the person: the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a
conception of the good.  He associates the reasonable with the former and the rational with the
latter. Id. at 52.  Rawls writes, “the reasonable is public in a way the rational is not.  This
means that it is by the reasonable that we enter as equals the public world of others and stand
ready to propose, or to accept . . . fair terms of cooperation with [others].” Id. at 53.
26 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 465. R
27 For Rawls’s discussion of “reciprocity,” see id. at xliv.  For the idea of “reasonable
rejectability” as the test for the acceptability of moral principles, see T. M. SCANLON, WHAT
WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 202–03 (1998).
28 See, e.g., JU¨RGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS-
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 469 (William Rehg trans., 1998) (“[T]he exercise
of political domination could be legitimated neither religiously (by appeal to divine authority)
nor metaphysically (by appeal to an ontologically grounded natural law).  From now on, a
politics radically situated in this world should be justifiable on the basis of reason, using the
tools of postmetaphysical theorizing.”).
29 See generally Charles Larmore, The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism, 96 J. PHIL. 599
(1999) [hereinafter Larmore, Moral Basis]; Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL.
THEORY 339 (1990) [hereinafter Larmore, Political Liberalism]; Stephen Macedo, The Politics
of Justification, 18 POL. THEORY 280 (1990).
30 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 191 (1986); A. John Simmons, Justification and
Legitimacy, 109 ETHICS 739 (1999).
31 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 117–20 (Richard Tuck, ed., 1996) (1651); see also Frank
I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 345, 358 (2004) (referring to “Hobbes’s thesis” by which he means the need for
an enforcer that would ensure “that everyone plays by the rules” so that citizens could enjoy
the advantages of political association).  For a reading of Kant as a defender of the inevitability
of the coercive power of positive law under conditions of disagreement, see Jeremy Waldron,
Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1547 (1996) (“For Kant, the potential for
violent conflict and thus the case for positive law is supposed to survive any realistic assump-
tion that we might make about human nature. . . .   Even if men are angels, they are opinion-
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accept authority that imposes wide-ranging normative commitments on soci-
ety members, especially concerning the question of the good life—how
members decide to lead their private lives.32  Accordingly, the dominant lib-
eral line runs roughly as follows: Given disagreement between individuals
and collective action problems, there is an inevitable and desirable need for a
coercive legal and political order (this is the question of justifying the state,
or the Hobbesian premise).33  Then, a question arises: To which conditions
should this coercive order conform so that it can be considered legitimate
and democratic (this is the question of liberal legitimacy)?  To these liberals,
authority is neither the good nor the just, but the legitimate.34
First, according to these liberal scholars, authority should not specify a
conception of the good life: It should not endorse a set of ends or a hierarchy
of values.  Indeed, these scholars consider defining the good to be more
controversial than defining justice amongst individuals.35  Moreover, these
scholars argue that authority ought not be paternalistic, treating “citizens
like children.”36  Thus, authority should be impartial towards individuals’
private ends, show respect to the individuality of persons, and accept the
importance of self-determination.37
Second, authority is not equivalent to justice because the unanimity
necessary for the exercise of authority is not expected regarding what justice
requires, and/or justice is too high a standard to meet given the imperfect
conditions of human reality.38  Although reason gives rise to principles of
ated angels, and they hold . . . conflicting views about justice for which they are prepared to
fight.”).
32 Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 131–33
(1987).
33 See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF
A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); Michelman, supra note 20. R
34 Dworkin, for instance, grounds legitimacy in “integrity.” DWORKIN, supra note 30, at R
190–216.  For the Rawlsian “liberal principle of legitimacy,” see RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBER-
ALISM, supra note 25, at 217. R
35 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 392–96. R
36 IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 141 (H.S. Reiss
ed., 2d enlarged ed. 1991); see also IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be
True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,’ in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra, at 74
[hereinafter KANT, On the Common Saying].
37 For a discussion of “neutrality” or impartiality with respect to the good, see BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10–11 (1981); DWORKIN, supra note 8, at R
191–92; WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 217
(1990); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 193–94; JEREMY WALDRON, Legisla- R
tion and Moral Neutrality, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 143 (1991);
Larmore, Political Liberalism, supra note 29, at 341. R
38 See, e.g., RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 74–77, 173 (referring to imperfection); R
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at xlvi–xlvii (recognizing disagreement regard- R
ing liberal conceptions of justice).  This disagreement is primarily recognized with respect to
the second principle of justice regarding social equality and fair equality of opportunity.  For
Rawls’s reasons for declining to make the second principle a precondition for political legiti-
macy (that is, social and economic rights are not included in the “constitutional essentials”),
see RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 156, 229–30, 296, 367. See also RON- R
ALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 214, 234
(2000); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 189 (1999).
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justice, contemporary liberals do not think that reason necessarily leads to
consensus as to these principles—disagreement, even among reasonable so-
ciety members, is inevitable.39  Still, many think that consensus can be
achieved with respect to some principles of justice.40  Accordingly, for many
liberals, the political order is legitimate so long as the general structure of
authority is merely “reasonably just.”41
Having thus excluded justice and the good, these scholars are left with
legitimacy as the basis for the political order.42  These liberals do not follow
Weber in defining legitimacy in terms of the facticity of acceptance and
obedience.43  Instead, they conceive of legitimacy as a normative idea con-
cerned with the acceptability and justifiability of legal and political ordering
through good reasons.44  Such conceptions of legitimacy identify the set con-
ditions to which political authority should conform in order to be morally
justified in coercing citizens to comply with the laws under conditions of
disagreement about justice.
Constitutionalism enters the picture as the mechanism for constructing
the framework for such legitimate authority.  To be sure, constitutionalism
includes an institutional specification, such as separation of powers, to pre-
vent the usurpation of power.  But more importantly, constitutionalism lays
down the fundamental laws and rules that incorporate the basic principles of
justice that govern the political community and secure individual rights.
Once the legitimate conditions for legal coercion are stipulated and a
functioning legitimate order is in place, citizens can pursue their private ends
in conformity with the fundamental rules of the community.  The question
then shifts: How should disagreements be resolved within this order?  The
difficulty is how to guarantee the order’s sustainability despite disagreement
on what constitutes the good life and the acknowledged gap between justice
and legitimacy.  Operatively, this question becomes: Who decides when peo-
ple disagree?  The majority could carry the day every time disagreement
surfaces (after all, the regime should be democratic in order to be legiti-
mate).  Alternatively, constraints external to the political decision-making
39 See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 54–58 (discussing the “bur- R
dens of judgment”).
40 See, e.g., id. at 133–72 (discussing Rawls’s notion of overlapping consensus).
41 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106 (1977); John Rawls, Reply
to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132, 148 (1995); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 250, 260–61 (1979); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and
the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1792 (2005).
42 See generally NIMER SULTANY, THE POVERTY OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: JUSTICE,
LEGITIMACY, AND LEGITIMATION (2012) (unpublished dissertation) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (providing an elaborate treatment of this argument and its implications).
43 See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
31–33, 37, 212–16 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978)
(1968).
44 JU¨RGEN HABERMAS, Legitimation Problems in the Modern State, in COMMUNICATION
AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979); Rawls, supra note 41, R
at 177 n.77 (referring to Habermas).  For an example of a sociological conception of legiti-
macy, see infra Part II.B.i.d. See also KANT, On the Common Saying, supra note 36, at 85. R
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process could be imposed upon the majority by an independent judicial au-
thority.  This is the question of constitutionalism and democracy.
Put this way, the question is a matter of practical institutional design
within the legitimate liberal state.  Scholars of political theory, constitutional
theory, and jurisprudence pose and address the question of constitutionalism
and democracy at different levels of abstraction.  Other formulations of the
question include: The so-called “paradox of constitutionalism” (the tension
between the constituent power—the People unconstrained in the founding—
and the constituted power—the government created by the People, but
which controls its affairs);45 reconciling reason with will (can will-autonomy
and will-formation coexist with constraints imposed by reason?);46 and rec-
onciling liberalism (understood as based on individual autonomy) and de-
mocracy (understood to be based on public autonomy).47  In these debates,
constitutionalism, reason, and liberalism seem to be used interchangeably at
times.48
These grand abstractions notwithstanding, the most prominent example
of the theme of constitutionalism and democracy in United States constitu-
tional theory is the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”49  While democracy,
understood as the rule of the many, seems to suggest unconstrained freedom
for the will of the majority,50 constitutionalism seems to work in the opposite
direction by imposing constraints on this freedom.51  Metaphorically, consti-
tutionalism is the gatekeeper that guards against closing the gap between
legitimacy and justice.  It also maintains the tension between the common
good—as understood by popular majorities—and the protected space deline-
ated by individual rights to allow the pursuit of differing conceptions of the
good life.  Constitutionalism, then, is a corollary to the Kantian liberal dis-
tinction between the “right” and the “good”: On the one hand, it is the
framework that guarantees basic rights and, on the other, it protects different
45 See, e.g., THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL FORM (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007).
46 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
411 (1981) (discussing the question as a tension between will and reason).
47 See, e.g., Ju¨rgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks
on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109 (1995); Rawls, supra note 41. See gener- R
ally CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2000); Sheldon S. Wolin, The Liberal/
Democratic Divide: On Rawls’s Political Liberalism, 24 POL. THEORY 97 (1996) (reviewing
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25). R
48 Indeed, it seems that the tendency towards abstraction leads scholars to elide the distinc-
tions between these concepts.  These theoretical weaknesses become concealed when they are
translated into concrete questions.
49 BICKEL, supra note 11, at 16. R
50 See, e.g., FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 5–6 (1999) (referring to a
common-sense view of democracy as “[p]opular political self-government—the people of a
country deciding for themselves the contents (especially, one would think, the most fateful and
fundamental contents) of the laws that organize and regulate their political association”); see
also infra Part III.C (discussing democracy as an essentially contested concept).
51 See infra Part III.D (discussing constitutionalism as an essentially contested concept).
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conceptions of the good pursued by citizens within this rights framework.52
Accordingly, constitutionalism is the deontological antidote to paternalistic
teleological rule: It prevents the imposition of the private ends of part of the
citizenry on other members of society.  Courts and judges gain prominence
and significance in this context as the enforcers of constitutionalism.  They
are the institutional embodiment of, and provide the concrete application for,
the abstract idea of constitutionalism.
The historically-situated, concrete form of the debate in the United
States over the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” reminds us that, despite the
theoretical trappings, the debate is not an expression of a timeless philosoph-
ical question.53  Rather, theoretical interventions in this debate are “situated
discursive practices,” that is, justificatory exercises that rationalize or cri-
tique existing institutional arrangements.54  Indeed, the crux of the debate
over the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” in the United States is about the
political stakes of the power of judicial review granted to life-tenured federal
judges.55  Or, as Alexander Bickel put it, the debate is about “the most ex-
traordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known.”56  Character-
istically this debate attracted scholars, whether progressive or conservative,
who thought that the stakes were high and thus invested intellectual re-
sources in explicating their positions.  Yet, other voices have emerged claim-
ing that the debate is misguided because the stakes are not as high as
assumed (because, for instance, the Court is not factually “counter-
majoritarian”).57
The history of ideas exposes the political nature of the change in pro-
gressive positions with respect to judicial review.58  These positions gener-
52 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 174 (“[J]ustice draws the limit, and R
the good shows the point . . . .”); SANDEL, supra note 33, at 10. R
53 Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Counterma-
joritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 156 (2002).
54 The phrase “situated discursive practice” points out that the activity of forming cultural
meaning is both context-bound and historical.  For Foucault, for example, discourse is not an
“ideal” or a “timeless” activity; rather it is conditioned by historical context and develop-
ments.  A discursive practice does not refer to the mere expressive function of uttering ideas
but to a “body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that
have defined a given period . . . .” MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 131
(1972).  That is, “discourse itself [i]s a practice” that “must establish [a group of relations].”
Id. at 51.
55 See, e.g., Harry H. Willington, Foreword, in BICKEL, supra note 11. Willington writes R
in reference to abortion: “To justify or discredit judicial intervention must be seen, therefore,
as an academic exercise with potentially important consequences for the nature of American
society.  It is indeed a high-stakes game.” Id. at x.
56 BICKEL, supra note 11, at 1, 235. R
57 See infra Part II.B.i.d. (discussing the “de-centering” position).
58 For attempts to construct such a history regarding scholarly attitudes vis-a`-vis judicial
review, see PAUL KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL THEORY (1992); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM
(1996); Friedman, supra note 53; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian R
Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Two: Reconstruction’s Polit-
ical Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
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ally moved from supporting judicial restraint to supporting judicial activism
and then back to skepticism regarding the role of judicial review.59  For the
first half of the twentieth century, a majority of progressive liberals invested
their intellectual resources in defending judicial restraint against a largely
conservative Court.  They challenged the Lochner Court’s impediments to
democratic attempts to regulate the market.  As Morton Horwitz writes, “the
exigencies of political struggle . . . led Progressives to a theory of judicial
restraint based on the notion that judicial review was undemocratic.”60
Brown v. Board of Education, and the Warren Court more generally,
forced later generations of progressives to rethink this political commitment
and to defend judicial activism to varying degrees.  Yet the consolidation of
conservative power, particularly under the Rehnquist Court, brought back
progressive unease with activism and with the role of the Court in advancing
social change.61  This unease seemed to prompt some progressives in the
1980s to turn unsuccessfully to history to offer an alternative to, and a more
progressive account of, the republican intellectual tradition.62  Other scholars
defended Roe v. Wade on substantive grounds while simultaneously re-
jecting Lochner.63  Concurrently, many progressives were also alarmed by
the unintended consequences of progressive rulings, especially the conserva-
tive “backlash” that Roe produced.64  Ultimately, the progressive attitude
became increasingly skeptical of the Court.65  Many scholars retracted to
“minimalism” or revived “popular constitutionalism,” which watered down
the Court’s role.66  Thus, the progressive liberal concern with the “counter-
Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Fried-
man, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 971 (2000).
59 Changes in conservative positions present a mirror image to this movement of progres-
sive positions.  Conservative scholars generally supported judicial activism during the first half
of the twentieth century, then rejected the Warren Court’s activism, and defended the Rehn-
quist Court’s activism. See Friedman, supra note 53, at 156, 159–60. R
60 Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599, 602 (1979).
61 For an exemplary discussion of the activism of the Rehnquist Court, see THOMAS M.
KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL
CONSERVATISM (2004).
62 For a discussion of  “republican proceduralism” under “reconciliation,” see, for exam-
ple, infra Part II.B.ii.b. See also KALMAN, supra note 58, at 132 (regarding the “turn to R
history”).
63 Compare LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 78–83 (1990)
(defending Roe against different objections), with  KALMAN, supra note 58, at 84–86 (criticiz- R
ing the Lochner Court). See also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 74, 208 (rev. ed. 2005) (criticizing Lochner as an “agreed
Supreme Court mistake[ ]”) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW] ; RONALD DWORKIN,
LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
(1993) (defending Roe’s reasoning).
64 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007).
65 Id.
66 For a discussion of “minimalism,” see infra Part II.B.ii.c; for “popular constitutional-
ism,” see infra Part II.B.ii.d.
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majoritarian difficulty” emerged as how to justify “good” judicial “activ-
ism” (that advances social and racial justice, as in Brown) without endorsing
“bad” judicial “activism” (that sanctions injustice or evil, as in Lochner).67
In other words, the difficulty is to justify judicial action and faith in law as a
tool for progressive change on the one hand, while simultaneously defending
against the risk that a judge might actively pursue an anti-progressive agenda
on the other.68
This search for a consistent, principled justification of judicial review is
particularly necessary against the backdrop of the Legal Realist attack.  Le-
gal Realists—and their successors in Critical Legal Studies—claimed that
judicial decision-making involves policy-making.  They challenged the dis-
tinctions between law and politics, and between adjudication and legisla-
tion.69  Accordingly, if judicial decision-making is intertwined with policy-
making, then judicial review is presumably anti-democratic because it is
“counter-majoritarian.”  The mission of post-Realist scholarship, then, has
been to offer principled justifications for judicial review that would recon-
struct the assailed distinctions and provide a solution for the tension between
judicial review and democracy.70  Yet, I argue, post-Realist scholarship has
largely failed in this mission.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF THE FIELD
A. Introduction
This Part presents a discursive analysis of the deployment of constitu-
tionalism to control democracy in the field of progressive constitutional the-
ory.  To date, several typologies have organized the literature of judicial
review from different perspectives, but none of them has comprehensively
67 KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 113–14; Horwitz, supra note 60, at 602 (“In some sense, all R
of American constitutional theory for the past twenty-five years has revolved around trying to
justify the judicial role in Brown while trying simultaneously to show that such a course will
not lead to another Lochner era.”).
68 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020,
at 37 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).  Sunstein writes that “minimalists” like
himself “reject the liberal activism of the Warren Court, and they are fearful that extreme
conservative activism may be the wave of the future.  They do not want judges to seize on
ambiguous constitutional provisions to issue broad rulings that limit democratic prerogatives.”
Id. at 38.
69 Since the Legal Realists are a diverse, loosely-defined group, different scholars empha-
size different aspects of the literature produced by the Realists.  For example, Fisher, Horwitz,
and Reed argue that Realism has challenged three central notions in American thought: That
the rules of governance are chosen by the People rather than unelected judges; that judicial
review protects the representative character of the political system; and that they are governed
by “a government of laws” and not by an arbitrary “government of men.”  AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM xiv–xv (William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993);
see also HABERMAS, supra note 28, at 213–14. R
70 KALMAN, supra note 58, at 5 (“Once the legal realists had questioned the existence of R
principled decision-making, academic lawyers spent the rest of the twentieth century searching
for criteria that would enable them to identify objectivity in judicial decisions.”).
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addressed the conceptual debate in order to reveal its structure.71  Through
interpretive reconstruction of scholarly writings, this Part introduces a typol-
ogy that identifies the primary discursive formations in the field and lays out
the virtual structure that undergirds the field.
This typology fills three major gaps in existing scholarship.  First, this
typology establishes a connection between the scholarly choice of a specific
form of argumentation and the effect of that intervention in the field of con-
stitutional theory.  It differentiates between theoretical positions on the basis
of their different approaches to the same existing institutional reality.  Spe-
cifically, I organize the multiplicity of constitutional theories that grapple
with the practice of judicial review.  I then capture both the proposed forms
that judicial review should take and the consequences of such attempts to
justify judicial review.  Second, rather than separate typologies for democ-
racy debates and for constitutionalism debates, this typology captures both
concepts in their (perceived) conflict with each other.  Finally, this typology
distinguishes between scholarly attempts to achieve some degree of closure
in conceptual controversies and the rejection of such attempts.72
The debate over constitutionalism and democracy divides into two
meta-categories of discourse: a “discourse of unity” and a “discourse of
disunity.”73  Put simply, the overarching difference between these meta-cate-
71 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO
POLITICS 106–12 (1996) (distinguishing between legal, prudential, and moral arguments con-
cerning judicial review); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115
YALE L.J. 1346, 1372–73 (2006) (distinguishing between “outcome-related” and “process-
related” arguments).
72 Attempts to seek closure purport to bring normative justificatory interventions (concep-
tions of legitimacy) to a less contestable territory and, hence, would presumably offer a stable
grounding for the political and legal order.  By “some degree of closure,” I do not suggest that
scholars in the field necessarily present their positions as definitive, indisputable solutions.
That is, I do not claim that these scholars are treating their theories (“this is legitimacy”) as
one would treat acceptance of empirical judgments (“this is a table”).  In fact, some of the
scholars discussed here resist such interpretation of their writings.  Dworkin is the most strik-
ing example of such resistance.  For Dworkin, all cases are normatively laden and controver-
sial.  He rejects the use of “objectivity” in legal and moral statements: “I think that the whole
issue of objectivity . . . is a kind of fake. . . .  We should account to ourselves for our own
convictions as best we can, standing ready to abandon those that do not survive reflective
inspection.” DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 167, 172.  Although he frequently uses the words R
“true” and “right answers,” he does not imply definitive or non-controversial resolution.
Rather, he means the “most reasonable” answer.  Ronald Dworkin, A Reply by Ronald Dwor-
kin, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 247, 278 (Marshall Cohen ed.,
1983).  While Dworkin recognizes the fallibility of judges, he claims that such fallibility
should not prevent them from attempting to find right answers.  Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1109 (1975).  Thus, for Dworkin, recognizing contestability does not
preclude the project of attempting to show the best justification of legal and political practices
and institutions.
73 The “discourse of unity” is a unifying discourse that rationalizes away appearances of
contradiction.  In contrast, the “discourse of disunity” emphasizes the appearance of contra-
diction.  The former seeks convergence whereas the latter seeks separation.  The former aspect
of my typology resembles what Mark Tushnet calls “unitary theories of constitutional law”:
Any theory identifies a set of principles from which its results follow, but unitary
theories are special in two related ways.  First, there are no conflicts among their
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\47-2\HLC204.txt unknown Seq: 17  3-JUL-12 13:18
2012] The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory 387
gories is that proponents of the discourse of unity think that “constitutional
democracy” can be defended on rational grounds as a harmonious concep-
tual marriage.  Indeed, they unite the concepts and justify judicial review.
Conversely, the proponents of the disunity discourse think that this attempt
is doomed to failure: The concepts cannot be united in a noncontroversial
way that would grant legitimacy to the political regime and justify the prac-
tice of judicial review.  While the proponents of unity think that political
conflict can and should be contained, the advocates of disunity believe that
political conflict cannot and should not be contained (at least not definitively
or non-controversially).  This formulation does not attribute to the propo-
nents of unity any denial of the existence or persistence of political conflict.
Indeed, many of them acknowledge disagreements about justice, but they
offer legitimacy as an answer to this disagreement.  For the disunity position,
however, disagreement undermines the prospects of presenting a non-contro-
versial conception of legitimacy.
Within the debate over constitutionalism and democracy, unity and dis-
unity arise in four primary instantiations:
The “discourse of unity” includes two main groups:
(1) Denial: there is no tension between constitutionalism and democ-
racy in the first place, and thus judicial review is justified; and
(2) Reconciliation: there is a tension, but it can be reconciled, and thus
judicial review can be justified.
The “discourse of disunity” includes two main groups:
(1) Endorsement: there is an irreconcilable tension but recognizing this
fact does not need to lead to negative practical conclusions because
judicial review can be prudentially justified; and
(2) Dissolution: there is an irreconcilable tension and it should be dis-
solved both conceptually and practically; thus, judicial review is
illegitimate.
These groups differ not only in terms of their positions but also in terms
of their different discursive techniques.  Figure 1 provides an overview of
the scholars, positions, and discursive techniques.
principles.  Some may appear to conflict with others, but the appearance is mislead-
ing because somewhere in the theory there is a metaprinciple that explains why the
conflict does not really arise . . . .  The second . . . is that their results follow from
their principles in a reasonably rigorous way.  Because the set of principles in a
unitary theory is self-consistent, standard operations in elementary logic or at least
standard uses of the rhetorical devices of legal reasoning can be employed to identify
the precise scope of the theory.
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
181 (1988).
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Meta-Groups Discourse of Unity Discourse of Disunity
Groups Denial Reconciliation Endorsement Dissolution
Representative Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, Frank Michelman, Jeremy Waldron,
Scholars John Rawls, Richard Pildes, Louis Seidman, Richard Parker,
Ju¨rgen Habermas, Frank Michelman, Laurence Tribe Mark Tushnet
Stephen Holmes, Alexander Bickel,
John Ferejohn, Cass Sunstein,
Lawrence Sager, Larry Kramer,
Bruce Ackerman, Mark Tushnet
Akhil Amar,
Frederick Schauer
Discursive Incorporation, Democratic (Reject attempts to Unqualified
Techniques Clarification, Proceduralism, close the question) Proceduralism,
Avoidance, Republican Populism
De-Centering Proceduralism,
Minimalism,
Popular
Constitutionalism
FIGURE 1: A TYPOLOGY OF THE PROGRESSIVE LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL FIELD
Before I explicate the typology further, some methodological points are
in order.  First, the labels used in the typology are given by the author.  No
scholar self-identifies thus.74  Second, this typology does not assume a his-
torical progression from one position to another, but posits that these posi-
tions coexist simultaneously and indeed compete against each other for
discursive acceptance.  Third, this Article considers scholars solely as repre-
sentatives of patterns of arguments.  Thus, the summary of their positions in
these specific debates might not do them justice qua scholars.75  Fourth,
since some scholars have presented different positions in different writings
they will be discussed in more than one category.76  Finally, while this typol-
ogy may be generalizable to other conceptual controversies, this Article does
not pursue such generalization.
74 Nevertheless, I do at times provide textual evidence that corresponds to the label.  For
instance, I offer quotations in which “deniers” actually “deny” the tension and advocates of
“clarification” say that they merely “clarify.”
75 It can be said that in pursuing such an approach I have de-centered the learning subject
by focusing on argumentative patterns and their relationship to the field rather than zeroing in
on specific scholars.  On this aspect of structuralist analysis, see GIDDENS, supra note 22, at R
38–40, 66.
76 Thus, for instance, Frank Michelman falls within the “reconciliation” position with re-
spect to some writings and within the “endorsement” position with respect to others; Mark
Tushnet falls within “reconciliation” with respect to some writings and within “dissolution”
with respect to other writings; and Frederick Schauer falls within the “denial” positions once
in the mode of “clarification” and then within “de-centering.”
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B. A Discourse of Unity
This Section discusses the positions of denial and reconciliation: The
“denial” position denies the tension between constitutionalism and democ-
racy, while the “reconciliation” position acknowledges that a proper inter-
pretation of the two concepts results in conflicting demands.  Both the denial
and reconciliation positions unite the concepts, and thus overcome the al-
leged tension and justify judicial review.
i. Denial
Deniers deploy four primary argumentative techniques to overcome the
tension between democracy and constitutionalism: incorporation (by incor-
porating constitutional constraints into the definition of democracy); clarifi-
cation (by claiming that both concepts are interdependent and
complementary); avoidance (by distinguishing between politics and popular
sovereignty, and denying that the latter is constrained by judicial review);
and de-centering (by questioning the tension’s factual basis in order to show
that judicial review does not constrain politics).
a. Incorporation
The first position of denial is the incorporation argument advanced by
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.77  This position rejects the majoritarian
conception of democracy and redefines democracy as constitutional democ-
racy with constraints on majority rule.  By incorporating constitutionalism
into the preferred concept of democracy, this position shifts the debate into
one internal to the concept of democracy—intra-conceptual—rather than an
external—inter-conceptual—debate between the competing concepts.  This
approach then advances normative reasons as to why a constitutional con-
ception of democracy is more attractive than a majoritarian regime.  It sup-
ports these reasons through either an interpretive historical construction that
presents a normatively attractive reading of the history of the country or a
normative ideal theorization that offers normative reasons that could be ac-
cepted by reasonable citizens.
John Rawls advances such a position of denial through a constitution-
centered theory of democratic legitimacy.78  Rawlsian theory, in its early ver-
sion, prioritizes the “liberty of the moderns” over the “liberty of the
77 This Article discusses Rawls and Dworkin more elaborately than other positions of
denial because of their prominent and even canonical positions in contemporary political and
constitutional theory.
78 Frank I. Michelman, Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy, and the Question of Judicial Re-
view: A Comment, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1407, 1420 (2004) (assessing “Rawls’s constitution-
centered theory of normative legitimacy”).
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ancients.”79  He argues that individual and civil liberties should not be com-
promised for the sake of equal political participation.80  In other words,
rights take precedence over democracy.  Thus the Rawlsian theory of justice
settles this question prior to the concrete stage of institutional design.81  In-
deed, according to the “priority of liberty,” restrictions of liberty are justi-
fied only for the sake of liberty itself.82
Concomitantly, there is a “lexical priority” within Rawls’s two princi-
ples of justice.83  Rawls’s first principle of justice is primarily concerned with
basic political and civil liberties.  The second principle focuses on equality.
Rawls prioritizes the liberty principle over the equality principle.  This “lexi-
cal ranking . . . specifies which elements of the ideal [part of the theory of
justice in which the principles of justice are strictly complied with] are rela-
tively more urgent.”84  That is, basic political and civil rights are more “ur-
gent” than social rights in designing a democracy.
When Rawls discusses constitutional arrangements and judicial review,
he expresses a similar approach.  His political conception of justice applies
to the “basic structure” of society, which “[he] take[s] to be a modern
constitutional democracy.”85  Limitations on majority rule—restrictions of
equal political liberty and participation—are compatible with principles of
justice so long as every citizen is equally limited and the burden is evenly
distributed between citizens over time.86  Constitutional devices secure civil
liberties at the expense of some limitation on political liberty.  Such limita-
tion is justified insofar as the benefits of security outweigh the constitutional
limitations.
But this act of balancing is not the focus of Rawlsian justice.  Rawls
explains that constitutional design and entrenchment of rights are not settled
philosophically or conceptually.  Rather, they are resolved in the constituent
assembly according to “a case by case examination of instances, and also
taking into account the particular political history and the democratic culture
of the society in question.”87  Despite such pronouncements, the Rawlsian
theory of justice determines the priority of liberty and the priority of the first
79 For the distinction between “liberty of the moderns” (individual liberties) and “liberty
of the ancients” (participatory rights), see BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients
Compared with that of the Moderns, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 307–28 (Biancamaria Fontana
ed., 1988).
80 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 176–77. R
81 Id.
82 Id. at 214.
83 The first principle of justice holds that “[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty
for all.” Id. at 266.  The second principle holds that “[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to
be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent
with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” Id.
84 Id. at 216.
85 Id. at 171; RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 11. R
86 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 197, 201. R
87 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 416. R
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principle.  Rawls implies that the choices of constituent assemblies should
comply with this theory.88  He prefers constitutional arrangements, as they
“lead to a more just body of legislation” and “compel a majority to delay
putting its will into effect and force it to make a more considered and delib-
erate decision.”89  The priority of liberty, then, is reflected in the imposition
of constitutional constraints on majoritarian decision-making to ensure that
rights will not be sacrificed at the altar of political preferences.
In later writings, Rawls modifies this position.  He emphasizes that the
“fair value of political liberties” provides citizens “an equal chance of influ-
encing the government’s policy and of attaining positions of authority irre-
spective of [citizens’] economic and social class.”90  He thus introduces
equality as a consideration that factors into the basic liberties themselves,91
modifying the first principle of justice to reflect this change.92  This evolu-
tion relaxes the priority of rights over democracy and modifies the precondi-
tions for democratic legitimacy to include equality.  Nevertheless, Rawls
continues to endorse a constitutional conception of democracy and to reject
parliamentary supremacy.93  In this conception of democracy, principles of
justice regulate the basic structure of a well-ordered society.  The general
structure of political authority reflects this idea through “constitutional es-
sentials,” including a list of basic rights of citizenship, derived from the first
principle, along with a social minimum that limit legislative majorities.94
These normative and substantive constraints are necessary for the develop-
ment of the two moral powers of the person (the rational and the reasona-
ble)95 and for the legitimacy of the regime.  Rawls suggests that a reasonable
individual accepts the coercion of a political system as legitimate if: (i) It is
universally acceptable to the reasonable and rational; (ii) it is generally com-
plied with by fellow citizens; and (iii) it is not too unjust.96  This hypothetical
88 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 176; see id. at 171–76 (discussing the “four-stage R
sequence”: the original position in which representatives choose the principles of justice; the
constituent assembly in which delegates establish the constitution; the legislative stage; and the
judicial stage).  For a critique of the Framers’ limited range of choice within Rawls’s original
position, see Ronald Moore, Rawls on Constitution-Making, in NOMOS XX: CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM 238, 247 (J. R. Pennock & J. W. Chapman eds., 1979).
89 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 201. R
90 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 358. R
91 See id. at 356–63.
92 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 149 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
93 For Rawls, an unconstrained majority rule in which the majority can vote its preferences
violates both public reason and the moral duty of civility. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM,
supra note 25, at 219.  Yet, Rawls says that in the debate between supporters of dualist consti- R
tutional democracy, supporters of parliamentary supremacy, or a German-style regime, in
which some entrenched principles are beyond amendment, his theory need not rule.  These
alternative regimes should be judged according to the values of public reason included in the
political conception of justice. Id. at 234–35.  For the rejection of parliamentary supremacy,
see Rawls, supra note 41, at 158. R
94 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 227. R
95 See id. at 48–54.
96 Id. at 217 (“[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reason-
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consensual standard for normative legitimacy is supported by an “overlap-
ping consensus” of reasonable people (who disagree about the good life and
the requirements of justice) affirming the constitutional essentials.  Constitu-
tionalism, then, is integral to democratic legitimacy.
The Court is not an anti-democratic institution from within this consti-
tutional conception.  Institutionally, it protects “higher law when its deci-
sions reasonably accord with the constitution itself.”97  It is anti-majoritarian
only with respect to ordinary law.  Indeed, judicial review is an “institu-
tional exemplar” of the Rawlsian idea of “public reason”98: It exemplifies
the ways in which citizens should discuss constitutional essentials through
formal democratic channels.99  Hence, the Court does not merely defend
higher law; it makes public reason effective, serves an educative role, and
brings vitality to the public forum.100  Unfortunately, however, Rawlsian the-
ory is not very helpful in resolving the concrete debates on judicial review.
It fails to confront the institutional question, the centrality of judicial review,
and the manipulability of abstract “higher law.”101
By contrast, Ronald Dworkin offers a more elaborate effort to answer
Bickel’s “counter-majoritarian difficulty” by arguing normatively and his-
torically that judicial review is democratically legitimate.102  Dworkin’s his-
torical argument suggests that democracy is a social practice and an
interpretive concept.  In order to understand the “truth” of contemporary
democracy, one needs to examine pre-interpretive paradigmatic understand-
ings collected from observing the history of the concept and its prevalent
features in a particular society.  By making judgments in the post-interpre-
tive stage, one arrives at the best understanding of democracy.  Having then
arrived at the best conception of democracy, one would conclude that the
majoritarian view is a mistake.  Unlike Rawls, Dworkin sees this as an actual
question about an actual practice, rather than a question of ideal theory.  So
far as the United States is concerned, constraints on majorities (as in judicial
review) are part of the culture and the political tradition of the nation.  Thus,
only a conception of democracy that includes judicial review would “fit” the
United States’ tradition.103
ably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasona-
ble and rational.”); see also Rawls, supra note 41, at 148, 175. R
97 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 234; see id. at 232–34. R
98 Id. at 235.
99 See id.
100 Id. at 235–37; RAWLS, supra note 92, at 145–48 (explaining the educational role and R
moral force of the constitution and the institutions of the political conception of justice).
101 See supra Part I.C (discussing these and other theoretical quandaries raised by liberal
defenses of judicial review).
102 Dworkin writes: “I will defend . . . the constitutional conception of democracy. . . .   It
denies that it is a defining goal of democracy that collective decisions always or normally be
those that a majority or plurality of citizens would favor if fully informed and rational.”
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 63, at 17 (emphasis added). R
103 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 378–79 (discussing American judicial review as R
“embedded in American legal practice”).
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Dworkin’s constructive historical strategy arguably understates the
majoritarian strand in United States history.104  Even more surprisingly,
Dworkin extends his argument to Britain, where the majoritarian tradition is
stronger than it is in the United States.105  Dworkin does not deny this
majoritarian tradition; rather, he hedges by arguing that it has been eroded
and “compromised” in recent British political history and that it has thus
become “less appealing.”106  This observation suggests that Dworkin’s posi-
tion would likely remain similar even if it seemed tenuous to construct the
history of the United States in support of the counter-majoritarian thesis.  For
Dworkin, a “genuine democracy” would constrain the legislature in order to
guarantee informed and free participation of citizens.107  Dworkin, then, sub-
ordinates history to a normative impulse.
Dworkin’s normative strategy is to change the terms of the debate from
an inter-conceptual level between constitutionalism and democracy to an in-
tra-conceptual level between alternative conceptions within the concept of
democracy: “I shall try to convince you to see the constitutional argument in
entirely different terms: as a debate not about how far democracy should
yield to other values, but about what democracy, accurately understood, re-
ally is.”108  Accordingly, Dworkin contrasts a majoritarian conception
against a constitutional conception.109  He characterizes the former as a
“bad” conception that treats people as statistics.  In contrast, he advocates a
constitutional conception that treats persons as moral agents who belong to a
self-governing political community.110  Democratic self-government is possi-
ble insofar as every citizen can see the political community as acting on her
behalf.111  Disagreements about justice, fairness, and political morality re-
quire a principled application of the coercive power of the law.112  It is
through the concept of integrity that Dworkin explains how communities
commit themselves to treating all members with equal concern and re-
104 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
959, 963–64 (2004) (arguing that popular constitutionalism was the norm through most of the
United States’ history and that the notion of judicial supremacy did not rise into prominence
until the 1980s) [hereinafter Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism]; see Larry D. Kramer, The
Supreme Court, Term 2000—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 13–15 (2001)
[hereinafter Kramer, We the Court].
105 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 63, at 352, 355 (“But though a written consti- R
tution is certainly not a sufficient condition for liberty to thrive again in Britain, it may well be
a necessary one.”).
106 Id. at 362.
107 Id. at 363.
108 Id. at 15.
109 Elsewhere, Dworkin makes a similar dichotomy between a “detached” conception of
democracy (which judges the democratic credentials of the regime through the process) and a
“dependent” conception of democracy (which judges the regime according to the outcomes it
is likely to advance).  Judicial review is undemocratic only under a detached conception but
not under the dependent conception. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 186–90, 208–09. R
110 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 63, at 23. R
111 Id. at 22; see DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 189. R
112 See DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 214, 411. R
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spect.113  For him, legitimacy requires integrity in legislation, adjudication,
and the moral community at large.114
Having rejected majoritarianism, judicial review no longer appears to
compromise democracy: Labeling judicial review as anti-democratic as-
sumes that the invalidated political decisions were democratic.115  Democ-
racy, however, is “government subject to conditions—we might call these
the ‘democratic’ conditions—of equal status for all citizens.”116  Thus, cer-
tain normative conditions (associated with constitutionalism) are incorpo-
rated into the chosen conception of democracy, eliminating the tension with
constitutionalism.  It is part and parcel of the meaning of democracy to con-
strain considerations of the general welfare or the dominant morality of ma-
jorities from encroaching upon individual rights.
The role of judges, according to Dworkin, is precisely to protect rights
against policy considerations.117  He distinguishes between the domain of
policy, in which majorities decide collective goals, and the domain of princi-
ple, in which judges consult political morality to make decisions regarding
individual rights.118  Following the integrity principle, courts are a “forum of
principle” in which judges should employ reasoning based on principles
rather than on policy considerations in deciding constitutional disputes.119  In
order to enforce the law and protect rights, judges have to decide what the
law is, which requires interpretive normative judgments about the funda-
mental commitments of the political community and the best legal interpre-
tation to vindicate those commitments.120
To conclude, both Rawls and Dworkin argue that democracy, properly
understood, is constitutional democracy.  The existence of constitutional
constraints in the form of rights against majorities is inherent to this concep-
tion.  Judicial review derives significance from its institutional role in en-
forcing these rights.  This enforcement is an essentially democratic task.
b. Clarification
The second discursive technique found in denial positions is the clarifi-
cation argument advanced by scholars like Ju¨rgen Habermas, Stephen
Holmes, John Ferejohn, Lawrence Sager, and Frederick Schauer.  This argu-
ment denies the existence of the problem altogether, and claims that the
alleged tension originates from a conceptual confusion.  Instead of shifting
113 Id. at 312.
114 Id. at 166–67.
115 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 63, at 17–18. R
116 Id. at 17.
117 Dworkin describes rights as “trumps” against policy justifications and collective pref-
erences. DWORKIN, supra note 41, at xi; DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 381. R
118 DWORKIN, supra note 41, at 22, 90. R
119 DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 33, 69. R
120 DWORKIN, supra note 30, at 228–31, 378.  For an example of a critique of Dworkin’s R
views on integrity, see Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273 (1992).
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the ground to the intra-conceptual level as a contest between two concep-
tions of democracy (like Dworkin), proponents of this argument address the
tension on its own inter-conceptual playing field as a contest between consti-
tutionalism and democracy.  In contrast to the incorporation positions that
privilege constitutionalism over democracy, clarifiers argue that constitu-
tionalism and democracy are mutually constitutive, interdependent, and
stand on equal footing before each other without one subordinating the
other; indeed, they are akin to inseparable twins.  Unlike the incorporation
position’s view of constitutionalism as an external constraint that precedes
democratic politics, for clarifiers, the procedural conditions necessary for
this democratic politics are not really constraints.121  The argument draws on
Hegel, who understands legal ordering as necessary to enhance human free-
dom.  Legal ordering liberates citizens from fears and natural impulses.
While law might be a restriction on abstract freedom, it is the embodiment
of actual freedom.122  True freedom, Hegel suggests, is only achieved in the
context of interaction with others within an ethical community that is politi-
cally organized in the state.123
In this vein, Habermas and the “self-binding” theorists argue that with
clarification the alleged tension between constitutionalism and democracy
disappears.124  This claim relies on the conceptual distinction between “ena-
bling” and “constraining” conditions.  Enabling conditions are the condi-
tions necessary to constitute a practice, whereas constraining conditions are
those that externally restrict a practice.  According to Habermas, what con-
stitutes democracy does not constrain it.125  In particular, human rights—
which are an integral part of the conception of constitutionalism—are “nec-
121 Habermas argues that rights for Rawls are “prepolitical” constraints because they have
been decided by the theory of justice outside and “prior to all political will formation” and are
not subject to “democratic self-legislation.”  Habermas, supra note 47, at 129.  Rawls denies R
this charge by asserting that, under his theory, individual and civil rights do not restrict politi-
cal participation. See Rawls, supra note 41, at 159.  However, Habermas’s assertion that his R
theory is more proceduralist and democratic than Rawls’s is not convincing.  Larmore and
Michelman point out that Habermas’s theory is constrained by “prepolitical” rights no less
than Rawls’s.  He too presupposes antecedent individual rights, specifically an individual right
to equal participation in the formation of the collective will.  Larmore, Moral Basis, supra note
29, at 617; Frank Michelman, Democracy and Positive Liberty, BOS. REV. (Oct.–Nov. 1996). R
122 G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 192–93, 282–83 (Allen W.
Wood ed., 1991) (1821).
123 Id. at 48–49.
124 Habermas writes: “The relationship between democracy as the source of legitimation
and a constitutionalism that does not need democratic legitimation poses no paradox . . . .  By
simply clarifying the concepts, the alleged paradox disappears: enabling conditions should not
be confused with constraining conditions.”  Ju¨rgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A
Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 770 (2001) (emphasis
added).  Holmes writes: “[T]he relation between constitutionalism and democracy can be sig-
nificantly clarified by an analysis of the way constraints in general can produce or enhance
freedom.” HOLMES, supra note 12, at 137 (emphasis added). See also Cass R. Sunstein, R
Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 639 (1991) (claiming that constraints
simultaneously empower and constrain by taking certain issues off the table).
125 Habermas, supra note 124, at 770. R
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essary enabling conditions” and “as such, they cannot restrict the legisla-
tor’s sovereignty . . . .”126  On the other hand, the enjoyment of individual
rights is not possible without an appropriate exercise of democratic will.  For
Habermas, constitutionalism and democracy are “co-original[ ]” because
neither is “possible without the other” and “neither sets limits on the
other.”127
According to Habermas, understanding the process of constitution-
making as an inter-generational, self-correcting process, where different
generations experience their involvement in this process as involvement in
the same project, resolves the alleged tension between constitutionalism and
democracy.128  While the democratic procedure is a sine qua non for legiti-
macy, it needs to comply with normative demands derived from the presup-
positions of communication.  These presuppositions derive from a
hypothetical ideal discourse that guarantees undistorted communication.
Accordingly, one examines political decisions from the perspective of poten-
tially affected citizens who are considered as free and equal participants in
an undistorted dialogue.  Communicative presuppositions, however, are not
reducible to parliamentary debates and legislative pronouncements.  Rather,
they include the “political public sphere as well as its cultural context and
social basis.”129  Under this procedural view, the constitutional court’s task is
to supervise the “system of rights that makes citizens’ private and public
autonomy equally possible.”130  The constitutional court’s role is better de-
scribed as a “tutor” rather than as a paternalistic “regent” or a “custodian”
of democracy.131  The Court’s exercise of judicial review ensures that
majoritarian procedures do not violate communicative presuppositions, and
thus secures the “conditions for the democratic genesis of laws.”132
These arguments mark a transition in Habermas’s thought.  The earlier
Habermas argues that constitutional arrangements like separation of powers
126 HABERMAS, supra note 28, at 128 (emphasis in original). R
127 Habermas, supra note 124, at 767.  In this view public and private autonomy are “in- R
terdependent” and “related to each other by material implication.” Id.  Political rights guaran-
tee public autonomy.  But the effective exercise of the latter requires the protection of private
autonomy through individual rights.  In turn, enjoyment of private autonomy is guaranteed
only if public autonomy is used appropriately. Id.  Rawls claims that he is co-original too.
Rawls, supra note 41, at 163–64.  For a similar Habermasian perspective, see Seyla Benhabib, R
Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 80 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (arguing that
“[t]he deliberative theory of democracy transcends the traditional opposition of majoritarian
politics vs. liberal guarantees of basic rights . . . .”).
128 Habermas, supra note 124, at 768.  For the difficulties that Habermas’s theory gener- R
ates, especially given Michelman’s critiques, see Ciaran Cronin, On the Possibility of a Demo-
cratic Constitutional Founding: Habermas and Michelman in Dialogue, 19 RATIO JURIS 343
(2006); Alessandro Ferrara, Of Boats and Principles: Reflections on Habermas’s “Constitu-
tional Democracy,” 29 POL. THEORY 782 (2001).
129 HABERMAS, supra note 28, at 274–75, 280. R
130 Id. at 263.
131 Id. at 275, 280.
132 See id. at 265.
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and democracy are not “of equal rank as political-ordering principles.”133
He distinguishes two kinds of norms: “[J]ustifiable norms”—norms
grounded in rational consensus achieved through ideal conditions of dis-
course—and norms grounded in force, which he calls “normative power.”134
The principles of separation of powers and individual liberal rights belong to
the latter category, which is inferior to the rationally-grounded norms.
These principles are only indirectly justifiable norms because they presup-
pose and stabilize a balance of power.  While such ordering principles have
an enabling function by securing individual autonomous domains, the regu-
lated interests under these principles may be rejected through the scrutiny of
rational discourse.135  For the earlier Habermas, then, constitutionalism is en-
abling and restricting rather than constituting; constitutionalism is not co-
original with democracy, as they occupy different statuses in the hierarchy
of norms.136
Like the later Habermas, several constitutional scholars defend the idea
of “self-binding,” which refers to those “constraints that an agent imposes
on himself for the sake of some expected benefit to himself.”137  By genera-
lizing this idea from the individual agent to the People as a collective agent,
Holmes argues that the claim of an “irreconcilable tension” between democ-
racy and constitutionalism is nothing but a “myth.”138  Holmes argues that
constitutional self-binding is both regulative and constitutive, limiting and
133 JU¨RGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 111 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975).
134 Id.
135 The earlier Habermas argues that the principle of separation of powers is “intended to
guarantee such a balance of power . . . in order to make compromises possible.”  He further
maintains that “bourgeois civil law . . . delimits autonomous domains of action for the strate-
gic pursuit of individual interests.  It presupposes a balance of power between private persons
and makes compromises on non-generalizable interests unnecessary.” Id.
136 These abstract and ideal accounts by the earlier and later Habermas remain unsatisfy-
ing from an institutional-operational perspective.  William E. Forbath, Habermas’s Constitu-
tion: A History, Guide, and Critique, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 969, 995–96 (1998) (reviewing
HABERMAS, supra note 28).  Forbath argues that Habermas does not explain the remedies by R
which constitutional courts can prevent the subversion of the public sphere by the corporate
media, the reach of judicial review, the balance of power between the courts and other
branches, or the electoral systems needed for equal representation. Id. at 996.
137 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMIT-
MENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 4 (2000).
138 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 136–37.  For a critique of self-binding theory, see Jon El- R
ster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of
Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1752  (2003).  Elster, in his reflection on his own previous
writings that defended self-binding, rejects the extension of the idea of self-binding from the
level of the individual agent to the level of the collective self (the People).  This extension, he
writes:
[I]s often close to meaningless.  If instead of the bland and agentless ‘precommit-
ment’ we use the term ‘self-binding,’ two acute questions arise.  First, what is the self
that is tying itself to the mast?  Second, how does it accomplish that feat?  If we
reflect on these questions, the idea of collective precommitment emerges as quite
fragile.
Id. at 1758.  Elster proceeds to emphasize that “there is nothing external to society.” Id. at
1760 (emphasis in original).
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creative, disabling and enabling.139  By establishing a basic framework, the
Constitution empowers the People to pursue its ends more effectively.140
Concretely, constitutional devices such as the separation of powers, an inde-
pendent judiciary, fixed periodical elections, and apportionment plans are
justified because they enhance and sustain democracy.141
Moreover, self-binding is both beneficial and obligatory because it
builds a foundation for learning when used strategically to protect rights.142
Through an “intergenerational division of labor”—in which previous gener-
ations free later generations from the need to struggle with fundamental
questions that faced the Framers—self-binding opens new possibilities for
learning.143  This view of self-binding assumes linear learning and presup-
poses an idea of progress in which the People, having accumulated the wis-
dom of many generations, moves forward.144
Similarly, Ferejohn and Sager distinguish between first-order internal
commitments and second-order external commitments.145  External procedu-
ral commitments—such as judicial review, entrenchment, periodical elec-
tions, and separation of powers—are “functional” and “instrumental” for
achieving internal substantive commitments.  Such external commitments
increase the likelihood that citizens will honor internal commitments, be-
cause the latter are not self-executing.146  Accordingly, constitutionalism
makes democracy possible.
Self-binding will require diverse majorities.  The participation of these
majorities in constitutional change is likely to lead to a national deliberation
that includes a multiplicity of perspectives.  For example, self-binding forces
broad social consensus to achieve change through the amendment process.147
Self-binding also encourages a more generalized, more principled, and less
particularistic text in which the general interest is taken into account.  Judi-
cial review—the judicial application and concretization of such abstract,
general constitutional texts—invigorates these national debates and ensures
139 HOLMES, supra note 12, at 163. R
140 Id.
141 Id. at 163, 165–66, 168.
142 Id. at 176.
143 Id. at 159.
144 Surprisingly, Holmes seems to adopt a version of the very idea of progress that he
criticizes in Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine’s arguments against constitutional con-
straints. Id.  There seems to be two views: one claiming that later generations should be freed
from chains by previous generations because the former are better situated; another claiming
that chains by previous generations allow this progress.  Both are progress theories.
145 John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1929, 1936–38 (2003).
146 Id. at 1938, 1944, 1949, 1956 (using the words “functional” and “instrumental” to
describe the relationship between internal commitments and external commitments).
147 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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that internal commitments “are, on the whole, honored.”148  Thus, constitu-
tional commitments are more democratic than normal legislation.149
In a similar vein, Schauer argues for second-order constraints on first-
order policy preferences in order to protect the long-term interests from the
“short-term weakness of the will.”150  The need for these “externally-en-
forced rules” arises out of the recognition that even when good people do
good things they might generate “bad collective long-term consequences” or
neglect deontological values.151  The Constitution is such a series of second-
order rules, and judicial review should be viewed as an authoritative en-
forcement of these rules, even with respect to well-meaning policies, rather
than as merely a limit against abuses of power.152
Unlike those who adopt incorporation positions, the arguments ad-
vanced by adherents of clarification positions do not incorporate the concep-
tion of constitutionalism into a conception of democracy; nor do these
arguments present constitutional self-binding as constraining democracy.
Rather, they present constitutionalism as enabling democracy to take con-
crete shape, to function, and to improve.
c. Avoidance
The third discursive technique within denial positions is the avoidance
argument advanced by scholars such as Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar.
This argument is predominantly historical in form and celebrates popular
sovereignty—that is, the manifestation of the will of the People—as a self-
validating notion.153  In order to rationalize constitutional constraints on
148 Id. at 1961.
149 Id. at 1958.
150 Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1045, 1057 (2004).
151 Id. at 1056–57.
152 As described below, Schauer combines this argument with another mode of argumenta-
tion.  Thus, he is positioned within the “clarification” position with respect to one argument
and within “de-centering” with respect to the other.  For the latter, see infra Part II.B.i.d.
These are both denial arguments and thus complementary.
153 Ackerman criticizes the “ahistorical” approach to constitutional theory, which focuses
on the writings of European political philosophers and misses the distinctive features of the
United States’ constitutional practice.  1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3
(1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE].  Nevertheless, the American colonists and
revolutionaries were influenced by European thought. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEO-
LOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23, 27–29 (enlarged ed. 1992) (mentioning
European scholars like Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau).  In addition, the parallels between
Ackerman’s work and Rousseau, in particular, are quite evident as I explain in the text.  Fur-
ther, although the avoidance position is historical and descriptive, it is also obviously norma-
tive.  History is authoritative because it carries normative weight; otherwise Ackerman’s use of
history in the debate would be meaningless.  By turning to history, Ackerman claims that those
periods he identifies as “constitutional” moments created binding constitutional norms.  Bruce
A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022,
1055–56 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Storrs Lectures]. Compare ACKERMAN, WE THE PEO-
PLE, supra, at 34, with Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy:
A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 465–66 (2000) (arguing that “history is not authoritative”
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democratic politics, this argument employs a twofold strategy.  First, it de-
centers representative democracy by pointing out the defects of ordinary
democratic practice and the fetishism of representation.154  Second, it denies
that true popular sovereignty—in a sociological (not idealized) sense—can
be constrained even by super-majoritarian entrenchment clauses like Article
V.
This line of argument draws on Rousseau’s arguments for the
supremacy of popular sovereignty.  Rousseau distinguishes between the
“general will,” which is directed towards the common good, and the “will
of all,” which merely reflects the aggregation of factional interests.155  Sov-
ereignty is “the exercise of the general will.”156  Accordingly, the political
community should be oriented towards the common good rather than to-
wards factional interests.  Popular sovereignty should subordinate private
and factional interests and force them to comply with its commands.157
Rousseau is hostile to representative democracy because sovereignty lies in
the general will and cannot be represented or delegated.158  Delegation is
particularly damaging to the general will because it obviates active political
participation, which transforms a person into a higher and more intelligent
being.159
Accordingly, proponents of the avoidance argument distinguish be-
tween the People, corresponding to Rousseau’s general will, and majorities,
corresponding to Rousseau’s will of all.  Government under representative
democracy represents majorities rather than the People.  Thus, the Court
does not counter the People’s determinations, and, ipso facto, the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” does not exist at the level of democratic self-
government.
Ackerman draws on Rousseau’s distinction between the People and ma-
jorities, arguing for a dualistic conception of politics: “Constitutional polit-
ics” arise when a “mobilized mass” of citizens acts collectively to redefine
the public good in “rare periods of heightened political consciousness”
called “constitutional moments.”160  In “normal politics,” people pursue
narrow interests between constitutional moments.161  Under this dualist con-
ception, which Ackerman applies to United States history, the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” mischaracterizes the issue at hand.  Instead, it is only
and that its relevance “is not determined historically, but by a present political and social
decision”).
154 I use fetishism here to denote the act of giving something power that it does not inher-
ently possess.  In this context, the representative system is arguably fetishized, because some
scholars venerate it as if it had the power to stand for the People when in fact it does not.
155 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER WRITINGS 60
(Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., 1997) (1762).
156 Id. at 57.
157 Id. at 60 (factional interests); id. at 87 (individual interests).
158 Id. at 57–59, 114–16.
159 Id. at 53–54.
160 Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 153, at 1022, 1029. R
161 Id. at 1022.
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an intertemporal difficulty.  Only constitutional moments represent the Peo-
ple sufficiently to achieve popular sovereignty.162  Accordingly, the task of
the Court is to “prevent the abuse of the People’s name in normal politics,”
“to uphold the integrity of earlier constitutional solutions against the pulling
and hauling of normal politics,” and to force government to initiate constitu-
tional politics.163  These constitutional cycles overcome, on the one hand, the
selfishness, ignorance, and apathy of ordinary politics and, on the other
hand, the reification of the People in the representative system when repre-
sentatives purport to be the People.164
According to this theory, the Court’s democratic function is to force a
conversation between generations.165  The Court signals to citizens that they
should mobilize and forces the resulting movement to clarify its purposes.166
Ackerman’s “structural amendment” concept becomes a reality when the
Court confirms a “sustained series of electoral victories and legislative suc-
cesses.”167  In contrast to normal times in which there is a Court but not a
People, in constitutional times there is a People, with a will no Court can
obstruct.168
Unlike Ackerman, Amar does not distinguish between constitutional
and political moments.  Nonetheless, he shares Ackerman’s critique of repre-
sentative institutions.  Like Ackerman, he disassociates the People from
electoral systems and existing formal political arrangements.  Like Rous-
seau, Amar argues that although the Constitution empowers and limits the
government, popular sovereignty can neither be waived nor limited by the
Constitution.169  The “counter-majoritarian difficulty” wrongly equates the
People with government and the Court with the dead hand.170  Consequently,
it ignores the agency costs of the representative system, such as its bias to-
wards long-serving incumbents and well-funded politicians whose agendas
might diverge from that of their constituencies; the deficiencies inherent in
162 Id. at 1046.
163 Id. at 1030–31.
164 Id. at 1026–27.  Reification denotes the reduction of aspects of reality into a thing-like
category that does not correspond to their reality.  The part displaces the whole. Id.  In this
context, scholars arguably reduce the People to a few institutions and practices, but these
cannot possibly “captur[e] the living reality of popular sovereignty.” Id. at 1028.
165 Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1805 (2007).
166 See Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 153, at 1054. R
167 Id. at 1055–56.
168 Ackerman’s theory has been contested on many levels.  His distinction between politi-
cal and constitutional moments seems especially wanting. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Con-
stitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of
Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992) (reviewing ACKERMAN, WE THE PEO-
PLE, supra note 153); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).  This R
distinction is foundational for Ackerman because it makes democratic self-government possi-
ble, despite the deficiencies of political systems and lack of political participation by the citi-
zenry given the existence of these constitutional moments.  Accordingly, if these moments do
not really exist, then democratic self-government is unachievable.
169 ROUSSEAU, supra note 155, at 67; Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amend- R
ing the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1055 (1988).
170 Amar, supra note 169, at 1077–79, 1085. R
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gerrymandering; and the problems of an ill-informed public.  These deficien-
cies show that the government is not representative of the People and that,
therefore, judicial review is not counter-majoritarian when it limits govern-
ment.171  On the other hand, Amar grounds the process of amending the Con-
stitution in an inalienable right of the People to abolish and amend
government at any time. Unlike Ackerman’s structural amendment in viola-
tion of Article V, this right to amendment preempts the need for a lawless
revolution.  This right to amendment further demonstrates that the Constitu-
tion is representative of the People, because the People can change it at will.
It then follows that the Court acts on behalf of the People when it enforces
the Constitution.172  Because the People is “democratic by definition,” judi-
cial review is not incompatible with democracy.173
The objections to the avoidance position in which popular sovereignty
is presented as a self-validating notion may take two primary forms: An
empirically-oriented critique would point out that the People has never man-
ifested itself, and that avoidance scholars have not articulated a convincing
mechanism by which the general will can be discerned and distinguished
from the mundane aggregation of preferences in ordinary majorities.  A
more normative critique would argue that it is circular to claim that popular
sovereignty is attractive by reference to the People.
d. De-Centering
The fourth discursive technique is the de-centering position advanced
by Frederick Schauer, Barry Friedman, and Michael Klarman.  Unlike the
avoidance position, which de-centers representative democracy, the fourth
form of denial de-centers the Court and thus de-emphasizes constitutional-
ism.  It presents a descriptive—rather than a conceptual—denial.  One ver-
sion of the de-centering position, advocated by Schauer, rests on a positivist
distinction between constitutionalism and the social presuppositions of con-
stitutionalism.  Legitimacy is therefore rooted in social facts of ongoing ac-
ceptance.174  Schauer claims that one should distinguish between the
Constitution as a text and the sociological conceptions that underlie it and
validate its authoritative power.175  Thus, a societal change in sociological
conceptions regarding what counts as law, the meaning of rights, and the
authority of the constitutional text is an extra-textual venue for constitutional
171 Id. at 1080–86.
172 Id. at 1078.
173 Id. at 1079.
174 For a contrasting view of the normative conception of legitimacy mentioned above, see
supra notes 42–44 and accompanying discussion. R
175 Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 147–48
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
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amendment.176  Unlike Amar’s theory of amendment according to prescribed
rules and existing rights, or Ackerman’s revolutionary change in violation of
Article V, this argument presents a third way for constitutional change
which is both extra-legal and not lawless.177
Another instantiation of de-centering is the adoption of a procedural
reading of the Constitution.178  Schauer argues that the “counter-majoritarian
difficulty” is based on a view of the Constitution as the main locus for deci-
sions about national identity and fundamental values.179  Judicial intervention
becomes worrisome given these enormous stakes.  In contrast to this sub-
stantive constitutional theory, Schauer espouses a procedural reading of the
Constitution as merely a text that sets the “basic structure of government.”180
Under this “modest” reading, judicial intervention involves no enormous
stakes and no assault on self-rule because representative institutions and the
general public still decide the main issues.  Hence, judicial supremacy is not
as threatening as it might initially seem.181  Accordingly, the “modest” Con-
stitution and judicial supremacy go hand-in-hand.182
In contrast to the historical framing of the avoidance positions, the de-
centering argument is largely an empirical rejection of the alleged judicial
intrusion of the domain of policy-making.  Proponents of the de-centering
position, like Friedman, maintain that most important national and political
decisions are not decided by the Court, and, even if they are so decided, they
are usually consistent with popular will.183  Klarman adds that only a roman-
tic view would perceive the Court as the “countermajoritarian hero.”184
Schauer goes further by arguing that most of the issues on the Court’s docket
are not even political in any interesting sense.185  His argument is part of a
176 Id. at 148; see also Alexander & Schauer, supra note 153, at 463.  For a critique of this R
positivist position, see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW
DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 30 (2001) (noting the ambiguity and
contestability of social facts and the need to make normative choices amongst different read-
ings of social facts); Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 64, 84 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (arguing that coercion exists
not only in the case of the legal ordering but also in the sociological presuppositions that
validate it, and concluding that participation in this coercion should also be justified).
177 Schauer, supra note 175, at 154 n.20 (situating his position between Amar’s and R
Ackerman’s).
178 Schauer, supra note 150, at 1045. R
179 Id. at 1064–67.
180 Id. at 1065.
181 Id. at 1064–67.
182 Id. at 1067.
183 See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
184 Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV.
145, 192 (1998) [hereinafter Klarman, Constitutionalism]; see also Michael J. Klarman, Re-
thinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Klarman, Revolutions].
185 Schauer writes:
For in a year in which the war in Iraq, terrorism, escalating fuel prices, healthcare,
immigration reform, Social Security, the nuclear capability of Iran and North Korea,
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general descriptive sociological view of the law as a “limited domain.”186
This kind of empirical argument, however, is open to the charge that it uses
an overly narrow definition of what counts as politics.187
e. Summary of Denial Positions
The preceding discussion explicated four prominent positions of denial:
incorporation, clarification, avoidance, and de-centering.  Advocates of the
incorporation position focus their analysis on the intra-conceptual level of
the concept of democracy by defending a conception of democracy that in-
corporates constitutionalism.  Advocates of the clarification position focus
on the inter-conceptual level by presenting the relationship between the con-
cepts of democracy and constitutionalism as critically symbiotic.  In the in-
corporation and clarification positions, democratic politics is by definition
constrained either by reading constitutionalism into democracy as a norma-
tively attractive interpretation of democracy itself (incorporation), or by
making constitutionalism a necessary condition for the practice of democ-
racy (clarification).  Accordingly, democratic politics is, and should be, con-
trolled through the substantive commitments that define the political
community as such, either because these commitments are part of what de-
mocracy, properly understood, means (incorporation) or because democracy
is not self-executing (clarification).  The more the community upholds these
constraints, the more it is faithful to its own constitutive commitments, and
the better it will be able to function as a democracy.
The avoidance and de-centering positions underplay the importance of
the limits on politics by claiming that the Court is not really dealing with
Hurricane Katrina, the estate tax, corporate scandals, CEO salaries, bird flu, and the
minimum wage appeared to dominate the nation’s public agenda and the workload of
the nation’s policymakers, only with respect to terrorism and related issues of home-
land security—and then only as to one aspect of those—was there much overlap
between the agenda of the nation’s governance and the agenda of the Supreme Court.
Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—And the
Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8–9 (2006).  He adds:
Perhaps most importantly, the distance between the Court’s activities and the public’s
major concerns—the relatively small number of decisions the Court actually
removes from what the public would desire to control directly—calls into question
much of the contemporary and not-so-contemporary angst about the countermajori-
tarian or antidemocratic behavior of the Court.
Id. at 50.
186 Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1942 (2004)
(noting that “failing to recognize the overwhelming narrowness of legal argument produces a
distorted picture of the practices and institutions we know as the law”).
187 See Duncan Kennedy, The Political Stakes in “Merely Technical” Issues of Contract
Law, 1 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 7, 8 (2001) (arguing that private law issues often considered
“merely technical” actually have political stakes because choices between different rules and
standards correspond to choices made in the political domain between individualism and altru-
ism).  Additionally, Kennedy argues that the politics of technicality vindicates the center
against the left and right extremes and upholds the distinction between the private and the
public. Id.
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political issues (de-centering) or that the Court is dealing with second-rate
political issues (avoidance).  While the incorporation and clarification posi-
tions are heavily conceptual, the de-centering position is largely empirical or
descriptive, and the avoidance position is largely historical.  The de-center-
ing and avoidance positions reject the tendency of the other strands of the
unity position to escalate the debate to a highly theoretical realm and thus
implicitly accuse it of inflating the political stakes or at least of failing to
realistically assess them.  Yet, like the other strands of denial, they arrive at
unity of the concepts.
ii. Reconciliation
Unlike the deniers, the reconcilers acknowledge that proper use of the
concepts of constitutionalism and democracy will inevitably result in ten-
sion.  Nonetheless, they believe that this tension can eventually be recon-
ciled through changes in the role or form of judicial review.  Reconcilers
reconcile the tension through four primary discursive moves: democratic
proceduralism (by assigning the Court the task of policing the political pro-
cess); republican proceduralism (by assigning the Court the task of policing
the deliberative process); minimalism (by advocating judicial deference to
the political process); and popular constitutionalism (by incorporating de-
mocracy into constitutionalism).
a. Democratic Proceduralism
The democratic proceduralism position, also called pluralist or process
theory, argues that the Court merely facilitates the procedural fairness of the
democratic process by enabling participation.  The Court intervenes when
the political market malfunctions and the process is untrustworthy.  This can
happen when insiders attempt to preserve their advantageous position by
blocking political change and excluding outsiders, or when there is a “sys-
tematic disadvantaging” of a minority group facing prejudice and hostil-
ity.188  Unlike the clarification strand within denial positions, here the
argument is for “judicial restraint” and avoiding value judgments given the
perceived problems of “counter-majoritarianism.”
Justice Stone’s famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products
Co. inspired much of the literature following this line of argument.189  John
Hart Ely, the main expositor of this position in legal scholarship, argues that
the Court makes popular sovereignty possible—rather than thwarting it—by
188 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103
(1980).
189 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  For a discussion of the importance of footnote four, see
Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1289 (1982).  For a critique of the formula expressed in footnote four, see Bruce A.
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
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enabling participation and reinforcing representation.190  This approach rests
on three arguments.191  First, he argues that the Constitution is “overwhelm-
ingly” concerned with structure and process rather than with identifying and
preserving substantive fundamental values;192 the latter “is not an appropri-
ate constitutional task.”193  Second, he argues that this approach is consistent
with the principles undergirding American representative democracy,194
namely, that political decision-making processes should be equally accessi-
ble to citizens, and that the interests of those affected by political decisions
should be considered.195  Third, he argues that this approach “involves tasks
that courts, as experts on process,” are better qualified to carry out than
politicians196: “The point isn’t so much one of expertise as it is one of per-
spective.”197  As “comparative outsiders in our governmental system,”
judges are objective and more trustworthy than politicians in policing the
political process.198  Ely, then, reconciles the tension between constitutional-
ism and democracy by reading the Constitution—and reframing the role of
judicial review—as procedural.199  Unlike Dworkin, he rejects the use of po-
litical and moral philosophy in judicial intervention.200  This procedural the-
ory leads Ely to criticize Roe v. Wade as an illegitimate judicial intervention
akin to Lochner.201
Ely’s critics, however, assert that his flight from substance to procedure
has been unsuccessful,202 and that his theory presupposes a substantive polit-
190 Ely writes:
My main point in using the examples has been to suggest a way in which what are
sometimes characterized as two conflicting American ideals—the protection of pop-
ular government on the one hand, and the protection of minorities from denials of
equal concern and respect on the other—in fact can be understood as arising from a
common duty of representation. . . . [It is] a participation-oriented, representation-
reinforcing approach to judicial review.
ELY, supra note 188, at 86–87; see generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE R
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SU-
PREME COURT (1980).
191 ELY, supra note 188, at 87–88. R
192 Id. at 87–88, 92.
193 Id. at 88.
194 Id. at 88, 102.
195 Id. at 100.
196 Id. at 88.
197 Id. at 102.
198 Id. at 103.
199 Ely does not deny that the Constitution is motivated by a substantive goal, namely
“preserving liberty.”  He claims, however, that the Constitution’s emphasis is on “how” that
goal can be achieved. Id. at 100.
200 Id. at 58.
201 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 939–40 (1973).
202 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 57–70; Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitu- R
tional Theory—And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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ical theory of representative democracy.203  Despite the general perception
that Ely’s project has failed,204 some continue to advocate a modified version
of his theory of democratic proceduralism through the law of democracy
literature.205  Richard Pildes, for example, argues that judicial review polices
institutional design and prevents political self-entrenchment.206  This over-
sight is the “ineliminable task” of the Court, even if other domains are left
to the People.207  Unlike deliberative democrats who lament interest-group
politics, post-Elyian democratic proceduralists continue to work within the
pluralist paradigm.  Pildes rejects the “romantic” view of politics pro-
pounded by participatory democrats and recognizes “collective organiza-
tional forms” as the natural way politics is practiced.208  In politics—as in
markets—antitrust measures should allow citizens to compete.209  Thus, an
external supervisor is required to ensure the fairness of the rules of the politi-
cal game.  Still, although the Court should be more active in “structural”
issues, it should play a “minimal” and “circumspect role” in deploying
rights and equality arguments within the political domain in order to avoid
“curtailing” the democratic “process of self-revision.”210  By playing a lim-
ited role, the Court would avoid “Lochneriz[ing] the very design of demo-
cratic institutions.”211  Thus, post-Elyian proceduralists like Pildes reconcile
constitutionalism with democracy by reducing the role of the Court to the
necessary minimum to guarantee a competitive political process and thereby
203 See, e.g., HABERMAS, supra note 29, at 265–66; James E. Fleming, Constructing the R
Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV. 211, 219 (1993).  Fleming distinguishes between
two kinds of flight from substance, and claims that:
[Ely’s] theory does not take the first flight: it is not a process-based theory at all, but
rather a process-perfecting theory that perfects processes in virtue of its substantive
basis in a political theory of representative democracy (a qualified utilitarianism
rooted in equal concern and respect).  Ely’s theory, however, does take the second
flight: his two process-perfecting themes do not account for, and thus leave out,
certain substantive liberties that are manifested in our constitutional document and
implicit in our underlying constitutional order.
Fleming, supra, at 219 (emphasis added).
204 See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Pro-
cess Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 722 (1991).
205 For a defense of Ely’s political process theory in a qualified manner, see Michael J.
Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991).
206 Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARV. L. REV. 28, 43–44 (2004); see also Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review:
The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997).
207 Pildes, supra note 206, at 42. R
208 Id. at 53–54.
209 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lock-
ups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
210 Pildes, supra note 206, at 42, 48. R
211 Id. at 48.  Pildes writes: “By . . . invalidating self-entrenching, anticompetitive laws,
courts might do more to secure the relevant interests of individuals and groups than by issuing
first-order judicial decisions about rights or equality. . . . [C]ourts have a distinct calling . . . to
address the structural problem of self-entrenching laws that govern the political domain.” Id.
at 54.
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minimizing the infringement upon the political space in the name of
constitutionalism.
b. Republican Proceduralism
The second major discursive move in reconciliation is the civic republi-
can revival.  Unlike the democratic proceduralism position, which advocates
for a limited role for the judiciary, the republican proceduralism position
entails a more active judiciary.212  This difference in judicial roles follows
from a robust conception of politics.  Unlike democratic proceduralists, re-
publican proceduralists believe that in politics virtuous citizens should pur-
sue the common good, even though in private life they follow self-interest.
This conception of politics has been referred to as “jurisgenerative” politics,
in which the multitude is transformed into a singular identity.213  The Court’s
task becomes to police the inclusive deliberative democratic process, which
expresses the People’s identity and the pursuit of the common good.
Some of Frank Michelman’s writings exemplify the republican
proceduralism position.214  Michelman proposes what he calls a dialogic,
“process-based, republican-not-pluralist constitutional jurisprudence.”215
Republican constitutionalism, on this view, “involves the ongoing revision
of the normative histories that make political communities sources of con-
testable value and self-direction for their members.”216  Pluralism, on the
other hand, is “the deep mistrust of people’s capacities to communicate per-
suasively to one another their diverse normative experiences . . . .”217  Plural-
ists perceive politics as a market in which different parties aim at
maximizing their preferences.218  Thus, Michelman shares with Ely the “rep-
resentation reinforcing” justification for judicial review, but he does so in
order to maintain jurisgenerative politics.219  The task of the Court on this
view is “protect[ing] the republican state—that is, the citizens politically
engaged—from lapsing into a politics of self-denial.”220  Michelman aims to
bypass “[a]ctual democracy,” i.e. majoritarian politics, by “appealing to
law’s republic.”221  The Court then protects the presuppositions of United
States constitutionalism by ensuring that dialogue between participants of
212 HABERMAS, supra note 28, at 265, 276–77. R
213 Robert M. Cover has influenced this “jurisgenerative” line of thinking. See Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.
4 (1983).
214 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 168; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 R
Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
215 Michelman, supra note 168, at 1526–27. R
216 Id. at 1495.
217 Id. at 1507 (emphasis in original).
218 Id. at 1508.
219 Id. at 1525; see also id. at 1502–24.
220 Id. at 1532.
221 Id. at 1537.
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the political process is free of coercion and exclusion.222  By redefining de-
mocracy as a republican process of self-government and giving the Court a
primary position in administering this process, Michelman hopes to recon-
cile the tension at the base of the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”223
c. Minimalism
The third discursive move within reconciliation is the minimalism of
scholars such as Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein.  These scholars advo-
cate a “weaker” form of judicial review to render judicial review compatible
with democratic theory.  This confinement is less structural and more a ques-
tion of judicial policy or attitude.  Accordingly, the minimalism position
calls for judicial modesty or deference.
Bickel considers judicial review a “deviant institution” and argues for
applying “method[s] of avoidance,” procedural devices such as ripeness,
standing, or the political question doctrine.224  These “passive virtues” allow
the Court to avoid deciding certain issues on grounds of principle when strict
application of principles would not allow the needed flexibility for expedi-
ency in politics, or when such principles would not be widely accepted in
society.225  This means, in Gerald Gunther’s memorable formulation, a
“100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time.”226
Similarly, Sunstein advocates for a judicial minimalism in which judges
act modestly and leave issues “incompletely theorized.”227  Accordingly,
judges should generally decide cases “as narrowly as possible,” thus leaving
more to the political process.228  Like Bickel, Sunstein asks the Court to re-
solve disputes without going into too many unnecessary and controversial
territories.  From this perspective, Sunstein, like Ely—considers the ruling in
222 Id. at 1526–27.
223 For a critique of this account, see HABERMAS, supra note 28, at 285–86 (claiming that R
republicans fail to distinguish between ethics and politics given their idealization of politics,
and that they ground preconditions in a particular antecedent agreement of the community
rather than an ideal inclusive one). See also Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power
and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence:
Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEO. L.J. 2243, 2262–63 (1993) (arguing
that the precondition of non-distortion is neither an actual nor an external precondition for
United States constitutionalism; rather it is a contested condition within the practice itself,
because the inclusion of different actors and the degree of this inclusion are a matter of dispute
and struggle).
224 BICKEL, supra note 11, at 18, 128 (referring to the Court as a “deviant institution”); id. R
at 170 (referring to “method of avoidance” and “ripeness”); id. at 116 (referring to “stand-
ing”); id. at 183–93 (referring to “political question doctrine”).
225 See id. at 111–98.
226 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
227 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 39–41 (1999).
228 Id. at 61.
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Roe v. Wade a “large mistake.”229  Sunstein’s minimalism, however, is more
substantive than Bickel’s and thus more deferential to politics.  Unlike
Bickel, Sunstein does not consider the Court to be the only principled insti-
tution.230  Nonetheless, this attempt by the minimalist position to avoid the
political involvement of the Court has been criticized as unsuccessful given
the Court’s need to exercise political judgment over when and how to deploy
minimalism and minimalist devices.231
d. Popular Constitutionalism
The fourth discursive move in reconciliation is the popular constitution-
alism of scholars such as Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet.  This line of
argument challenges the exclusivity and finality of judicial interpretations of
the Constitution, arguing for popular involvement in enforcing and deter-
mining constitutional meaning.  Unlike the de-centering position’s argument
that most of the important decisions are already outside the constitutional
realm, popular constitutionalists seek to distribute the authority to create
constitutional meaning.232  The popular constitutionalist discursive move
reverses the incorporation move within denial:  While denial incorporates
constitutionalism into democracy, popular constitutionalism incorporates de-
mocracy into constitutionalism.
Kramer, for example, acknowledges the tension between constitutional-
ism and democracy, but he frames it as a tension internal to constitutional-
ism itself, between two competing conceptions of constitutionalism: judicial
supremacy, in which judges interpret the Constitution, and popular constitu-
tionalism, in which the People interpret it.233  He argues that the growing role
229 Sunstein, supra note 68, at 38; cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Fate of Roe v. Wade and R
Choice, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2008, at D9.
230 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 145–46 (1993); see also Christopher J.
Peters & Neal Devins, Alexander Bickel and the New Judicial Minimalism, in THE JUDICIARY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY,
AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 45, 46 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo
eds., 2005) (arguing that “Bickel’s minimalist project was juricentric” while “the New
Minimalism . . . is primarily policentric” (emphasis in original)).  Peters and Devins cite other
“substantive” minimalists.  Peters & Devins, supra, at 46; see, for example, ROBERT A. BURT,
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997); Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for
Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008).
231 Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 207–08 (1968) (arguing that Bickel
fails to extract the Court from politics); Mark Tushnet, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional
Regimes: Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY,
supra note 230, at 23–43 (claiming that Bickel and Sunstein fail to draw a convincing distinc- R
tion between law and politics).
232 See Schauer, supra note 150, at 1065 (noting this difference between his position and R
popular constitutionalists).
233 Kramer, We the Court, supra note 104, at 14 (describing judicial supremacy and popu- R
lar constitutionalism as “conflicting principles”).
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of the Court comes at the expense of popular involvement in constitutional-
ism.  This lack of popular involvement means that the Constitution is no
longer “an act of popular will.”234  Rather than a model of judicial
supremacy in which the Court, while retaining the final word, is but one of
several branches authorized to interpret the Constitution, the Court applies a
model of judicial sovereignty in which it is the only branch authorized to
interpret the Constitution.235  Rejecting judicial sovereignty, Kramer criti-
cizes the exclusivity and finality of the Court’s interpretive judgments.236
The Constitution should not be merely an ordinary law to be defined by the
Court alone.  Accordingly, the People should be entrusted with the final in-
terpretive authority and the Court should be subordinate to the People, as
represented by the elected branches.  Yet, Kramer emphasizes that he is not
arguing for the abolition of judicial review “or even judicial supremacy”;237
rather, he suggests “thinking about a minimal model of judicial review that
calls upon judges to intercede only where necessary.”238
Kramer’s views resemble other scholars’ concerns with the separation of
powers.239  These scholars have propagated what has come to be known as
“departmentalism,” according to which “each of the three branches of the
federal government possesses independent and co-ordinate authority to inter-
pret the Constitution,” and hence the Court does not have a privileged or an
exclusive position in its interpretive judgments.240  Nevertheless, for many
departmentalists, the Court’s interpretation practically binds the President
and Congress because the Constitution is understood to grant the Court this
power.241  Departmentalism, then, rejects judicial supremacy but not necessa-
rily judicial review.242
Another version of popular constitutionalism rejects finality, but is less
concerned with interpretive authority and more with enforceability.  Tushnet,
in some of his recent interventions, has adopted such a reconciliatory ap-
234 Id. at 12–13 (comparing the Constitution as “an act of popular will” in the time of the
founders with judicial supremacy that “had entered America[ ]’s political lexicon by the
1830s”).
235 Id. at 13–16.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 166.
238 Id.
239 See, e.g., SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABOR-
TION AND WAR POWERS DEBATES (1992); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 236 (1994).
240 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2004); see also Kramer, We the Court, supra note
104, at 84–86 (tracing this view back to Madison and Jefferson). R
241 Kramer, We the Court, supra note 104, at 7–8 (explaining that even scholars who R
criticize judicial finality do not generally object to judicial supremacy); Post & Siegel, supra
note 240, at 1033 n.30 (explaining that “[m]ost scholars” accept the binding and final nature R
of judicial rulings (citations omitted)); see also id. at 1033 (noting inter alia that departmental-
ists believe finality stems from the constitutional allocation of judicial power in the courts).
242 John E. Finn, The Civic Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTI-
TUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 41, 59 (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George
eds., 2001).
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proach.  In Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Tushnet argues for reconciling the
tension by adopting a “weak-form” judicial review according to which the
Court can examine the constitutionality of legislative acts but does not have
the power to enforce declarations of unconstitutionality and does not have
the final word.243  The last word remains with the legislature.  Accordingly,
this form of judicial review allows courts to identify and enforce socio-eco-
nomic rights but only in a provisional manner that can be overturned by the
legislature.244  The argument, then, justifies adopting socio-economic rights
by minimizing what is conceived of as an anti-democratic feature of judicial
intervention.
e. Summary of Reconciliation Positions
Reconcilers accept judicial review and focus their concerns on the form
it takes and the authority of judicial interpretations of the Constitution.
Reconcilers aim to change the balance of power by reducing judicial power
vis-a`-vis legislative power and curbing the judiciary’s influence.  As such,
one of the main differences between some scholars of reconciliation and the
de-centering position within denial is that the former is prescriptive and the
latter is descriptive.
For reconcilers, constraints on politics are allowed, but only to the ex-
tent necessary to protect the democratic process (democratic proceduralism),
protect membership in the political community (republican proceduralism),
and so long as the Court shows deference to political institutions (minimal-
ism), or leaves room for popular participation (popular constitutionalists).
Some of these scholars define the relevant political community more nar-
rowly than others (pluralistic and aggregative for the democratic procedural-
ists, rather than deliberative and participatory for republican proceduralists).
Thus, while for many reconcilers constitutionalism is a procedural notion,
the meaning of proceduralism differs from one group to another depending
on their (substantive) conception of the political community.
While differences in reconcilers’ proceduralism(s) are significant for the
kind of politics they espouse, deniers are largely more constraining of polit-
ics than reconcilers.  Unlike reconcilers, deniers are unapologetic about
these constraints since they see them as part and parcel of their conceptions
of politics and democratic self-government.  These constraints are internal,
integral, and constitutive of—rather than external to—politics.
C. A Discourse of Disunity
The discourse of disunity argues that it is impossible to unite constitu-
tionalism and democracy.  Proponents of this discourse believe that there is
243 MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WEL-
FARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (2008).
244 Id. at xi.
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no indisputable theory that can successfully integrate judicial review in de-
mocracy.  They highlight the irreducibility of disagreement, and argue that it
is misguided to pretend that disagreement can be superseded in some con-
sensual manner.245  For some scholars, this belief in the irreducibility of dis-
agreements is not limited to the good and the just, but extends to
legitimacy.246  If legitimacy itself is disputable, it follows that it cannot be
deployed to contain disputes about the good and the just.  This Section dis-
cusses two main groups of positions within the discourse of disunity: en-
dorsement (which endorses judicial review despite its incompatibility with
democracy) and dissolution (which abolishes judicial review given its in-
compatibility with democracy).
i. Endorsement
Endorsement positions differ substantially from the denial, reconcilia-
tion, and dissolution positions because they do not deny or attempt to recon-
cile the tension between constitutionalism and democracy; nor do they
follow the dissolution recipe for resolving the tension, which is to advocate
the majoritarian conception of democracy and annul judicial review.  Argu-
ments advanced by Frank Michelman, Louis Seidman, and Laurence Tribe
exemplify this position.
a. Frank Michelman
I earlier discussed the civic republican strand in Michelman’s writings,
which militated in favor of classifying them within reconciliation positions.
Here, I examine Michelman’s later writings, in which he argues that “there is
no such reconciliation to be had.”247  This position originates in “a grown-up
acceptance” of contradiction and not only “of ambivalence, complexity and
approximation.”248  Indeed, the “appreciation of hitherto denied contradic-
tion can be emancipatory.”249  Rather than a pessimistic acknowledgment of
the contradiction between human impulses of individualism and collectiv-
ism, Michelman believes that “the contradiction is [his] friend.”250  Accord-
ingly, deconstruction should not lead to relinquishing construction;
acknowledging abstraction does not dispense with rights altogether; and rec-
245 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 153–54 (1999).
246 As discussed below, this extension of contestability is more forceful in the endorsers’
case than in the dissolvers’ because the dissolvers ultimately offer an answer to the legitimacy
question that seeks to overcome contestability.
247 MICHELMAN, supra note 50, at 32.  Michelman writes, “[Dworkin’s] argument seems R
meant to reassure and persuade us that we really can reconcile a democratic aspiration . . . with
the practice of letting a few judges decide the applied contents of the country’s basic laws.  But
I think the real, darker-hued message is that there is no such reconciliation to be had.” Id.
248 Frank I. Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory World,
in NOMOS XXVIII: JUSTIFICATION 71, 84 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1986).
249 Id. at 86.
250 Id. at 94.
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ognizing the ambivalence of distinctions like the one between law and polit-
ics does not lead to withering them away.251
Michelman considers judicial review to be a liberal edifice of prudence,
and not a logical necessity of liberalism.252  Nevertheless, the centrality of
the activist progressive judge, the Court, and judicial review are constant
themes in his work.  In his reconciliation position, it is the dialogic judge
who enhances our freedom,253 and in the endorsement position, it is the re-
sponsive judge who enhances the credibility and respectability of the legal
order in the eyes of the citizens.254  There are two crucial differences be-
tween these characterizations: First, the authority of the judge in the endorse-
ment position is no longer derived, as in the reconciliation position, from a
reification of the identity of the People;255 and, second, in the endorsement
position, judicial proclamations are not considered as public authoritative
answers to the question of legitimacy.
This endorsement position vis-a`-vis legitimacy warrants further discus-
sion.  Michelman argues that legitimacy per se is not achievable; one has to
settle for a weaker idea of “legitimation-worthiness” of the general structure
of authority, which can legitimate legal and political decisions and their en-
forcement.256  One can approximate a public demonstration of legitimacy
without ever realizing it.257  While legitimacy is not achievable, procedural
validity is insufficient because what is needed is normative validity.258  Le-
gitimation, then, is less than legitimacy, but more than mere procedural va-
lidity.  This legitimation does not follow from a procedural idea of
democracy or from an act of democratic founding by the People.  Instead,
democratic legitimation is impossible for three reasons: circularity, infinite
regress, and “reasonable interpretive pluralism.”259
One cannot define democracy by reference to democracy itself because
that would be circular.  Ultimately, one must appeal to substance to judge
the procedure.  And one cannot judge the respect-worthiness of a democratic
process, whether constitutional or majoritarian, by reference to the respect-
worthiness of a previous democratic process because that will only lead to
“infinite regress.”260  Likewise, deflecting from one concrete level of contro-
versial laws to a higher and more abstract level of basic laws merely leads to
251 Id. at 94, 89–90, 83–84.
252 MICHELMAN, supra note 50, at 135. R
253 Michelman, supra note 214, at 75. R
254 MICHELMAN, supra note 50, at 58–60. R
255 Id. at 13.
256 Frank I. Michelman, Reply to Ming-Sung Kuo, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 715, 726 (2009).
257 MICHELMAN, supra note 50, at 8; Frank I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of R
Constitutional Theory, 13 RATIO JURIS 63, 76 (2000).
258 Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV. CONST.
STUD. 101, 115 (2003) (distinguishing between validity, legitimacy, and rightness: Laws need
not be just to be legitimate and may be valid yet illegitimate).
259 Michelman, supra note 257, at 70. R
260 Frank I. Michelman, Dilemmas of Belonging: Moral Truth, Human Rights, and Why We
Might Not Want a Representative Judiciary, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1221, 1240 (2000).
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disagreement over the proper interpretation of these higher laws that are
meant to settle the controversy in a more concrete way.  And attempting to
avoid this new interpretive controversy by searching for a higher level leads,
again, to infinite regress.261
By “reasonable interpretive pluralism,” Michelman means an irreduci-
ble residue of disagreement with respect to the moral justifiability of politi-
cal coercion (as in disagreement over the interpretation and application of
human rights).262  Reasonable interpretive pluralism is an assumption about
social life.  Denying it would simply demonstrate its existence, because it
would reveal the existence of disagreement between those who believe that
disagreement over legitimacy is irreducible and those who do not.
Such disagreement exists between Michelman and Rawls.  For Rawls,
disagreement is contained amongst reasonable persons; irreconcilable con-
flict only persists between the reasonable and the unreasonable.  For
Michelman, however, disagreement is pervasive among the reasonable.  For
Rawls, a convergence of an overlapping consensus of differently situated,
yet reasonable, substantive theories on a bill of rights makes the project of
constitutional democracy possible.  Under this account, controversy in mod-
ern constitutional regimes is ultimately containable through consensus on a
conception of legitimacy.  In contrast, Michelman doubts the possibility of
convergence: Abstract constitutional essentials detached from their practical
materialization are a carte blanche, and thus it is impossible to reach an
agreement over them.  Abstraction merely hides disagreement.  If abstrac-
tion fails to contain disagreement, then Rawlsian convergence is not possi-
ble, and Rawlsian legitimacy fails.
Michelman does not reject proceduralism in which rightness judgments
are transformed into constitutionality.263  Instead, he believes that methods of
substance-avoidance or controversy-avoidance are doomed to fail.264  Rawl-
sian and Habermasian proceduralism purport to offer abstract background
conditions for legal and political ordering.  Yet, such procedures require sub-
stantive judgments on whether their standards are fulfilled.265  Thus, they do
not allow citizens to escape from making controversial substantive judg-
ments that would lead to disagreement.  Universalizable hypothetical accept-
ability of these abstract conditions is impossible even for the reasonable,
given their removal from meaningful concrete materialization.
For Michelman, then, contestable substantive judgments are simply in-
evitable.  Legitimation can follow only from juristic competence that allows
261 MICHELMAN, supra note 50, at 49–50; Michelman, supra note 257, at 75–76. R
262 Michelman, supra note 257, at 70–72; Frank I. Michelman, Postmodernism, R
Proceduralism, and Constitutional Justice: A Comment on van der Walt and Botha, 9 CON-
STELLATIONS 246, 246–47 (2002).
263 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, A Reply to Baker and Balkin, 39 TULSA L. REV. 649, 658
(2004).
264 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 MOD.
L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2003); Michelman, supra note 214, at 122–24. R
265 Michelman, supra note 257, at 67–68. R
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such judgments based on a chosen set of principles.  Constitutionalism
means the existence of a priori non-negotiable normative principles that in-
form a jurist’s understanding of the regime as democratic and in compliance
with human rights principles.266  Only such substantive judgments can solve
the problem of infinite regress and allow the jurist to judge the regime.  Such
principles also inform the so-called proceduralist accounts.  These principles
lead Michelman to endorse a substantive conception of democracy, under-
stood as social democracy.267
While Michelman’s endorsement position does not necessarily conflict
with the other camps on these normative principles, disagreements follow
three interrelated themes.  First is the question—debated mainly with the
deniers and reconcilers—of whether these principles can be inscribed in, or
deduced from, noncontroversial notions of democracy or procedure in order
to grant legitimacy to the political regime.  Second is the debate between
endorsers and dissolvers regarding whether the negative answer to the previ-
ous question should lead to relinquishing existing arrangements.  Third is the
debate regarding who “authors” these principles: the judge (Dworkin); the
People (Ackerman); or individual reason (Michelman).
That is, for Michelman, there is no public author.  Individual reason
leads to these principles, but reason cannot preclude disagreement with other
reasonable individuals.268  Unlike with ordinary individuals, disagreement
among judges causes a problem for justice.  One cannot rely on judicial au-
thority to declare for her the respect-worthiness of the regime under which
she lives.269  Ultimately, this is a judgment for which the individual must
take responsibility.270  Of course, the individual may still consider others’
views vis-a`-vis the regime in making her own assessment.271
Michelman concludes that reason can establish a priori normative prin-
ciples to guide judgments regarding the legitimation-worthiness of a political
regime.272  This position owes a debt to both Kant and Kelsen because it
recognizes the necessity of grounding judgments in purely logical princi-
ples.273  Michelman’s position, then, differs from the reliance in the discourse
266 Id. at 66; MICHELMAN, supra note 50, at 50. R
267 Michelman, supra note 20; see also Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social R
Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 13, 33 (2003) (claiming that a
conception of democracy that does not include social rights is a poor conception of
democracy).
268 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 260, at 1243. R
269 Michelman, supra note 31, at 351. R
270 Michelman, supra note 257, at 66–67. R
271 Michelman, supra note 256, at 729–30. R
272 See Michelman, supra note 257, at 66–67. R
273 KANT, On the Common Saying, supra note 36, at 86.  Kant writes: R
But reason provides a concept which we express by the words political right.  And
this concept has binding force for human beings who coexist in a state of antagonism
produced by their natural freedom, so that it has an objective, practical reality, irre-
spective of the good or ill it may produce (for these can only be known by experi-
ence).  Thus it is based on a priori principles, for experience cannot provide
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of unity either on history (avoidance positions) or on factual judgments (de-
centering positions).  Unlike Kant, Michelman denies that public reason can
converge over these principles.  Like Kelsen, he claims that one needs to be
a “believer” in constitutionalism because no other “objective” way exists.274
Once one believes in constitutionalism, individual justifications can multiply
and there is no need to converge on an objective (i.e., publicly demonstrable
and deductively provable) normative justification.  The emphasis moves
from consensus on a shared justification to consensus on compliance based
on individualized justifications.275  Citizens may have diverging reasons for
collaborating with freedom-guaranteeing public institutions.  Nonetheless,
liberal legal and political ordering is possible so long as citizens—who rec-
ognize the importance of government under law—comply with and maintain
these institutions.  Michelman, then, abandons the quest for consensus-based
public justification in liberalism without abandoning the idea that liberal rea-
son—though it cannot command consensus—justifies public institutions of
freedom.
b. Louis Seidman
Seidman presents another version of the endorsement position.  Like
Michelman, he sees political conflict as intractable and rejects theoretical
attempts to contain this conflict.276  In fact, he believes conflict should be
knowledge of what is right, and there is a theory of political right to which practice
must conform before it can be valid.
Id. (emphasis in original); Hans Kelsen, The Function of the Constitution, in ESSAYS ON KEL-
SEN (Richard Tur & William Twining eds., 1986) (arguing that grounding the validity of a
lower legal norm in a higher norm leads to infinite regress, and that the only way to block this
regress is to presuppose a basic norm that would grant validity to the whole legal system).
Kelsen writes:
It is the ‘basic’ norm, because no further question can be raised about the basis of its
validity; for it is not a posited but a presupposed norm.  It is not a positive norm,
posited by a real act of will, but a norm presupposed in juristic thinking.  It repre-
sents the ultimate basis of the validity of all the legal norms forming the legal order.
Only a norm can be the basis of the validity of another norm.
Id. at 115.  Using Kantian terminology, Kelsen describes his move as providing “the transcen-
dental-logical condition of the judgments with which legal science describes law as objectively
valid.” Id. at 116.
274 Kelsen analogizes grounding the validity of the legal system in the basic norm to relig-
ious thinking: “[A]s a believer, one presupposes that one ought to obey the commands of
God.  This is the statement of the validity of a norm that must be presupposed in a believer’s
thinking in order to ground the validity of the norms of a religious morality.”  Kelsen, supra
note 273, at 112. R
275 See Michelman, supra note 31, at 353 (explaining that “Hobbes’s thesis” requires vol-
untary compliance with the laws in exchange for enjoying the benefits from collective organi-
zation in a political community); id. at 358 (explaining that believing in “the great goods of
government by law, along with Hobbes’[s] thesis, provides the major premise for . . . a legiti-
mation project”); id. at 364–65 (comparing his approach with Rawlsian “overlapping
consensus”).
276 SEIDMAN, supra note 176, at 7–8. R
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celebrated, as he considers stasis to be the real risk.277  Thus, scholars and
judges should reorient their perception of the role of constitutional law to-
wards unsettlement.  Entrenching political settlements through constitutional
law is inadequate because it means excluding losers from the political com-
munity.278  Unsettlement sends a message of inclusiveness because nothing
is final or fixed.279  Judicial review can play a major role in unsettlement.280
It simply must avoid pretending to rule according to neutral or apolitical
constitutional principles.281  Thus, unsettlement theory is mainly a change of
attitude and does not require serious changes in existing arrangements.282
Like Michelman, Seidman’s position questions the Rawlsian ideas of
reasonable pluralism and overlapping consensus.283  For Seidman, there is
nothing more than modus vivendi in politics; it is a dangerous posture to
claim otherwise.284  Indeed, if there is any potential overlapping consensus, it
will be around disagreement, rather than agreement on a fixed and stable
settlement of any sort.285
c. Laurence Tribe
Tribe presents a third version of the endorsement position.  He calls the
search for objective grounds for constitutional law and judicial review the
“futile search for legitimacy.”286  For Tribe, every exercise of power is prob-
lematic and suspect.  Theories legitimating exercises of power are dangerous
because they conceal the problematic nature of exercising power and silence
277 Id. at 56.
278 Id. at 44.
279 The openness for unsettlement, however, is no comfort for losers in the face of settled
injustice. See Brannon P. Denning, Against (Constitutional) Settlement, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
781, 789 (2002) (reviewing SEIDMAN, supra note 176). R
280 SEIDMAN, supra note 176, at 62, 83–84. R
281 Id. at 38–39.
282 Id. at 75, 180.
283 Id. at 32.
284 For a somewhat similar example of a neo-Hobbesian value-pluralist position, see JOHN
GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM 5–6 (2000).
285 Seidman’s arguments resemble Roberto Unger’s. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER,
FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOC-
RACY 530 (1987) (arguing that citizens should be granted “destabilization rights” to disrupt
concentrations of power and well-established institutions).  Yet, Seidman claims that his posi-
tion is different because he thinks “that ordinary legal institutions currently in place have the
capacity to serve the unsettlement function” without recourse to institutional changes. SEID-
MAN, supra note 176, at 57. R
286 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 5 (1985).  Tribe writes:
[A] sense of the ultimate futility of the quest for an Archimedean point outside
ourselves from which the legitimacy of some form of judicial review or constitu-
tional exegesis may be affirmed.  Even if we could settle on firm constitutional pos-
tulates, we would remain inescapably subjective in the application of those
postulates to particular problems and issues.  For, at every level of constitutional
discourse . . . there is no escape from the need to make commitments to significant
premises.  And these may be premises that others do not share . . . .
Id. (emphasis in original).
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doubts.287  Tribe sees legitimacy neither as the uncontested premise, nor the
product of constitutional practice.288  Rather, the search for legitimacy should
be abandoned altogether, because it is better to leave the tension apparent.289
Like Michelman, Tribe rejects the “pretense of proceduralism” in
which substance and subjectivity are denied.290  Disagreement is not limited
to the meaning of constitutional norms, but extends to the “very identity” of
the authoritative legal materials (“the Constitution”).291  On both these levels
of disagreement there are no “objectively deduced or passively discerned in
a viewpoint-free way. . . . single ‘answer[s]’ [that are] readily available.”292
There is no escape from the need to make choices and take “responsibility
for choice.”293  For Tribe, these choices are egalitarian.294
Yet, Tribe is wary of the possible nihilistic implications of his view and
emphatically rejects nihilism.295  He stands somewhere between the “rule of
law” and the “rule of men”; between an impartial order and an order based
on nothing but unconstrained personal preferences of judges; and between
those who believe in determinacy and those who see constitutional practice
as hopelessly indeterminate.  He neither endorses the first nor wholly denies
the second.296  Tribe, like Michelman and Seidman, does not see such con-
287 Id. at 6–7.
288 Id. at 273 n.9.
289 Id. at 7; see also Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a
Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV. 433, 437 & n.17 (1983).
290 TRIBE, supra note 286, at 28. R
291 Id. at 25.
292 Id. at 26.
293 Id. at 26, 44.
294 For instance, Tribe supports the redistribution of property, id. at 165–87, affirmative
action, id. at 221, and sex equality, id. at 238.  For some scholars, however, it is not clear how
these choices are made. See L. A. Powe, Jr., Making the Hard Choices Easy, 11 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 57 (1986) (reviewing TRIBE, supra note 286).  According to Powe, “a reader R
gets surprisingly little feel for how choices are really made.  Despite Tribe’s disclaimer of
certainty . . . the choices look and sound very easy for Tribe.” Id. at 75 (emphasis in original).
295 TRIBE, supra note 286, at 3.  “Nihilism” implies the denial of the availability of ration- R
ally-compelling statements about the world (epistemologically); the denial of the availability
of rationally-compelling answers to the question of the good life (in morality); and the denial
of the availability of rationally-compelling renditions of legal practice (in law). See Joseph
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 4–5
(1984).  More concretely, in legal theory nihilism is associated with the claim that the law is
incoherent, and thus all generalizations about legal practice are invalid.  Mark Tushnet, Truth,
Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies,
57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1309 (1979).  Tribe himself came close to this nihilist position in his
decision not to publish the projected second volume of the third edition of his treatise on
constitutional law because he concluded that constitutional practice has become contradictory
to the extent that a synthesis is no longer possible at this particular time.  Laurence H. Tribe,
The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 294–95 (2005).  For Tushnet’s reaction to this
decision, see Mark Tushnet, Treatise Writing During Constitutional Moments, 22 CONST. COM-
MENT. 251 (2005).
296 TRIBE, supra note 286, at 4.  Tribe writes: R
For all the writing and work I do ventures repeated acts of faith that more is at stake
than that; that constitutional interpretation is a practice alive with choice but laden
with content; and that this practice has both boundaries and moral significance not
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clusions as necessarily damaging for the continuation of the practice of judi-
cial review itself.  Indeed, elsewhere Tribe defends the legitimacy of judicial
review, not only on democratic grounds as the enforcer of the People’s own
constitutional commitments but also as light unto the nation’s.297  Indeed,
“[t]he whole point of an independent judiciary is to be ‘antidemocratic,’ to
preserve from transient majorities those human rights and other principles to
which our legal and political system is committed.”298
Tribe, Seidman, and Michelman, then, occupy a distinct position within
the field.  Whereas deniers, reconcilers, and dissolvers all arrive at a degree
of closure with respect to the conceptual controversy, the endorsement posi-
tion rejects such closure on either side of the debate and declines to make
such grand theoretical claims.299
ii. Dissolution
The second position in the discourse of disunity is dissolution.  Dissolu-
tion resolves the tension by practically forgoing constitutionalism as under-
stood by the discourse of unity and embracing majoritarianism.  Dissolution
is a mirror image of the discourse of unity.  Denial and reconciliation are
anti-majoritarian, while dissolution is majoritarian.300  The denial position
posits that conceptual clarity leads to unity of the concepts; the dissolution
position contends that it leads to disunity.301  Both the denial and reconcilia-
tion positions argue for the removal of fundamental issues like basic rights
or procedural fairness from politics; the dissolution position rejects this re-
moval.  Denial and reconciliation positions constrain democratic politics; the
wholly reducible to, although never independent of, the ends for which it is
deployed.
Id. Such an intermediary position led one commentator to observe that the “approach of not
taking an approach is not illuminating.”  Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as Mirror:
Tribe’s Constitutional Choices, 84 MICH. L. REV. 551, 553 (1986) (reviewing TRIBE, supra
note 286).  Posner argues that Tribe does not acknowledge the “political character of his own R
premises,” and that his policy choices are “based on will and emotion.” Id. at 561, 564.
297 Laurence H. Tribe, Jeremy Waldron & Mark Tushnet, On Judicial Review, DISSENT,
Summer 2005, available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=219.  Tribe’s
statement is a reply to Mark Tushnet, Democracy Versus Judicial Review, DISSENT, Spring
2005, available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=248.
298 TRIBE, supra note 63, at 80 (emphasis in original). R
299 This position is influenced by Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies.  Indeed,
Tushnet had reached a similar conceptual position in the 1980s claiming that judicial review is
both necessary and impossible.  Yet, when it emanates from within the liberal field, the posi-
tion is often more optimistic than in its critical form. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutionalism and
Critical Legal Studies, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 150 (Alan S.
Rosenbaum ed., 1988).  For another possible candidate for the endorsement position, see
Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103,
1111–12 (1983) (advocating “eclectic liberalism”).  Shiffrin criticizes the “desire for security
[that] triumphs over the willingness to live with and appreciate ambiguity.” Id. at 1192.
300 See supra Part II.B.i.a (discussing incorporation); supra Part II.B.i.c (discussing
avoidance).
301 See supra Part II.B.i.b (discussing clarification); see also WALDRON, supra note 38, at R
303.
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dissolution position argues for unconstrained democratic politics.  Denial
and reconciliation positions support judicial review; the dissolution position
rejects judicial review.  Denial and reconciliation positions are arguments for
an existing practice; the dissolution position is an argument against this
practice.
Indeed, the dissolution position critiques avoidance tactics (like Acker-
man’s) by rejecting the distinctions between two realms of politics or two
forms of expression of popular will.  There are two main expressions of this
rejection: unqualified proceduralism (for which the justification for majori-
tarianism is rights-based) and populism (for which the justification for ma-
joritarianism is participation-based).
a. Unqualified Proceduralism
Jeremy Waldron—a prominent exponent of the dissolution position—is
a majoritarian proceduralist.302  He opposes constraining majorities by higher
law; argues that citizens and their representatives should decide the proce-
dures to resolve conflicts regarding rights (including determinations of
which rights citizens should have); and defends legislative sovereignty.303
He offers two objections to the constitutional conception, a principled rights-
based argument and a more pragmatic one. The former takes the liberal
view of human agency to its logical end: The tension is not between rights
and democracy, but between constitutional rights enforced by judicial re-
view and democracy.  Entrenchment of rights means constitutional immu-
nity and corresponds to the disabling of citizens and their representatives,
rendering the regime anti-democratic.  According to this view, entrenchment
is based on a “predatory view” of human nature and sends a message of
mistrust that contradicts individual moral autonomy.  If the individual is to
be trusted as a bearer of rights, then the same individual should be trusted as
a bearer of political responsibilities.304  Waldron, then, makes an opposite
move to the incorporation strand in denial.  Whereas Dworkin shifts the dis-
302 Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LE-
GAL STUD. 18, 39 (1993); see also WALDRON, supra note 38, at 160.  Waldron rejects qualified R
majoritarianism and argues for pure majoritarianism.  The former reproduces conflicts regard-
ing considerations of justice and thus does not advance settlement of disagreements. Id. at
198.  For an example of a qualified majoritarianism, see Carlos Santiago Nino, A Philosophi-
cal Reconstruction of Judicial Review, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND
LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 285–332 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).  Nino starts
as a dissolver but he ends up as a reconciler.
303 For the roots of this view in the British tradition of constitutionalism, see A. V. DICEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (MacMillan & Co. 10th ed.
1961) (1885); Ulrich K. Preuss, The Political Meaning of Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTION-
ALISM, DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 11–27
(Richard Bellamy ed., 1996) (explaining that, in the British tradition, the protection of rights is
ensured by relations of cooperation between the different parts of the parliament rather than by
a court).
304 Waldron, supra note 302, at 27–28; see also WALDRON, supra note 38, at 282; Wal- R
dron, supra note 71, at 1366. R
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cussion into one internal to democracy, Waldron shifts it into one internal to
constitutionalism.
In contrast to positions within the unity discourse, Waldron asserts that
disagreement is a fact at all levels of political debate, demonstrating the
unity discourse’s failure to secure a consensual theory of authority.  Indeed,
rights theorists themselves disagree both about what counts as rights and the
content of these rights.305  Resolving disputes about rights by recourse to
theories of authority merely reproduces these disagreements.306  Eventually,
disputes about authority—“disagreements about how to settle disagree-
ments”—must be settled by a majoritarian procedure.307  By claiming that
rights themselves are controversial and thus cannot trump majority deci-
sions, Waldron specifically argues against Dworkin.308  To the extent that
Dworkin thinks that disagreements about justice can be contained by “integ-
rity” that seeks coherence in the political community, Waldron thinks that
disagreements about what justice requires extend to whether—and if so
how—justice should be balanced against integrity.309
Furthermore, Waldron believes justice cannot be the “first virtue of so-
cial institutions”—as Rawls claims in A Theory of Justice310—because even
reasonable people can disagree about justice.311  The Rawlsian notion of
overlapping consensus cannot contain disagreements on justice because jus-
tice can be derived from citizens’ conception of the good, and different con-
ceptions are unlikely to converge on a single list of rights.312  Furthermore,
self-binding theorists who argue for rationally imposed commitments ignore
disagreement about these very commitments.313  Consensus over constitu-
tional rules is impossible because people disagree about what reason re-
quires.  Finally, even if everyone agrees that representative political
institutions suffer from ailments—as Ackerman and Amar, for instance,
point out—such agreement should not lead to excluding citizens from partic-
ipation and handing decision-making to a small group of judges to decide
what the ailments are.314
Unlike the pluralist scholars who understand politics as a self-interested
pursuit, and deliberative democrats who conceive of politics as a moral con-
305 Waldron, supra note 302, at 30. R
306 Id. at 32.
307 Id. at 40.
308 Id. at 33.
309 WALDRON, supra note 38, at 197–98. R
310 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 3. R
311 WALDRON, supra note 38, at 160–61. R
312 Id. at 161–63.
313 Waldron, supra note 302, at 47–49; Jeremy Waldron, Precommitment and Disagree- R
ment, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 176, at 285, 292; see also supra Part II.B.i.b (dis- R
cussing “self-binding” theory within clarification).
314 Waldron, supra note 302, at 44–45. R
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vergence over the common good,315 Waldron understands politics as a good-
faith disagreement over principle “all the way down”316 where “everything
is up for grabs.”317  Nonetheless, Waldron does not argue that everything is
permissible in politics—or that whatever is decided in a majoritarian process
is democratic—and shares the liberal constitutionalist objective of “slowing-
down” politics.318  “Democracy and majority-decision,” Waldron writes,
“make moral sense only under certain conditions.”319
The pragmatic argument against judicial review further explains these
conditions.  The argument is both process- and outcome-related.  In terms of
process, the practice of settling disputes about rights, justice, and democracy
by allowing a few unelected judges—who settle their internal disagreements
by a majority vote—to review the enactments of elected legislators violates
principles of political equality and representation, and is therefore “illegiti-
mate.”320  The outcome-related argument stipulates that entrenchment of
rights leads to textual rigidity, formalism, and concern with the legitimacy of
judicial decisions, which are detrimental to substantive outcomes.321  These
two prongs of the pragmatic argument are conditioned upon four assump-
tions: (i) the existence of well-functioning democratic institutions; (ii) a
well-functioning court system; (iii) a commitment to individual and minority
rights; and (iv) the existence of disagreements about rights in society.322  The
lack of these conditions renders Waldron’s argument against judicial review,
and for unqualified proceduralism, inapposite.
b. Populism
The second discursive strand within the dissolution position is popu-
lism, of which Richard Parker and Mark Tushnet are two prominent propo-
nents.  Like Waldron, populists reject judicial review.  Unlike Waldron’s
unqualified proceduralism, however, populism emphasizes participation of
ordinary citizens more than rights.  The populist argument aims to improve
the democratic process by promoting ordinary political energy among the
People, rejecting the removal of issues from political debate, and rejecting
attempts at impeding majority rule.323  For the populist, political freedom
315 For an example of pluralist scholars, see supra notes 188–201 and accompanying text R
discussing Ely’s views.  For an example of deliberative democrats, see supra Part II.B.ii.b
discussing Michelman’s republican proceduralism. See also discussion infra Part III.C.
316 WALDRON, supra note 38, at 295. R
317 Id. at 303–05.
318 Id. at 305–06; see also Waldron, supra note 302, at 46. R
319 WALDRON, supra note 38, at 283. R
320 Waldron, supra note 71, at 1353. R
321 Id. at 1381.
322 Id. at 1359–69.
323 Richard D. Parker, Seegers Lecture: “Here, the People Rule”: A Constitutional Popu-
list Manifesto, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 531, 574, 578–79 (1993).
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means “political equality, popular sovereignty and, therefore, majority
rule.”324
Parker contrasts his populist position with the “liberal” position: The
former argues for equality in political agency; the latter justifies inequality in
political agency by supporting judicial review.325  Parker argues that the
“central mission . . . of modern constitutional law . . . ought to be to promote
majority rule.”326  He attacks what he calls the Anti-Populist sensibility,
which associates the majority with connotations like intolerance, irrational-
ity, emotionality, and irresponsibility and aims at taming ordinary politics.327
The Populist sensibility that Parker espouses attacks both political passivity
and derision of ordinary political energy.328  For him, the Anti-Populist fet-
ishizes constitutional law and the Court, while the Populist seeks disenchant-
ment from constitutionalism.  He rejects “oracles of . . . law,” arguing that
judges should be ordinary people; courts should be politicized; and, at times,
judicial decrees should be disobeyed.  In the long run, law cannot control
politics.329  Constitutionalism, then, is a fantasy providing losers in political
conflict with false guarantees.
Parker’s populism, however, might be considered illiberal (and thus
outside this project’s mapping).330  Parker invokes “honor” as a “moral sen-
timent” and a “social code” that dictates respect amongst citizens.331  In
contrast, Waldron is a liberal individualist who sees reason as a constraint on
324 Richard D. Parker, Five Theses on Identity Politics, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 53
(2005).
325 It should be noted, however, that the constitutional populists discussed here lack the
populist sensibility against private power, and focus only on public power. See Balkin, supra
note 20, at 1946 n.29 (noting this focus with respect to Parker’s work); Seidman, supra note R
20, at 567–68 (making a similar point with respect to Tushnet’s work). R
326 Parker, supra note 323, at 573. R
327 Id. at 553–55.
328 Id. at 556–57.
329 Id. at 564–65, 581–83.
330 Balkin includes Parker within the left-liberal camp composed of progressives and
populists.  Balkin, supra note 20, at 1943 n.23 (mentioning Parker’s support for constitutional R
populism); id. at 1944 (“An opposition between progressivism and populism exists wholly
within left-liberal discourse . . . .”).  However, Parker’s arguments seem to evoke four strands
that, taken together, lead him outside the left-liberal camp: (i) Rousseau-esque romanticism
(explaining the centrality of the term “sensibility”), see, for example, IRVING BABBITT, ROUS-
SEAU AND ROMANTICISM (1919); (ii) an anti-Nietzschean posture faulting the morality of the
few that excludes the majority from governance; for Nietzsche’s views, see FRIEDRICH NIETZ-
SCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY (Keith Ansell-Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans.,
1994); (iii) a romantic view of the People as a historic organic whole that goes back to Herder,
see, for example, JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER, ANOTHER PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND SE-
LECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS (Ioannis D. Evrigenis & Daniel Pellerin trans., 2004); and (iv) a
Schmittian view of the sovereignty of the People as extending outside the rule of law, see, for
example, CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVER-
EIGNTY (George Schwab trans., 2005).
331 Richard D. Parker, Democratic Honor: Liberal and Populist, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 291, 298–99 (2004).  Parker claims that the “populist democratic impulse vastly extends
access to the experience of honor.” Id. at 305.  Respect amongst citizens, according to this
view, emanates from honor and not from external constraints imposed on them.  Such con-
straints are disrespectful to citizens. Id. at 299–300.
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the passions.  Furthermore, Waldron’s work lacks the anti-elitist sensibility
of Parker’s populism.
Tushnet, discussed above within the reconciliation positions, has ex-
pressed a populist position in other writings that is more clearly within the
progressive liberal field.332  Like Parker, Tushnet calls his approach populist
because “it distributes responsibility for constitutional law broadly.”333  He
argues that “the Constitution belongs to us collectively” and not to lawyers
and judges.334  Judicial constitutional interpretation “has no special norma-
tive weight.”335  Unlike popular constitutionalists in the reconciliation posi-
tions, Tushnet and Parker aim not merely to weaken the interpretive
authority of judicial pronouncements, but to erase the distinction between
judicial and non-judicial formations of constitutional meaning.
Tushnet distinguishes between a “thick” Constitution and a “thin”
Constitution.  Populist constitutional law discusses and defends a “thin”
Constitution of fundamental principles exhibited in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Preamble of the United States Constitution.336  Proponents
of this approach “believe[ ] that the public generally should participate in
shaping constitutional law more directly and openly.”337  Thus, Tushnet de-
fines populist constitutional law as “a law committed to the principle of
universal human rights justifiable by reason in the service of self-govern-
ment.”338  For Tushnet, there is no contradiction between universal human
rights and populist constitutionalism.339  While the People might make bad
decisions, this is no different than judges and courts.340
Waldron, Parker, and Tushnet defend positions that make them dissolv-
ers who reject the rule of judges.  As such, dissolution is a distinct position
from all the other positions.  Whereas deniers and reconcilers overcome the
tension between constitutionalism and democracy, dissolvers see irreconcila-
ble tension.  Whereas endorsers consider it an insoluble tension, dissolvers
insist that it is soluble. Unlike reconcilers that are concerned with interpre-
tive supremacy and finality of judicial review, dissolvers attack the very le-
gitimacy of judicial review.  Rather than being an argument for modifying
judicial review or changing its relative status in the general power scheme,
as in some of the reconciliation strands, the dissolution position is an argu-
ment for the abolition of judicial review.
332 See supra note 243 and accompanying text. R
333 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS x (2000).
334 Id. at 181–82.
335 Id. at x.
336 Id. at 9–14.
337 Id. at 194.
338 Id. at 181.
339 Even radical measures, such as the nationalization of property, are consistent with
American political philosophy. See id. at 190.
340 Id. at 186.
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c. Summary of Disunity Positions
Endorsers and dissolvers employ two different notions of impossibility
or disunity.  For the dissolvers, impossibility encompasses the conceptual
and practical; for the endorsers, impossibility is confined to the realm of
conceptual demonstration and is not extended to prescriptive recommenda-
tions.  In other words, for the endorsement position, the conceptual disunity
does not dictate any determinate course of action.  Thus, the positions articu-
lated by Michelman, Seidman, and Tribe do not lead them to dispense with
judicial review like the dissolvers; instead, they embrace judicial review de-
spite the conceptual disunity.  Unlike Dworkin’s harmonious system in
which tensions disappear without any tradeoffs, endorsers are value-plural-
ists who argue that the persistence of the tension necessitates choices.  Their
choice is to endorse judicial review.
Endorsement, in turn, takes an intermediary position between unity po-
sitions and dissolution.  While proponents of endorsement differ from the
supporters of the discourse of unity by rejecting their conceptual positions
and many of their justifications, endorsers’ institutional prescriptions none-
theless end up in the same camp.  The proponents of endorsement practically
live with, more or less, the same arrangements that deniers and reconcilers
accept.  The main difference between unity and endorsement is the form of
justification offered for constitutionalism and the weight given to this form.
Despite different justificatory exercises they are institutionally similar.
Consequently, the division between unity and disunity does not corre-
spond to the division or competition between the two conceptions of democ-
racy (majoritarian and non-majoritarian).  The endorsement position does
not necessarily espouse a majoritarian conception.  Dissolution, however,
entails a majoritarian conception.
D. Summary: A Mapping
The preceding discussion has presented a complex structure of the field
of progressive liberal constitutional theory by surveying the central debate
concerning the tension between constitutionalism and democracy.  I have
attempted to show the different parts that constitute the whole of the field
and how these parts relate both to each other and to the whole.  The follow-
ing charts give a summary and a general overview of the field, while high-
lighting prominent trends inside it.
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FIGURE 2: MAPPING PROGRESSIVE LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Figure 2 presents a concrete illustration of the discursive structure.
Starting from the question of the perceived tension between constitutional-
ism and democracy, the chart shows how scholarly positions diverge into
two meta-groups.  These meta-groups are fragmented into four groups.
These four groups, in turn, are fragmented into several sub-groups. Well-
defined cohorts of scholars occupying a specific field of inquiry and address-
ing a similar question populate each of these meta-groups, groups, and sub-
groups.
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FIGURE 3: RELATIONSHIPS: PROGRESSIVE LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
While Figure 2 aims to map the whole of the discursive field, Figure 3
focuses on relations among the main groups that comprise the whole.  Figure
3 shows the basic dichotomy between unity and disunity as opposing camps
or meta-groups.  Within each camp, it shows the two groups that make up
the camp.  The dotted, double, and bold lines in Figure 3 indicate increasing
degrees of separation between the groups.  The dotted line in between denial
and reconciliation in the unity camp represents the narrow gap between the
two positions.  The double line between endorsement and denial shows the
marked difference between the group in the disunity camp and that in the
unity camp.  The former rejects the conceptual unity of constitutionalism and
democracy as advocated by the latter.  Yet, these differences do not over-
shadow the similarity.  Indeed, the tag “constitutional democracy” above
endorsement positions is the same as the one around the denial and reconcil-
iation positions.  The bold line surrounding the dissolution group shows that
this group is different from all other groups in its rejection of constitutional
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democracy and in that it embraces majoritarian proceduralism.  It also shows
the isolation of this group given this difference.
E. Convergence
These aforementioned positions seem to move on a linear spectrum
from constitutionalists to democrats, or from believers in the conceptual
unity of constitutional democratic regimes to non-believers.  More con-
cretely, the spectrum moves from constitutional democrats whose faith
seems unshakeable (deniers); to weak skeptics whose skepticism quickly
evaporates into solid faith in the unity of the concepts (reconcilers); to strong
skeptics whose skepticism of the concepts’ compatibility constantly looms,
yet never develops into a full-scale practical disbelief (endorsers); to active
non-believers (dissolvers).  Within this typology, only the endorsers do not
attempt to close the debate.  From this perspective, believers and non-believ-
ers appear as two sides of the same coin.
Within this spectrum, however, some positions converge.  On a first
reading, denial and reconciliation are two distinct positions, but when
closely examined, these positions collapse into each other: The difference
between deniers and reconcilers is really only a temporal matter—the pre-
sumed reconciliation between constitutionalism and democracy occurs at
different points of time.  For the deniers, it occurs at the beginning of the
intellectual journey; for the reconcilers, it occurs at the end of the intellectual
journey.  In other words, unity positions are all reconciliatory.  The differ-
ence between them is between the already-reconciled (i.e. the state of being
reconciled) and the soon-to-be reconciled (i.e. the act of reconciling).  Deni-
ers present a state of affairs in which reconciliation is unnecessary because
they dismiss the tension between constitutionalism and democracy, whereas
reconcilers provide reconciliatory theories because they acknowledge the
tension.
Furthermore, unity positions are all denial positions.  Temporally, de-
nial occurs either ab initio (for the deniers) or post factum (for the recon-
cilers).  In psychological terms, these positions correspond to the difference
between two forms of denial: wholesale denial (denying the existence of the
tension) and minimization (initially acknowledging the tension, but such ad-
mission is not daunting because eventually scholars solve it rather easily).341
Ultimately, the difference between denial and reconciliation is a matter of
degree, not kind.
Another interesting feature of this typology is that the tension between
constitutionalism and democracy––which pits the pro-constitutionalists
341 For denial as a defense mechanism see, for example, ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE
MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE (rev. ed. 1966).  For the distinction between wholesale denial (or
denial of fact) and minimization (or denial of impact), see, for example, THE OXFORD COM-
PANION TO EMOTION AND THE AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 114 (David Sander & Klaus R. Scherer
eds., 2009).
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against the pro-democrats––is not only external across the groups of posi-
tions but also internal to them.  Recall that within the dissolution positions,
one line of justification is rights-based, as in Waldron’s unqualified
proceduralism, while the other emphasizes participation, as in Tushnet’s pop-
ulism.  Likewise, the denial positions are, in general, inclined to rights-based
justifications, whereas the reconciliation positions are more participation-
based.  More importantly, some denial positions are relatively more inclined
to rights-based justifications, like Dworkin’s incorporation, while others are
more inclined to participation, like Ackerman’s avoidance.
Furthermore, both sides of the debate mirror each other’s accusations,
namely, reification and fetishism.342  For instance, constitutional democrats
like Ackerman argue that reducing the People to the representative system
and denying the transformative agency of popular sovereignty is a process of
reification.343  Others, like Dworkin, argue against the majoritarian model’s
reduction of moral agents into mere statistics.344  This alleged reification
leads, in turn, to the additional charge of fetishism.  From Ackerman’s per-
spective, the representative system becomes fetishized because it is treated
as if it stands for the People; from Dworkin’s perspective, fetishism occurs
when the part (majority-rule) stands for the whole (genuine democracy) as if
it were endowed with binding powers.  These constitutional democrats hope
to de-fetishize majoritarian democracy by advocating for popular sover-
eignty (Ackerman) or democratic self-government (Dworkin) and defending
judicial review and constitutional constraints in general.  Similarly,
majoritarians like Tushnet and Parker accuse constitutionalists of reifying
constitutionalism by divorcing the “rule of law” from the “rule of men,”
and thus fetishizing constitutionalism by falsely elevating it above the fury
of ordinary politics.345  Majoritarians hope to defetishize constitutionalism by
abolishing higher law and annulling judicial review.  Thus, by disenchant-
ment with constitutionalism, majoritarians risk fetishizing the People; by
disenchantment with the People, constitutionalists risk fetishizing
constitutionalism.
Taking this mirrored and linear debate, Part III suggests that the tension
between constitutionalism and democracy is irreconcilable because the two
concepts are essentially contestable and thus can reasonably lead to contra-
dictory conclusions.  Part IV suggests that only by collapsing the distinction
between the concepts and ignoring this contestability can scholars “resolve”
the contradiction.
342 See supra notes 154, 164. R
343 See supra text accompanying note 168 (discussing Ackerman’s position). R
344 See supra text accompanying notes 108–11 (discussing Dworkin’s position). R
345 See Parker, supra notes 325–29 and accompanying text; Tushnet, supra note 297 R
(“Liberals were unbelievers for the first half of the twentieth century and then got religion
during the short period when liberals dominated the Court.  The Supreme Court and judicial
review are false gods, and liberals should return to their unbelief.”).
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III. FROM CONTESTABILITY TO THE PARADOX
Justification and reason, two interrelated motifs of liberalism, wend
their way through this discussion of the alleged contradiction of constitu-
tional democracy.  The complex relationship between post-Enlightenment
liberalism and reason, in turn, gives rise to two additional issues: first, the
nature and origin of contradictions in general, of which this particular con-
tradiction is only an example (the focus of sections A to D below); second,
the prospects and the possible methods for resolving them (the focus of Sec-
tion E).
A. The Essential Contestability of Concepts and the Good Life
Contemporary disagreements about the relationship between constitu-
tionalism and democracy exemplify the amenability of foundational con-
cepts in liberalism to different positions.  Some scholars explain this
amenability by distinguishing between Enlightenment and post-Enlighten-
ment liberals in their approaches to reason.346  For most Enlightenment liber-
als, the free application of universal reason leads to moral and political
consensus because reason can unveil truth, and morality can be deduced
from rationality.347  Post-Enlightenment liberal scholars, however, recognize
that reason does not necessarily lead to moral truths and that rational disa-
greement is an integral part of the human condition.348  Both post-Enlighten-
ment liberals and their predecessors believe that public political justification
is possible by virtue of reason.  Where the two groups differ is in how they
explain the possibility of convergence on political justification, given the
level of disagreement inherent in any political community.349  As the preced-
ing discussion reveals, contemporary liberals are deeply divided on how to
explain the convergence on acceptable notions of legitimate political order-
ing and thus proffer various ways to political justification.
The notion of conceptual contestability emerges against the backdrop of
these fragmented liberal approaches to reason and the post-Enlightenment
recognition of the limits of rational inquiry.350  W. B. Gallie argues in a fa-
346 See, e.g., GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM 1–22 (2003);
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at xviii (distinguishing his own work from R
Enlightenment liberalism).
347 GAUS, supra note 346, at 4–5.  A major representative of this line of thought is Kant. R
See KANT, What is Orientation in Thinking?, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 36, at 249; R
see also discussion of “reason” and “rationality,” supra note 25. R
348 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at xvi.  Rawls argues that his politi- R
cal conception of justice, unlike Enlightenment liberalism, does not claim to be “true” but
only “reasonable.” Id. at xix–xx.  Furthermore, while he claims that his political conception
of justice is the most reasonable, he does not consider it the only reasonable conception of
justice. Id. at xlvi–xlvii.
349 GAUS, supra note 346, at 18–19. R
350 See, e.g., John N. Gray, On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts, 5 POL.
THEORY 331, 335 (1977).
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mous article that the persistence of some conceptual disputes cannot neces-
sarily be explained away by reference to psychological or metaphysical
causes.351  While supported by sound arguments, these genuine disputes are
irresolvable because they center on “essentially contested concepts” which
he defines as “concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless
disputes about their proper uses on the part of the users.”352  Gallie charac-
terizes essentially contested concepts as appraisive because they denote
“valued achievement,” are internally complex, variously describable, open
for modification in unpredictable ways, and used either aggressively, to re-
fute other descriptions, or defensively, to defend against the same.353
For William Connolly, the thesis of essential contestability includes
three elements.354  First, concepts are highly disputed, yet also partly shared
in a way of life.355  Second, rationality’s tools can illuminate these controver-
sies, but are insufficient to resolve the debate definitively by showing that
only one account is defensible.356  Given the lack of rational consensus, the
debate remains open.357  Third, affirming contestability does not preclude de-
fending a specific position within the debate.358  Connolly emphasizes that
the thesis of essential contestability accentuates the “internal connection”
between disputes over concepts and rival worldviews regarding the good life
(“the contestable standards, judgments and priorities which help to consti-
tute that life”).359  The contestability of the good life makes it likely that
concepts used by scholars will be similarly contestable.  Indeed, conceptual
debates about politics, for instance, are not merely debates about the deploy-
ment of discourse and concepts in politics.  These debates also partly consti-
tute politics because these concepts are internal to politics.360  Thus, the
“desire to expunge contestability from the terms of political inquiry ex-
presses a wish to escape politics.”361
The notion that a concept is essentially contestable recognizes that other
contestable concepts are implicated in the concept’s description or presup-
positions. Still, scholars have largely applied the notion of essential contest-
ability to intra-conceptual disputes rather than inter-conceptual ones.362  In
351 W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 169
(1956).
352 Id.
353 Id. at 171–72.  Gallie adds two additional conditions to distinguish contestability from
confusion. Id. at 180. Waldron expands the appraisive criterion to include non-achievement.
Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 LAW
& PHIL. 137, 157–59 (2002).
354 WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 225, 230 (3d ed. 1993).
355 Id. at 225–26.
356 Id. at 227.
357 Id. at 244 n.5.
358 See also Waldron, supra note 353, at 153. R
359 CONNOLLY, supra note 354, at 230–31; see also Gray, supra note 350, at 344. R
360 CONNOLLY, supra note 354, at 36, 39. R
361 Id. at 213.
362 See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 353, at 157–59 (applying the notion of contestability to R
the “rule of law”).
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this Article, I extend this thesis to refer not only to the contestability of
“democracy” and “constitutionalism” taken separately but also to the con-
testability of the attempt to bring these concepts into a stable relation in
which a perceived tension or conflict is absent ab initio or eradicated after
the fact.  If these concepts are essentially contested, then the ways in which
they are positioned in relation to each other, and, for that matter, how they
are understood to relate to other concepts, are no less contestable.  Moreo-
ver, as discussed in Part II, the line between intra-conceptual and inter-con-
ceptual disputes blurs because the dispute across concepts quickly becomes
a dispute within the concepts themselves.363  When one subscribes to a con-
cept, its description or definition largely informs the resolution of the inter-
conceptual dispute and vice versa; that is, the preferred resolution of the
dispute between concepts is likely to inform the preferred definition of the
concept or concepts.364  This cycle might explain the great attention given to
definitions in the dispute over the concepts under discussion.  This also calls
to attention a possible question-begging reasoning in which the cross-con-
ceptual resolution presupposes the definition or definitions.  Yet, both the
alleged resolution and the employed definitions are contested and are likely
to remain contestable.
B. The Persistence of the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
Employing this notion of contestability should not necessarily lead to
finding a consistent, principled account of scholarly resolution of conceptual
disputes.  One might think that scholars adopt a general theoretical approach
for consistent resolution of cross-conceptual disputes by transforming them
into disputes internal to the concepts, or vice versa, regardless of the specific
issues at hand and the implications of their resolution.  Such an expectation
is likely to falter.  Dworkin’s writings exemplify this point.  In his discussion
of constitutionalism and democracy, he adopts the first approach by shifting
the discussion into competing conceptions of democracy.365  He does the
same with respect to the tension between liberty and equality, by transform-
ing the debate into one internal to equality.366  Conversely, in his discussion
of pornography, Dworkin rejects the attempt to portray the debate as one
363 See, e.g., supra Part II.B.i.a (the focus of Dworkin’s incorporation on the concept of
democracy); supra Part II.B.ii.d (the focus of Kramer’s popular constitutionalist on the concept
of constitutionalism); supra Part II.C.ii.a (the similar focus of Waldron’s unqualified
proceduralism on constitutionalism).  All these positions purport to resolve the tension be-
tween concepts by offering an account of a single concept.
364 For example, a scholar who subscribes to a majoritarian conception of democracy is
likely to resolve the tension between democracy and constitutionalism, by rejecting constitu-
tional constraints on majority rule like judicial review.  In contrast, a scholar who supports
judicial review and constitutional democracy is likely to reject the majoritarian conception of
democracy.
365 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 63, at 15–31. R
366 DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 188–91. R
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internal to negative liberty, and shifts it into one between positive liberty and
negative liberty.367  Taking Dworkin as but one exemplar of the failure of an
overarching, trans-substantive approach, I suggest that the approach to con-
ceptual disputes cannot be an isolated theoretical judgment per se.  Rather, it
depends on the specific issues at hand.  Yet, many scholars who recognize
the contestability of concepts continue to address the debate on a highly
theoretical level that abstracts from explicitly political considerations.368
Accepting the intertwining of the conceptual and the political offers a
more accurate account for the persistence of the “counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty.”  Consider, for example, the bewilderment of many rationalist or em-
piricist scholars over the “obsession” with, or persistence of, this difficulty.
They express wonder over why scholars who have debated this question for
a century cannot grasp simple facts of political science, history, or logic
concerning judges, democracy, or political systems.369  This assessment sug-
gests that the debate over this difficulty will come to an end once scholars
come to their senses, that is, once they forgo their preoccupation with the
normative over the descriptive, values over facts, and the “ought” over the
“is.”370  Rationalist and empiricist scholars reduce the political battle to fac-
tual and conceptual debates that are supposedly resolvable by rational in-
quiry.  Such a view, however, ignores contestability.
367 DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 63, at 214–26. R
368 See KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 50 (claiming that one should be wary not to reduce R
political debates to mere philosophical questions); West, supra note 8, at 648–49 (claiming R
that divisions in constitutional thought emanate from political orientations and are only com-
plicated by jurisprudential differences).
369 See, e.g., Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Danger-
ous Branch, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 230, at 123.  Peretti R
writes:
American democracy is not majoritarian.  I must admit that advancing such an obvi-
ous point feels rather silly.  However, the persistence of the countermajoritarian par-
adigm in constitutional scholarship—a straw-man argument if there ever was one—
makes such silliness necessary . . .  [D]espite the occasional concession [that Amer-
ican democracy is anti-majoritarian] . . . Bickel stubbornly and irrationally clings to
the majoritarian view.
Id. at 137; Friedman, supra note 53, at 157 (“[T]he paradigm that has driven constitutional R
theory for more than half a century may be neither necessary nor accurate . . . .”).
370 “Positive” political science focuses on the actuality of judicial practice rather than
normative arguments regarding the desirable form of this practice.  It is less concerned with
the direction and values to which judicial practice should be oriented than it is with studying
its past as an observed experience from which conclusions can be drawn regarding possible
future developments of this practice.  Specifically, in this context, it asks to what extent have
the Court’s rulings been counter-majoritarian?  This is an empirical question that is not con-
cerned with normative definitions of democracy or how democracy can be reconciled with
constitutionalism.  It seeks to address the factual assumptions underlying the normative contro-
versy.  For an argument for the introduction of “positive” political science into normative
theory of judicial review, see Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV.
257, 259 (2005); see also Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review and the Protection of Constitu-
tional Rights, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 277 (2002) (noting that the debate between
supporters and opponents of judicial review, like Dworkin and Waldron, is “relatively insensi-
tive to the facts about the protection of individual rights in existing systems of judicial
review”).
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Yet neither the flight from facts to values nor the opposite move from
values to facts is likely to end the debate.371  The “counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty” persists because both the political battle over the good life and the
discussion concerning the role of law in society persist.372
C. Democracy as an Essentially Contested Concept
Contestability might have been contained or superseded if democracy
included an adequate and agreed-upon procedure to resolve such issues.  It
could be argued that democracy is an ideal candidate for replacing the role
that reason played in the dominant view of Enlightenment liberalism.373  Ac-
cording to this view, if reason is no longer assumed to lead to a consensus
endorsing freedom under law, then a democratic process could perhaps sub-
stitute for reason by providing a reliable mechanism for demonstrating pub-
lic reason.374
Democracy itself, however, is a contestable concept.375  While many
contemporary liberals accept the democratic process as the means for sorting
out the public reason required for endorsing freedom under law, they often
disagree about what this process should look like and what democracy
means and requires.  The classical debate on the meaning of democracy is
between procedural democracy (or majoritarianism) and constitutional de-
mocracy.  According to the first conception, democracy is the rule of the
371 Indeed, the distinction between judgments made irrespective of facts and fact-based
judgments (the “analytic” and “synthetic,” or the conceptual and the empirical) has been
forcefully challenged. See W. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20, 34
(1951) (“[F]or all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic state-
ments simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an
unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.”).  Quine maintains that the
difference between conceptual schemes and “brute facts” is “only one of a degree” rather than
kind. Id. at 43. See generally HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOT-
OMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2002).  Alasdair MacIntyre notes that the modern outlook, accord-
ing to which facts are value-free, marks a transition from an Aristotelian, teleological
paradigm to a “mechanist view”:
On the former view human action . . . must be, characterized with reference to the
hierarchy of goods which provide the ends of human action. On the latter view
human action . . . must be, characterized without any reference to such goods. On the
former view the facts about human action include the facts about what is valuable to
human beings (and not just the facts about what they think to be valuable); on the
latter view there are no facts about what is valuable.
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 84 (3d ed. 2007).
MacIntyre criticizes the law-like generalizations stipulated by the social sciences and questions
the alleged predictive power of these sciences given the pervasiveness of unpredictability in
human affairs. Id. at 88–108.
372 To be clear, I am not suggesting the strong argument that the “counter-majoritarian
difficulty” is insoluble; I am only offering an explanation of why it has persisted.
373 GAUS, supra note 346, at 20–21. R
374 I bracket, for a moment, critiques of the assumption that the institutional structure of
the representative democratic system corresponds to majority preferences. See, e.g., ROBERT
A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 129–31 (1956).
375 CONNOLLY, supra note 354, at 10–11; Gallie, supra note 351, at 183–87. R
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many.  The law is the will of the majority so long as the formal procedures
for its enactment have been followed.  On the other hand, the constitutional
conception restricts what the many can do through limits provided by consti-
tutional constraints (fundamental laws of the community) that are estab-
lished by the People itself.  Accordingly, the majority-will-turned-into-law
has to conform to fundamental laws.  It is from within the context of the
constitutional democratic conception that debates over the tension between
constitutionalism and democracy and the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”
arise.
However, the constitutional democratic framework itself is amenable to
different interpretations.  Contemporary debates have largely focused on two
rival sets of conceptions: aggregative conceptions and deliberative concep-
tions.  Aggregative or pluralist conceptions understand democracy as a mar-
ket-like competitive process in which the preferences of strategic players,
whether individuals or interest groups, are aggregated.  Deliberative or civic
republican conceptions, on the other hand, understand democracy as a pro-
cess of dialogue in which practical reason is exercised for the purposes of
reaching agreement over issues of collective concern and articulating the
common good.  According to such conceptions, the process of resolving dis-
agreements and decision-making should be inclusive of all those who are
subject to, and might be influenced by, the decision in order to qualify as
legitimate.376
Cass Sunstein positions deliberative conceptions on the spectrum of
several possible responses to the descriptive pluralism upon which aggrega-
tive conceptions are based377: normative pluralism (acceptance of the de-
scriptive, as in Robert Dahl’s theory of polyarchy);378 modified normative
pluralism (minorities-protecting-aggregative democracy, as in Ely’s process
theory);379 invocation of rights as an autonomous sphere (whether egalitari-
ans or libertarians); and finally, the deliberative democracy invoked by civic
republicans.  While the deliberative conception is generally popular amongst
scholars, there are probably as many deliberative conceptions as there are
deliberative democrats.380  Additionally, some scholars continue to reject the
376 IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 18–26 (2000) (discussing these two
conceptions of democracy).
377 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
32–35 (1985).
378 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971).
379 See generally ELY, supra note 188. R
380 For examples of this literature, see BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERA-
TION DAY (2004); JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DE-
MOCRACY (1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT:
WHY MORAL CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT
(1996); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE
ENDS OF POLICY (2002); YOUNG, supra note 376; Benhabib, supra note 127; Michelman, supra R
note 214.  For a discussion and a review of some of this scholarship, see Emily Hauptmann, R
Can Less Be More? Leftist Deliberative Democrats’ Critique of Participatory Democracy, 33
POLITY 397 (2001); Emily Hauptmann, Deliberation = Legitimacy = Democracy, 27 POL.
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deliberative conception.381  These disagreements are consequential to judicial
review.  As discussed above, supporters of majoritarian conceptions, like
Waldron, reject judicial review.382  And it is often the case that proponents of
aggregative conceptions, like Ely and Pildes, argue for a more limited role
for the judiciary than proponents of deliberative conceptions, like Rawls,
Habermas, and Michelman.383
Moreover, disagreements over the meaning of “democracy” are not
limited to the academic literature.  They are evident in Court rulings and
judicial attitudes.  Morton Horwitz claims that since 1940 “democracy” has
become a “foundational concept” in the Court’s rulings.384  Yet, as Horwitz
shows, the Court deployed the concept differently over time both to con-
strain and justify judicial intervention.  Those who saw “democracy” more
narrowly and procedurally as simply majority rule (for instance Justice
Frankfurter), found a tension with judicial review.385  Those who conceptual-
ized “democracy” more broadly and substantively, like the view associated
with the Warren Court, found no such tension and argued that judicial re-
view can promote “democracy.”386
This leads the discussion back to the starting point: Rather than democ-
racy being the remedy for contestability, it is part and parcel of this contest-
ability.  Its introduction to the debate gives rise to other forms of
disagreement.
D. Constitutionalism as an Essentially Contested Concept
Because democracy is itself contestable, and therefore cannot contain
contestability, it would seem that constitutionalism is the only remaining
promising candidate for this role.  Indeed, some contemporary liberal think-
ers present the idea of constitutionalism as a reaction to contestability and
pluralism with respect to the good life.  But constitutionalism is an equally
contestable notion.  This contestability undermines the utility of constitution-
alism.  Applying contestability to constitutionalism in this section shows the
insufficiency of mere conceptual or definitional inquiries to settle disputes
over constitutionalism and the futility of denying the connection between
THEORY 857 (1999); Christian F. Rostbøll, Emancipation or Accommodation? Habermasian
vs. Rawlsian Deliberative Democracy, 34 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 707 (2008).
381 For an example of such rejection, see, for example, Pildes, supra note 206, at 53–54. R
382 See discussion of Waldron’s position of dissolution supra Part II.C.ii.a.
383 For an example of a deliberative democrat who does not give the Court a prominent
role, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 230, at 145–46. R
384 Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of
Change: Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 61 (1993); see also
id. at 61–63.
385 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 661–63, 667 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
386 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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conceptual disputes and political ones in the pursuit of such theoretical
accounts.
Constitutionalism is often captured by the slogan “government by law,
not government by men.”387  Scholars offer variations on this theme, calling
constitutionalism “the idea . . . that government can and should be legally
limited in its powers, and that its authority depends on its observing these
limitations.”388  Others suggest it is “the endeavor to place government
under reason expressed as law.”389  In another formulation, it is “the contain-
ment of politics, including popular politics, by a supervening law that itself
stands beyond reach of the politics it is meant to contain.”390  A final articu-
lation calls constitutionalism “the idea of the subjection of even the highest
political authority in a country to limits and requirements having the form
and force of law.”391
Constitutionalism exemplifies essential contestability because it is in-
ternally complex and is variously described.392  The origins of the concept
are themselves varied, supposedly emanating from three distinct traditions—
in Britain, France, and the United States—that describe and deploy the con-
cept in different ways.393  The rise of liberal constitutionalism is also con-
nected to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, as it
suggested for some scholars a historical progression towards liberal democ-
racy.394  For these scholars, the only available alternative became the combi-
nation of market economy and liberal constitutionalism.395  Thus, in the
387 This statement seems to originate from James Harrington’s formulation “empire of
laws and not of men.”  JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM
OF POLITICS 21 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1656).  Such a formulation
invites the charge of fetishism by the populists who see this as an enchantment with constitu-
tionalism. See discussion supra Part II.E.
388 Wil Waluchow, Constitutionalism, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL., http://seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/
constitutionalism/ (last updated Feb. 20, 2007).
389 MICHELMAN, supra note 50, at 50. R
390 Michelman, supra note 20, at 183. R
391 Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, in THE CAM-
BRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 394, 394 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
392 Thomas C. Grey, Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework, in NOMOS XX, supra
note 88, at 189. According to Grey: R
Constitutionalism is one of those concepts, evocative and persuasive in its connota-
tions yet cloudy in its analytic and descriptive content, which at once enrich and
confuse political discourse.  The long-standing confusion about the meaning of the
term appears in the numerous mutually inconsistent simple definitions that have
been confidently asserted in its name.
Id.
393 See Preuss, supra note 303, at 18–24. R
394 See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
395 See, e.g., id. at xi (asserting that “the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved
on”) (emphasis in the original); id. at 44 (liberalism “[i]n its economic manifestation” simply
is a free market economy); see also Francis Fukuyama, Reflections on the End of History, Five
Years Later, 34 HIST. & THEORY 27, 29 (1995) (“[L]iberal democracy and free markets con-
stitute the best regime, or more precisely the best of the available alternative ways of organiz-
ing human societies.”). These arguments are highly problematic, of course. The flaws relevant
to this Article include an insufficient attention to the contestability of liberalism itself and an
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modern world, constitutionalism has also become an appraisive concept.396
It is a prominent feature of world order and a precondition for admission to
the club of democratic nations.397  Indeed, “one may even say that constitu-
tionalism has risen to the status of the only contemporary political idea that
enjoys almost universal acceptance.”398
While the above-quoted formulations of constitutionalism readily
showcase the view of politics espoused by constitutionalists, they are highly
abstract and fail to capture the different conceptions offered by scholars in
the field.  Indeed, they do not expose the controversies surrounding the con-
cept, which roughly divide into two major groups.  First, scholars debate the
internal components or criteria of the concept—as in debates over whether
constitutions must be written or unwritten, flexible or rigid, and whether
limitations on government may be based on conventions or only laws399—
and its validity conditions, as in debates over constitutional authorship.400
Second, scholars debate the goals the concept might serve and its abil-
ity to achieve these prescribed goals.  Given inherent disagreements about
the good life, constitutionalism is perceived in the liberal tradition as neces-
sary.401  Constitutionalism presumptively shows respect to individuals’
choices by tolerating their chosen ways of life.  For many liberals, then, con-
stitutionalism is synonymous with the “proceduralization” and “legaliza-
tion” of the question of justice—first-order rightness—in order to
circumvent an “overt moral civil war.”402  It attempts to minimize conflict
by deferring the question from the statute level to the general structure of
authority.  Constitutionalism, then, “mediates the controversies that arise
among citizens who hold clashing political aspirations.”403  Moreover, con-
stitutionalism itself is likely to be an already mediated controversy.  Indeed,
obliviousness to the contradictory nature of liberal democracy (the tension between rights and
democracy). See David Held, Liberalism, Marxism, and Democracy, 22 THEORY & SOC. 249,
257 (1993) (noting these two flaws with respect to Fukuyama’s writings).  Unger refers to
views like Fukuyama’s as the “dictatorship of no alternatives.” ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UN-
GER, WHAT SHOULD THE LEFT PROPOSE? 1 (2005).
396 See Gallie, supra notes 351–52 and accompanying text. R
397 See Vivien Hart, Democratic Constitution Making, 107 U.S. INST. PEACE SPECIAL RE-
PORT, July 2003, at 2, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr107.pdf  (“We live in an era of
constitution making.  Of close to 200 national constitutions in existence today, more than half
have been written or re-written in the last quarter century.”).
398 Preuss, supra note 303, at 11. R
399 Grey, supra note 392, at 190. R
400 Michelman, supra note 176 (distinguishing between the priority of reason in “liberal R
constitutionalism” as opposed to populism (Ackerman) or non-volitionist positivism
(Schauer)).
401 See discussion supra Part I.C.
402 Michelman, supra note 260, at 1252; see also Frank I. Michelman, The Not So Puzzling R
Persistence of the Futile Search: Tribe on Proceduralism in Constitutional Theory, 42 TULSA
L. REV. 891, 893 (2007) (discussing different attempts to proceduralize controversial moral
and ethical questions).
403 MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 2
(2006).
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“all constitutions remain compromises as long as citizens cannot agree on
the qualities of the good society.”404
For other scholars, constitutionalism is an illusory and self-deceptive
project.  It is an attempt to escape from the reality of politics by mere verbal
utterances.  Some Legal Realists, for instance, define constitutionalism as
“the name given to the trust which men repose in the power of words en-
grossed on parchment to keep a government in order.”405  Similarly, for
Tushnet, constitutionalism is no more than an ideological “effort to create
social institutions that stabilize the social world by placing the definition of
the social order beyond willful transformation.”406  Likewise, for Unger, lib-
eral constitutionalism aims at “slowing politics down” and thus impedes the
“transformative reach” of politics.407
Judicial review is less contestable and more concrete than constitution-
alism, but this does not mean that judicial review is controversy-free.  Judi-
cial review is at the center of the controversies in constitutionalism both
regarding its existence as an integral part of the concept and regarding its
role within the concept.408  While not always a significant component of con-
stitutionalism, judicial review is generally part of the liberal constitutionalist
ideal, whether for prudential reasons, out of logical necessity, or because of
the historically conditioned development of political regimes, as in the
United States.  One reason for the importance of the judiciary in these de-
bates, notes Habermas, is that it stands at the intersection between democ-
racy and the rule of law.409  In fact, argues Howard Gillman, the relation
between “regime politics” and “jurisprudential regimes” gives rise to the
claim that “constitutionalism in the United States is not merely a normative
or theoretical practice.  It is also a distinctive form of politics.”410
The fragmentation and proliferation of theories of constitutionalism,
then, comes as no surprise.  Michael Klarman, for example, identifies ten
conceptions of judicially enforceable constitutionalism:
[E]nforcement of a principal-agent relationship; enforcement of
societal precommitments; providing a mechanism for checks and
balances; protection of minority rights; maintenance of continuity
404 Id. at 8.
405 Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 176, R
at 16 (quoting Walton H. Hamilton, Constitutionalism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCE 255 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1931)).
406 Tushnet, supra note 295, at 151. R
407 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENED: PRAGMATISM UNBOUND
187–88 (2007).
408 Of course, American-style judicial review, which is the focus of American discussions
and thus the focus of this Article, is not the only model of judicial review. See generally VICKI
C. JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed., 2006); Wal-
dron, supra note 71, at 1353–60. R
409 Habermas, supra note 124, at 766. R
410 Howard Gillman, Regime Politics, Jurisprudential Regimes, and Unenumerated Rights,
9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 107, 107 (2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\47-2\HLC204.txt unknown Seq: 71  3-JUL-12 13:18
2012] The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory 441
or tradition; symbolizing national unity; serving an educational
function; securing finality for disputed issues; providing a rule of
recognition for the law; [and] satisfying a majoritarian preference
for constitutionalism.411
Klarman argues that all of these accounts are descriptively unsatisfactory
and normatively ambiguous as they require controversial value judgments.412
Hence, constitutional theories are no less controversial than the particular
substantive controversies they are supposed to circumscribe.413  Conse-
quently, neither constitutionalism as a “framework,” nor the answers pro-
vided by its mechanisms for internal debates is controversy-free.  The choice
of a conception of constitutionalism is likely to affect the resolution of con-
troversies or to presuppose the likelihood of a certain answer.  Given this
entanglement between moral and political conflicts, and between conflicts
over ways of life and the method devised to bracket or tentatively resolve
them, the recourse to method becomes futile.  Further insisting on this
method despite this entanglement may have bad effects on political and
moral debate.414
As with democracy, there are no neutral or non-controversial defini-
tions for constitutionalism.  As Thomas Grey writes:
[T]here is no reason to suppose that an adequate conceptual anal-
ysis of constitutionalism must produce a definition, a set of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions which justify either describing a
norm as constitutional or describing a set of norms as a constitu-
tion.  The focus on definition leads to largely verbal dispute, or to
stipulative fiat masquerading as discovery or analysis.415
Thus, the debate should move away from definitions.
If every conception of constitutionalism is value-laden and thus contro-
versial, it follows that the distinction between the public framework of jus-
tice—that which is universally recognized as good for everyone—and the
private choices of the good within this framework—that which is subjec-
tively good for the individual—is itself contestable and difficult to draw.
Substantive commitments guide every choice between institutional arrange-
ments, which will be more congenial to certain forms of life than to others.416
But no matter how thin these substantive commitments are, they fail to con-
tain conflict in a non-controversial manner.  Evading disagreement by esca-
411 Klarman, Constitutionalism, supra note 184, at 145.  Klarman offers an eleventh ac- R
count: “The Supreme Court, in politically unpredictable ways, imposes culturally elite values
in marginally countermajoritarian fashion.” Id. at 146 (emphasis in original).
412 Id. at 193–94.
413 Id.
414 SANDEL, supra note 33, at 23; see also DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 63, at R
37.
415 Grey, supra note 392, at 190–91 (emphasis in original). R
416 UNGER, supra note 407, at 192–93. R
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lating from one level to a higher one—from a specific statute to the
Constitution or from the good to the just—does not lead to consensus.417
Disagreement is not only evident with respect to conceptions of the good but
also with regard to the concrete application of the constitutional principles
designed to evade disagreement over the good.
To frame this tension more concretely, under a constitutional democ-
racy the judiciary is entrusted with this business of concrete applications.
Because these applications are contestable, it comes as no surprise that the
judicial power to enforce them is itself contestable.  Scholars disagree on
whether to hand the power to settle disputes over constitutional meaning to
unelected judges or to majoritarian processes.  Both sides of the debate have
offered reasonable justifications for rejecting positions espoused by the other
side.
Here, then, is a puzzling feature of much of the contemporary discus-
sion of political and constitutional theory: On the one hand, a repeated at-
tempt by scholars to find a solid and uncontroversial normative justification
(“legitimacy”) for legal and political ordering; and on the other hand, the
proliferation of contestable ways for doing so.  The latter seems to under-
mine the former.  If the “problem” is disagreement about fundamental ques-
tions within a political community, these suggested “solutions” bring more
disagreement rather than less.
Thus far, this Part has discussed the contestability of “democracy” and
“constitutionalism” separately.  The paradox, however, arises from the mar-
riage of the two concepts.  The remainder of this Part examines whether the
combination between the concepts delivers what each could not on its own.
The possibility of political justification seems to hang on a positive answer
to such question.
E. Between a Paradox and an Antinomy
Contestability gives rise to paradoxes.  Indeed, scholars describe the
combination of constitutionalism and democracy as a “paradox,” “tension,”
or “difficulty.”418  These terms essentially describe the puzzling existence of
two plausible and defensible, yet seemingly contradictory or inconsistent,
conclusions.  In this sense, the “paradox of constitutional democracy” is one
major example of a more general phenomenon.  This Section examines the
possible methods for resolving such paradoxes.  It discusses the meaning
and types of paradoxes and the general patterns of scholarly answers given
to paradoxes, and applies these patterns to the concrete typology developed
in Part II.  I argue that the “paradox of constitutional democracy” is irre-
417 Waldron, supra note 302, at 39–41. R
418 See HOLMES, supra note 12, at 134–37 (using “paradox” and “tension”); MICHELMAN, R
supra note 50, at 4–11 (using “paradox”); Bickel, supra note 11, at 16–23 (using “diffi- R
culty”); Habermas, supra note 124, at 769–70 (using “paradox”). R
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solvable not only because “constitutionalism” and “democracy” are con-
testable concepts, the combination of which results in a paradox but also
because there are multiple kinds of paradoxes, a variety of ways to resolve
paradoxes, and such resolutions may themselves be inconsistent.
i. Types of Paradoxes
There is no one definition of “paradox.”  Paradoxes have been defined
as “questions . . . that suspend us between too many good answers.”419  One
indication of the existence of a paradox “is that different thinkers ‘solve’ it
in incompatible ways.”420  For W. V. Quine, a paradox is a nexus between a
seemingly absurd conclusion and a seemingly defensible argument support-
ing it.421  Quine distinguishes between three kinds of paradoxes.  First, verid-
ical paradoxes yield truthful conclusions despite appearances to the
contrary.  Second, falsidical paradoxes are absurd in conclusion and falla-
cious in argument.  Third, antinomies contain contradictory conclusions
flowing from accepted patterns of reasoning.422
Only antinomies require revision or rejection of conceptual traditions
and established conceptual frameworks or patterns of reasoning.423  For
Quine, the “discovery of antinomy is a crisis in the evolution of thought.”424
An antinomy brings about contradictory results that require such revision.425
Thus, antinomies are paradigm-dependent.  What seemed to be antinomies to
the classical Greek philosophers might be exposed in our generation to be
resolvable contradictions given, for instance, the progress of science.426  Of
course, not all scholars facing the same paradoxical situation would agree on
defining it as an antinomy.  Some might think it is merely a veridical or
falsidical paradox that can be resolved by the very patterns of reasoning and
conceptual schemes in which this paradox arises.  Thus, the way scholars
conceive of a situation influences the proposed resolution for this dilemma.
ii. Responses to Paradoxes
There is no single way to resolve a paradox.  Western philosophers have
tackled paradoxes in five primary ways: rationalism, empiricism, Kantian-
419 ROY SORENSEN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PARADOX: PHILOSOPHY AND THE LABY-
RINTHS OF THE MIND xii (2003) (emphasis in original).
420 Id. at 299.
421 W. V. QUINE, The Ways of Paradox, in THE WAYS OF PARADOX AND OTHER ESSAYS 1
(rev. ed. 1976).
422 Id. at 4–6 (regarding “antinomy”); see also IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REA-
SON 410, 459–60 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds., 1998) (1781).
423 QUINE, supra note 421, at 9. R
424 Id. at 16.
425 Id. at 5.
426 See id. at 9.
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ism, Hegelian dialectics, and decisionism.427  The first two approaches seek
to reconcile apparent contradictions by harmonizing reason and perception.
The third and fourth are not reconciliatory in this sense, yet they do respond
to perceived contradictions and the reality of contradictions, respectively.428
The fifth approach is an emotivist approach according to which choice be-
tween inconsistent ethical demands is unguided by reason.429
In the first vein, rationalists emphasize the role of reason, whereas em-
piricists privilege perception and experience.  Rationalists think that para-
doxes originate in logical mistakes, and thus resolve them by offering logical
solutions, as in Habermas’s clarification position.430  Empiricists think con-
tradictions stem from the lack of sufficient reliable information, and solve
them by introducing information, as with de-centering positions and some of
Bickel’s critics.431  On the other hand, Kantian and dialectical approaches to
paradoxes espouse a fundamentally different response.  These approaches do
not seek to wish away contradictions.  Rather, they acknowledge the exis-
tence of paradoxes.  They may disagree on which paradoxes are antinomies,
and Kant himself limits antinomies into four paradigmatic cases.  But over-
all, the Kantian response is basically that reason runs out, because there is no
conclusive rational way to, for example, prove the existence of God or free
will.432
This Article’s mapping and typology show that the responses offered by
constitutional theorists to the question of constitutionalism and democracy
are variations of some of these approaches to paradoxes.433  But more than
427 SORENSEN, supra note 419, at xii–xiii (mentioning rationalism, empiricism, and dialec- R
tics); id. at 303–05 (discussing the differences between Kant and Hegel).
428 See id. at 304–05.
429 For a discussion of emotivism, see MACINTYRE, supra note 371, at 11–12 (“Emotivism R
is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are
nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are
moral or evaluative in character.”) (emphasis in original). See generally id. at 6–22.
430 See supra notes 121–52 and accompanying text. R
431 See discussion of de-centering positions supra Part II.B.i.d; see also supra note 369 R
(citing empiricist critics of Bickel, namely Peretti and Friedman).
432 At face value, scholars who accept the irresolvable antinomian character of constitu-
tional democracy make a move that resembles Kant’s.  For Kant, the existence of contradiction
and the lack of ability to rationally and conclusively prove the existence of God or free will do
not necessarily mean a disbelief in God or free will.  For constitutional scholars, like
Michelman, the contradiction between constitutionalism and democracy does not mean the
impossibility of constitutional democratic regimes or the impossibility of judicial review.  Yet,
the antinomy here is different: For Kant, it is reason running out; for Michelman, it is agree-
ment running out.  Thus, one might distinguish between two kinds of antinomy: Epistemologi-
cal antinomy in which the antinomy is considered “internal” to reason, because reason does
not provide persons with sufficient resources to reach a definitive conclusion; and political
antinomy in which the antinomy is considered resolvable by individual reason, but such reso-
lution does not command agreement.  Post-Enlightenment liberals are generally concerned
with the latter given their interest in political justification.
433 An exception is the moral skepticism of the emotivist/decisionist approach, which is
largely rejected by field participants. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 214, at 25–26 (arguing R
that decisionism is incompatible with the idea of “positive freedom” or “self-government” but
compatible with “negative liberty”).
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that, the mapping shows a more complicated picture beyond what the “tri-
chotomy” of rationalism, empiricism, and Kantianism supposes.  To begin
with, there are not necessarily generic approaches to all paradoxes because
the same scholar could be a rationalist with respect to one paradox and an
empiricist with respect to another.  More importantly, the chosen pattern of
reasoning does not necessarily predict the conclusion with respect to the
specific paradox at hand.  Obviously, rationalists and empiricists who think
that logical and empirical solutions are available with respect to the paradox
do not think that this alleged paradox constitutes an antinomy and thus think
it can be resolved.  The form and implications of this resolution, however,
are a matter of further inquiry.
Denying the existence of antinomy can produce different results.  Some
scholars deny the existence of antinomy to claim a harmonious marriage
between constitutionalism and democracy.  Even if these scholars agree that
antinomies are paradigm-dependent, they will argue that in the current para-
digm, a specific paradox does not qualify as an antinomy.  The strongest
form of this argument denies not only the antinomian character of the ques-
tion, but even that it is a paradox in the first place.  Dworkin’s denial posi-
tion vis-a`-vis the paradox of constitutional democracy exemplifies this
stronger form of the argument.434  A milder form accepts the seemingly para-
doxical nature but quickly offers solutions to resolve it, as, for example,
reconciliation positions like Ely’s do.435  For these theorists, the so-called
paradox is no more than falsidical, because the argumentation is flawed and
the conclusion is absurd.  To use Quine’s terminology, for them the paradox
is a “false alarm” once the “underlying fallacy” has been exposed.436
Scholars on the other accepting end of the paradox spectrum accept the
initial contradictory nature but proceed in different directions.  They
might—as exemplified by Michelman’s endorsement position vis-a`-vis the
paradox of constitutional democracy—accept the antinomian character as a
fact of life and hence think that the contradiction is irresolvable whether
logically or empirically.437  Or, as exemplified by Waldron’s dissolution posi-
tion, they might proceed to solve the contradiction and thus end up denying
the antinomian character.438 For the latter theorists, the paradox is no more
than veridical because the apparent contradiction is actually correct: Consti-
tutionalism and democracy are contradictory.
iii. Revisiting the Typology
The preceding discussion suggests that, given the variety of approaches
that might be pursued in the face of contradictions, a guide may be helpful to
434 See supra Part II.B.i.a.
435 See supra Part II.B.ii.a.
436 QUINE, supra note 421, at 9. R
437 See supra Part II.C.i. for a discussion of endorsement positions.
438 See supra Part II.C.ii. for a discussion of dissolution positions.
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navigate the inquiry into the field.  Revisiting the typology of Part II through
the tools developed in this section clarifies the internal distinctions amongst
the different positions:
(1) Denial: For deniers like Dworkin, Habermas, and Ackerman, the
tension between constitutionalism and democracy is not an antinomy.  It is
not even a paradox.
(2) Reconciliation: For reconcilers like Bickel, Ely, and Sunstein, the
tension is a paradox but not an antinomy.  It is a falsidical paradox.
(3) Endorsement: For endorsers like Michelman, Seidman, and Tribe,
the tension is both a paradox and an antinomy.
(4) Dissolution: For dissolvers like Waldron, Tushnet, and Parker, the
tension is a paradox but not an antinomy.  It is a truth-telling paradox.
Three out of the four positions try to close the debate by rejecting the
“antinomian” character of the “paradox” and recasting it as a soluble ques-
tion.  While unity positions—denial and reconciliation—see a false paradox,
dissolution sees a real paradox.  Deniers and reconcilers see a false paradox
because, for them, liberal premises lead to constitutionalism and thus they
defend the practice of judicial review.  Dissolvers insist that it is a resolvable
paradox, and they resolve the paradox against judicial review because they
think that liberal premises lead to majoritarianism.  Thus, only dissolution
requires a fundamental institutional change by rejecting judicial review and
constitutional democracy.  In contrast, only endorsers see an antinomy be-
cause liberal premises lead both to constitutionalism—as deniers claim—
and democracy—as dissolvers claim—the final result of which is self-
contradiction.
Figure 4 restates the positions:
Institutional Constitutional
Paradox Antinomy Implications Democracy
Denial NO NO NO YES
UNITY Reconciliation YES NO NO YES
Endorsement YES YES NO YES
DISUNITY Dissolution YES NO YES NO
FIGURE 4: REVISITING THE TYPOLOGY OF THE PROGRESSIVE LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL FIELD
IV. THE CIRCULARITY OF PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
While Quine’s typology sharpens the different positions taken in the
field, it presupposes a linear view of the spectrum of those positions.  As
articulated, the major dispute in constitutional theory involves the relation-
ship between constitutionalism and democracy.  The dispute seems to lead to
wide and irreconcilable gaps between opposite positions on a linear contin-
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uum: Deniers sacrifice democracy for constitutionalism, while dissolvers
sacrifice constitutionalism for democracy.  Deniers prefer the rule of judges
while dissolvers make the majority the sovereign.
Despite these differences, I suggest that the basic opposition in the field
between constitutional democrats and majoritarians is not as sharp and wide
as it appears.  Unlike Part II, which collapses the differences between deni-
ers and reconcilers within the discourse of unity,439 this Part’s analysis goes
further to collapse the distinctions between positions across the discourses
of unity and disunity.  Complementing the analysis of Part III, this Part
shows that the contradiction between the concepts can be resolved only by
collapsing the distinction between them, and that this collapse leads the de-
bate into a circular movement.
A. Loopification
The notion of “loopification” shows the nature of the discursive move-
ment in the field and challenges the linear view of the debate.440  According
to Duncan Kennedy:
One’s consciousness is loopified when the ends of the continuum
seem closer to one another, in some moods (for some purposes, in
some cases), than either end seems to the middle.  Otherwise
stated one’s consciousness is loopified when one seems to be able
to move by a steady series of steps around the whole distinction,
ending up where one started without ever reversing direction.441
Kennedy develops this concept in the context of the debate about the public
and private distinction.  Kennedy casts away the image of a linear opposition
between an unregulated private sphere and a regulated public sphere.  In-
stead, he argues that loopification occurs in this debate because each side of
the distinction includes elements of the other side and thus the distinction
itself blurs.442  The debate offers varying degrees of regulation that move
from the most private to the most public, from the family to the state.  Yet,
the family is a basic unit comprising the state, which, in turn, is part of the
family because it regulates familial relations by, for example, protecting the
best interest of the child.443  The public-private continuum is circular because
both the family and the state are simultaneously public and private, and be-
tween them there are many entities that combine, to varying degrees, public
and private aspects.
439 See supra Part II.D.
440 I am indebted and grateful to Frank Michelman and Gonc¸alo de Almeida Ribeiro for
extremely helpful discussions of this section.
441 Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1982) (emphasis in original).
442 Id. at 1354–57.
443 Id. at 1356.
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The progressive liberal constitutional field exemplifies loopification be-
cause what is suppressed in one extreme comes into full force in the other.
Democracy is suppressed by the deniers, but comes forward more potently
in the dissolvers’ case.  Rights are suppressed by the dissolvers, and come
back to the foreground in the deniers’ case.  But that which leads the deniers
to suppress democracy through rights is itself democracy.  And that which
leads the dissolvers to reject rights for the sake of democracy is itself rights.
Hence, there are two circles: The first is represented by a movement
away from rights towards democracy—from the deniers to the dissolvers,
which ends with rights; the second reverse-circle is represented by the move-
ment away from democracy towards rights—from the dissolvers to the deni-
ers, which ends with democracy again.  Therefore, the extremes are closer
than they seemed at the outset.  In between these two extremes are gray
areas represented mostly by the reconcilers who offer combinations to vary-
ing degree of democracy and constitutionalism.
To elaborate, two opposing camps both claim to provide a theory of
“genuine democracy.”  At the outset, deniers (constitutional democrats)
seem to prioritize constitutionalism while dissolvers (majoritarians) seem to
prioritize democracy.  Yet, deniers present themselves as the true democrats
even though they privilege constitutionalism over democracy.  And dissolv-
ers present themselves as the true constitutionalists even though they privi-
lege democracy over constitutionalism.
Deniers, like Dworkin, claim to be the “real democrats” because they
provide a theory for the proper understanding of self-government.444  Rights
provide necessary conditions or restrictions that allow the People to self-
govern.  Thus, “genuine democracy” implies rights.445  If the dissolvers care
about democracy, according to a denier, it should lead them to constitution-
alism.  In the other extreme, dissolvers, like Waldron, claim that, given disa-
greement, it is not possible to agree on such restrictions or conditions.446
Waldron advocates for a supra-right to equal participation, which should
lead to a simple majority rule.  Rights, in other words, imply majoritarian-
ism.  Deniers claim to be rights-based in their approach, but such an ap-
proach, according to the dissolver, should lead to equality in political agency
and majoritarianism.  Thus, rights—properly understood—do not extend to
constitutional entrenchment.  That is, both deniers and dissolvers accuse the
other camp of misunderstanding the very concept on which each camp
builds its case against the other.
Both Dworkin and Waldron agree that there is no tension between de-
mocracy and individual rights.447  Yet this agreement, or starting point, leads
to opposing movements: For the deniers, rights dictate movement towards
444 See discussion of Dworkin, supra notes 102–19 and accompanying text. R
445 See discussion of Dworkin, supra notes 102–19 and accompanying text. R
446 See discussion of Waldron, supra notes 302–22 and accompanying text. R
447 WALDRON, supra note 37, at 282. R
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one direction (constitutional democracy); for the dissolvers, rights lead to-
wards the other direction (majoritarianism).  The end result of the movement
in both directions is called democracy by their proponents.  Therefore, re-
gardless of whether one is a denier or a dissolver, rights are believed to lead
to “genuine democracy.”
Figure 5 illustrates the phenomenon of loopification with a circular
movement around the tension between constitutionalism and democracy.
Starting at the circle from Dworkin, one moves (clockwise) away from con-
stitutionalism towards an increasing degree of “democratization,” from a
“thick” conception of rights to thinner conceptions.  Starting at the circle
from Waldron towards the opposite direction, one moves away from democ-
racy towards an increasing degree of “constitutionalization.”  But regardless
of the movement’s direction on the circle, the ending point is the starting
point.  If one begins from constitutionalism, one ends up with constitutional-
ism again, and if one starts from democracy one ends up with democracy
again.  Yet both democracy and constitutionalism are essentially contested
concepts: In starting from a contestable territory, one ends up with a similar
one.
• Dworkin, Rawls,
Habermas, Holmes,
Ferejohn, Sager
• Waldron, Parker,
Tushnet
• Ely, Pildes,
Michelman, Bickel,
Sunstein, Kramer,
Tushnet
• Ackerman, Amar
Constitutionalism
prior to Democracy
(Constitutional
Democracy)
Constitutionalism
prior to Democracy
(except during
popular sovereignty)
Democracy prior to
Constitutionalism
(Procedural
Democracy)
Democracy prior to
Constitutionalism
(except when
judicial intervention
is necessary)
FIGURE 5: THE CIRCULAR MOVEMENT AROUND THE CONSTITUTIONALISM/
DEMOCRACY DISTINCTION
Ultimately, Dworkin and Waldron still occupy different positions, but
they are closer to each other than to the middle of the circle, which is com-
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posed of the democracy and constitutionalism distinction.  They both deny
or dissolve one side of the distinction and thus retain the same distance from
the middle.  They both restate the issues at hand.  Dworkin is as far from—
or as close to—resolving the tension as Waldron is.
B. Undermining the Distinction
The above discussion draws attention to a general phenomenon of un-
dermining the distinction between constitutionalism and democracy, which
itself gives rise to the tension between the concepts.  The distinction is less
clear than it appeared at the beginning of the intellectual inquiry.  Both ex-
tremes of the debate deconstruct it and collapse it by deducing one concept
from the other.  Dworkin argues for the priority of constitutionalism: A
proper understanding of democracy as constitutional democracy means de-
mocracy requires constitutional constraints.  He thus argues for the value of
constitutionalism from within the concept of democracy.  Waldron argues for
the priority of democracy: A proper understanding of rights requires a
majoritarian decision-making process on all matters.  He derives his majori-
tarianism from a supra-right to equal political participation.  Waldron thus
argues for the value of democracy from within the concept of constitutional-
ism.448  In other words, both Dworkin and Waldron argue for prioritizing
their preferred concept, given a proper understanding of the other competing
concept.449
448 Thus, one might say that Waldron is a participant in a unity discourse no less than
Dworkin.  By collapsing the distinction, and deducing one concept from the other, he “denies”
the disunity of the concepts and unites them.  Nonetheless, he is still a dissolver in my typol-
ogy rather than a denier since the typology was drawn in reference to the current institutional
reality that includes judicial review.  Still, one can think of an alternative way of drawing the
initial distinction made in this Article, as represented by the following chart.  I thank Frank
Michelman for making this point clear to me.
Unity Disunity
Democracy implies rights (rights are prior to Dworkin, Habermas Michelman
majorities)
Rights imply majoritarianism (majoritarianism over Waldron Parker
courts)
449 I use Dworkin and Waldron here as examples, but one can observe a similar movement
of the debate with respect to other positions.  Consider the denial and dissolution positions
advanced by Ackerman and Tushnet.  Ackerman sacrifices democracy for constitutionalism,
and Tushnet sacrifices constitutionalism for democracy.  The pictorial expression of this polari-
zation is a straight-line continuum.  However, Ackerman distinguishes between two concep-
tions of democracy—popular sovereignty and representative democracy—and argues for his
pro-constitutionalism position by claiming that a proper understanding of democracy as popu-
lar sovereignty requires constitutional constraints.  That is, he argues for the merits of constitu-
tionalism from within the concept of democracy.  Tushnet distinguishes between two
conceptions of constitutionalism—judicially-enforced constitutionalism and populist constitu-
tionalism, or the “thick” Constitution and the “thin” Constitution—and argues for his pro-
democracy position by claiming that a proper understanding of constitutionalism as populist
constitutionalism requires majoritarian decision-making.  In other words, Tushnet derives his
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Thus, the loop shows that the radical endorsement of one concept over
the other occurs when the distinction is collapsed.  It is the very act of col-
lapsing the distinction that creates polarization in the field.  Scholars occu-
pying opposite sides in the debate make the same move to achieve different
results.  Once the distinction has been collapsed scholars can go either way:
democracy or constitutionalism.  Collapsing the distinction is not inherently
a pro-democracy or pro-constitutionalism move.
However, it is the very clarity of the distinction that gives rise to the
tension in the first place.  The normative effects of deductions and defini-
tions become questionable.  Far from resolving the tension, this scholarly
process of redefinitions and deductions merely restates the issues at hand.
Neither defining democracy as a majority rule nor as a constitutional process
can settle the debate, given the contestability of both conceptions.  Neither
deducing democracy from rights nor deducing rights from democracy settles
the debate given the contestability of such a deduction.
C. Outside the Circle?
This account leaves out the fourth group: the endorsers.  This group, in
effect, claims to be outside the circular movement.  Endorsers resist being
caught in the circle by rejecting the reduction of the tension to one side of it,
or by claiming that the concepts can otherwise be reconciled.  They have
given up the attempt to advance a conceptual position in the field.  For en-
dorsers, it is futile to advance a new smart theory to resolve the tension; it is
even misleading to pretend that any new smart theory can or should resolve
the tension given the unlikelihood of eradicating reasonable disagreement.
Conceptual solutions advanced by other scholars simply hide this disagree-
ment or ignore it.  Endorsers effectively say that if one takes disagreement
seriously, then one would have to abandon the quest for conceptual solutions
or, alternatively, one would have to advance a conceptual solution that is
beyond contestation.  Because the latter has not been shown possible, thus
far, the former remains more attractive.
This outsider position requires redrawing Figure 3 so that the most dis-
tinct group becomes the endorsers rather than the dissolvers (see Figure 6).
majoritarianism from a supra-right to equal political participation.  He argues for the merits of
democracy from within the concept of constitutionalism.  Therefore, both Ackerman and
Tushnet collapse the distinction between democracy and constitutionalism: They privilege one
of the competing concepts by arguing that such privileging is warranted by a proper under-
standing of the other concept.  Ackerman presents himself as the true democrat, even though
he privileges constitutionalism over democracy, whereas Tushnet presents himself as truest to
the constitutional ideal, even though he privileges democracy over constitutionalism.  The pic-
torial expression of this polarization is a loop or a circular continuum.
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FIGURE 6: RELATIONSHIPS: DISCURSIVE MOVES OF PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
This redrawing, however, does not mean that Figure 3 inaccurately rep-
resents the field.  Rather, these are two ways of representing the field: a
focus on discourse itself (Figure 6), or a focus on the effects of discourse
(Figure 3).  As for the latter, it remains correct that, insofar as institutional
prescriptions are concerned, the dissolvers are more distinct.  The endorsers
are not radically different from the deniers and reconcilers in that respect.
After all, they are constitutional democrats, like the deniers and reconcilers.
However, insofar as the discursive strategy is concerned, the dissolvers lose
some of their singularity given the proximity of their strategies to the unity
groups.
Only the endorsement position refuses to hide the choice and value
judgments behind rational, empirical, and conceptual solutions claiming to
resolve or dissolve the foundational tension of modern constitutional democ-
racies.  Endorsers reject both the majoritarian answer of the dissolvers and
the constitutionalist answer of the deniers and reconcilers.  These answers
are equally controversial and fail to command a consensus that would re-
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solve the tension.  Yet acknowledging the irreconcilability of the tension—
that is, the inability to solve it within existing theoretical frameworks—does
not lead endorsers to reject these very theoretical frameworks given their
emphasis on the political aspect of the tension, that is, the lack of agreement.
Further, abandoning the project of legitimacy does not lead endorsers to re-
ject existing constitutional democratic regimes as unjustifiable.  In other
words, they have not abandoned the project of public justification simplic-
iter.  Rather, they only gave up the inter-subjective version of it.  While for
the endorsers as individuals or as reason-givers constitutional democracy is
probably justified (indeed, that is why they endorse the existing institutional
reality), endorsers do not offer a publicly demonstrable and deductively
provable justification that can command consensus.
V. CONCLUSION
Attempts to resolve the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” or the “ten-
sion between constitutionalism and democracy” bring the field of progres-
sive liberal constitutional theory into an evident state of contradiction.
Multiple discursive moves have attempted to answer this tension in order to
justify or critique the practice of judicial review of the validity of legislation.
Different scholars have attempted to provide an indisputable normative pre-
mise to justify non-negotiable principles that legitimatize existing political
regimes.  In search of such a premise, these scholars have turned to founda-
tional concepts like “democracy” and “constitutionalism.”  But these con-
cepts are not useful because they are unspecified.  Thus, scholars have
offered and defended their own conceptions of these concepts.  It then be-
comes evident that each concept has many competing conceptions, and each
concept involves the other in differing ways.  These same concepts lead
prominent scholars to opposite directions, producing the effect of
contradiction.
This state of the field creates a tension between the claims of different
theorists that they have found a solution demonstrating the compatibility of
judicial review with democracy, on the one hand, and the multiplicity of
solutions that fail to bring the debate to a close, on the other hand.  The
former seems to be an attempt to overcome contestation, while the latter
enhances contestation.  That is, by attempting to overcome contestation,
scholars enhance contestation.  Yet, the typology offered in this Article is not
merely a symptom of the fact of contestation in the field, it is also a symp-
tom of the contestability of the main legal and political concepts.  Indeed,
this contestation is an outcome of many competing, rationally appealing the-
ories advanced by highly sophisticated and well-respected leading scholars.
Different theoretical positions (denial, reconciliation, and dissolution) under-
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mine each other by advancing respectable rational arguments against com-
peting positions.450
Many scholars in the field recognize contestability in some form.
Nonetheless, they ignore contestability in practice and continue to advance
certain positions within the field, claiming their own conception is superior
to others’ based on self-defined criteria.  Each scholar further claims that her
theory will provide a consensual basis for legal and political ordering, and
particularly for judicial review.  As such, these scholars still aspire to a cer-
tain degree of closure by attempting to resolve the tension between constitu-
tionalism and democracy.451  They “resolve” the tension, however, only by
papering over disagreement and through definitional fiat.
Despite these theoretical efforts, no single theory has hitherto achieved
consensus or gained wide acceptance, and the debate thus far has been in-
conclusive.  The typology offered in this Article is only one way to organize
theoretical interventions in the debate.  It shows that the proffered theories
are more similar than is normally acknowledged, given their convergence
into certain modes of discourse.  In addition, most of these theories are
loopified in a similar way.  The mapping and typology—as illustrated by
loopification—are symptoms of a circular movement in the debate.  The de-
bate revolves around the tension without addressing it in a satisfactory man-
ner.  Only by collapsing the distinction that gives rise to the tension in the
first place can scholars claim that they are able to resolve the seemingly
irreconcilable tension.  Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that de-
mocracy and constitutionalism are no less contestable and inconsistent at the
end of the intellectual journey than at its beginning.  Thus, the complexity
and richness of the debate is misleading as it conceals this circular move-
ment and the failure to advance the debate.
Not only is the debate not advancing, it is also detrimental to the exami-
nation of specific legal questions in which scholars deploy charges like
“counter-majoritarianism,” “judicial activism,” or “usurpation of power.”
In light of the contestability of competing concepts, these charges, which are
made alternately by progressives and conservatives against rulings they dis-
approve of—for example, Citizens United or Lawrence—become questiona-
ble.  It is difficult to give these charges any determinate meaning.  Far from
clarifying the real issues at stake in specific cases, the introduction of these
charges merely obscures them.  The deployment of such rhetorical charges
further conceals the intractability of political disputes that these cases em-
450 Endorsement contributes to this contestability by critiquing the other positions, but it is
not similarly affected by these positions because endorsers do not attempt to compete with the
other positions.
451 For a discussion of the meaning of closure, see supra note 72. R
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body.452  While these charges deploy shared concepts that everyone can refer
to in public debates, these concepts are virtually empty.
I am not suggesting the strong version of essential contestability, ac-
cording to which no theory might be presented in the future to resolve the
tensions and hence produce rational closure in the field.  I suggest only that
this has not yet been the case, and that it is unlikely that this will be the case
anytime soon within the progressive liberal constitutional field.  This Article
does not offer a solution to the tension between constitutionalism and de-
mocracy.  It provides only a critique of the ongoing attempts to solve the
tension.
While all this in no way proves the failure of contemporary constitu-
tional theorists to justify progressive constitutional democratic or
majoritarian regimes, it allows for a growing sense of skepticism towards the
deployment of competing discursive strategies for this purpose, and hence
skepticism towards the project of legitimacy in general.  After all, the project
is one of public political justification—that is, an attempt to convince ra-
tional or reasonable people in the public sphere.  It is not about the smartest
theory per se, but about a theory’s ability to provide a public political justifi-
cation that can be offered to others as a compelling normative reason that
cannot be reasonably rejected.  This failure might not have been consequent-
ial had the discussion revolved around a less important tension than the one
between constitutionalism and democracy. It is perhaps unsurprising that
progressive liberal theorists attempt repeatedly and in a variety of ways to
rationalize modern democracies, given the perception of foundational ten-
sion and the political stakes.  These repeated and unconvincing attempts sug-
gest an anxiety regarding the contradictory foundations of the political order
as well as an effort to wish the contradiction away and quiet this anxiety.
Nevertheless, all these attempts notwithstanding, the specter of unresolved
tension still looms over the modern liberal polity, and thus the question of
liberal legitimacy remains far from being resolved.
Perhaps it is more fruitful to ask new questions.
452 See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CON-
TEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 5 (1996) (noting that commentators “pretend” that hard
constitutional questions are easy).
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